Encountering Turkish Denialism:
From the Syrian conflict to the Second Karabakh War

Arsen Hakobyan
(Yerevan State University, Armenia)
arshakobyan@gmail.com

Marcello Mollica
(University of Messina, Italy)
marcello.mollica@unime.it

In this article we examine how Armenian Genocide denialism is expressed and why it took place in urban areas and symbolic spaces during the Second Karabakh War. Denialism took the form of a ‘battle’ against Armenian heritage and Genocide-related memorials, from destruction to vandalism, from the heroization of old perpetrators of violence to direct violence against Turkish and diasporic Armenian communities. The denial of the Armenian Genocide penetrated the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Alongside Turkey, Azerbaijan also denies the Armenian Genocide and campaigns against its international recognition. The discussion will address the following questions: How was Turkish denialism symbolically reproduced in the Second Karabakh War narratives as an expression of a political strategy? How was denialism linked to the different urban settings and the transnational context? How was it transferred from the Syrian War to the Karabakh War in terms of symbols, actors and narratives?

Keywords: Denialism, Second Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Syrian conflict, ethno-religious violence.

Dissolving the Temporal Gap

We have recently co-authored, a book titled The Syrian Armenians and The Turkish Factor: Kessab, Aleppo and Deir ez-Zor in the Syrian War currently in publication in the Series ‘Palgrave Studies in Urban Anthropology’ (Mollica and Hakobyan 2021). The book provides an understanding of contemporary events in the Arab Republic of Syria by reading them through the eyes of the Syrian Armenian community, which is a recognized ethno-religious group with religious, confessional, cultural and educational rights. This community was mostly formed in 1915, after the Ուտո ծնվու (Great Crime), an expression used by Armenians to refer to the Armenian Genocide.

In 2003, there were between 65,000 and 90,000 Armenians in Syria (Ayvazyan 2003: 508; Migliorino 2006: 6). In 2017, there were around 28,000, 18,000 of whom lived in Aleppo (Mshetsyan 2017). In February 2019, the General Consul of Armenia in Aleppo, Armen Sargsyan, said that no more that 14,000-15,000 Armenians remained in the city (Mkrtychan 2019). The direct involvement of the Turkish Armed Forces and the Turkoman militia in the Syrian conflict played a major role in Syrian Armenians’ war narratives.

The Turkish government, not only supported the Syrian Opposition but hosted their headquarters. The Turkish Armed Forces (and the factions supported by them) launched three distinct military operations in north-western Syria: Operation Euphrates Shield, August 2016-March 2017; Operation Olive Branch, January 2018; Operation Peace Spring, started on 9 October 2019. The Syrian conflict prompted changes in the attitude of war actors towards the Syrian Armenians and their past and transformed urban realities that were regarded as important symbols of the Armenian diaspora.

Our discussion sheds light on war-related social changes in three urban case studies: Kessab, Aleppo and Deir ez-Zor. Here, conflict-related stories are part of everyday life and a means for actors to express and negotiate their experience. In such a frame, the involvement

---

1 We are grateful to the Board of Urbanities for their comments and suggestions.
of Turkey in the Syrian War, is seen by the Syrian Armenians as an attempt to remove Armenian presence from Syria. The past represents itself in contemporary wartime events, materializing into a constant fear which has penetrated both the Republic of Armenia and other Armenian diasporic settings.

The memory of the Armenian Genocide of 1915-22 is a main marker of Syrian Armenian identity formation and representation. The contemporary involvement of Turkey in the Syrian conflict is seen by Syrian Armenians as a threat with direct links to the past, a past which is reproduced by new events. The symbols of the Armenian Genocide extend to contemporary views, as today’s wartime narratives are linked to a dramatic past, almost dissolving the events’ temporal gap and spatial distance.

**Connecting Armenian Enclaves**

The development of anthropological research in Western urban settings led to a prolonged methodological debate (Prato and Pardo 2013). Pardo and Prato (2010) have pointed out that this also emerged in relation to anthropological research in Mediterranean societies that addressed local communities as if they were isolated in space and time. Since the 1960s, as Pardo and Prato (2010) document, there has been a proliferation of Mediterranean ethnographies, among them Middle East studies addressed mainly the Israeli-Arab conflict, the role of religion in political processes (Fischer 1980), populations’ ethnic composition (Shokeid and Dresden 1982) and nation-state formation dynamics (Aronoff 1986).

In our aforementioned book, we deal with critique of the so-called Mediterraneanist literature that, following the functionalist approach, initially conceived anthropology as the study of isolated’ small-scale societies. There, we also take into account the questions raised by a new generation of ‘Mediterraneanists’. As Prato (2009) has synthesized, when research on urban areas started in the 1930s, the functionalist approach was dominant in anthropology, but there was a lack of appreciation of broader dynamics. Thus, although a few authors tried to consider the wider picture (Boisseveain and Friedl 1975), it is from the late 1980s that this trend took a definite form. Pardo’s (1996) monograph on Naples represents a seminal work in a major Western urban setting that brings together micro- and macro- processes. In this line, we argue that Christian enclaves in the Middle East should not be seen as entities isolated in space and time nor disconnected from the wider regional arena. Marcello Mollica reached similar conclusions in his work on Syrian Orthodox Christians in South Eastern Turkey (Mollica 2011) and on Christians of various denominations in South Lebanon (Mollica 2010). We suggest that these settings are part of wider dynamics and deep-rooted processes that are brought to the fore by war-related events.

**How do Cities Matter?**

The old-standing *vexata quaestio*, ‘how do cities matter?”. In our aforementioned book, we have argued that mass action has probably occurred in different places while addressing the same national issues (Tilly 1993: 274). Nevertheless, we did not mean to say that the occurrence of violence in Middle Eastern cities is an exception, or specifically Middle
Eastern. We have suggested, with Ghrawi et al. (2015: 21), that regional processes of urban modernization that are under the influence of exogenous forces can create specific forms of contention.

In his work on morals of legitimacy, Italo Pardo (1995, 1996, 2000) has argued that people do not always accept as legitimate what is formally deemed legal, nor do they regard as morally illegitimate actions that may fall outside the boundaries of the law (Pardo, quoted in Prato 2019: 30). In turn, an erosion of the legitimacy of the ‘system’ (Pardo and Prato 2019: 5) is engendered by the action of political and governmental bodies that fail to respond to the instances of citizenship (Arendt 1972: 140, quoted in Pardo and Prato 2019), as well as by the distortions of local bureaucracy and the arbitrariness of the law (Fuller 1969, quoted in Pardo and Prato 2019; Pardo 2000). Finally, these occurrences widen the gap between rulers and the ruled (Spyridakis 2019; Pardo and Prato 2019: 5-6).

Pardo and Prato (2019: 8) suggest that the main contemporary debate in this field is inspired by Weber’s theory of different forms of authority and their sources of legitimacy. They suggest that the ‘social-scientific study of legitimacy should recognize the distinction between normative and empirical aspects and produce an analysis of the social construction of legitimacy; that is why people accept or reject a particular form of government and governance’ (Pardo and Prato 2019: 8). They ask, how much more governance failure before legitimacy is withdrawn? In our Syrian case, we asked, how much governance effort is needed before legitimacy can be brought back?

Indeed, alongside their political representation, religious symbols have great importance, especially when their religious meaning is associated with historical memory. It is by reference to a clear symbolism that the action of political actors and factions become understandable and the target audience — in our case, the urban Syrian Armenian communities — could easily identify with them.

We must also note that, the relation between the memory of the Armenian Genocide, its commemoration and the urban space impacted diasporic Armenian settings. This is documented in urban anthropological research on Armenian loci in the Republic of Armenia. One thinks, for example, Marutyan’s (2008) study of loci where monuments were erected to remember Genocide victims in the context of Armenian mourning rites; or Gayane Shagoyan’s discussion (2009, 2011) of natural and social crises, memory and urban space in the city of Gyumri, but also of studies carried out in diasporic settings, such as the Armenian community of Tbilisi (Ponomareva 2014) and that of Saint Petersburg, where cultural markers related to the memory of the genocide are defining components of group solidarity and identity (Brednikova and Chikadze 1998, Angelmyuller 1998).

Exporting Northern Syrian violence to Nagorno Karabakh

On 12 July 2020, when we started writing the Concluding chapter of our book, fighting suddenly erupted on a new front on the Armenian-Azerbaijani northern border, between the Armenian Province of Tavush and the Azeri District of Tovuz. In Armenia, these military actions were linked to new tension on the border between Syria and Turkey. Turkish support
to Azerbaijan in the Karabakh conflict and to Azerbaijani militants involved in the Syrian War were established features. What was new in the July 2020 clashes was that, according to Kurdish, Russian, Syrian and Syrian Armenian information sources, Turkey had started preparing the transfer of Free Syrian Army units to Azerbaijan. This proved not to be simply an allegation, as in October 2020 the involvement of Syrian fighters was confirmed (Sotak 2020).

It was the above event that, after a night-long Skype call, convinced us to embark into a new writing project. Northern Syrian war events reproduced themselves in the Nagorno-Karabakh War. In spite of the lack of geographical continuity between the two regions not only actors and factions were similar, but also the motivations, perceptions and actors’ views of events were perfectly matched. For example, the Free Syrian Army registration points were opened in north-eastern Syria, in Jindires, Rajo and Afrin. However, when on 22 July, the fighting at the Armenian-Azerbaijani border ended, Turkey and Azerbaijan denied the abovementioned allegations. Nevertheless, a narrative developed that pointed to the transnational dimension of the Syrian War, and to the way in which it was linked to Armenian Genocide memory both in the mainland and in diasporic loci.

In our new writing project, we will not simply suggest that Armenian urban settings in Syria were not isolated entities; we will submit that this was also the case in Nagorno-Karabakh. Exogenous forces acting on their own or as part of international coalitions had for instance contributed to creating the current situation in Syria and to its spill-over into neighbouring countries (Mollica 2018). The dynamics that linked the memory of the Armenian Genocide, the Syrian political-military situation and the transnational and international context showed a logical historical progression and political transformation. A case in point is what happened on 13 February 2020, when the Syrian Parliament recognized the Armenian Genocide (Al-Arabiya, 13 February 2020). The resolution was passed in the aftermath of the clashes between the Syria Arab Army and the TAF in the southwest Idlib Governorate area. It gave additional resonance to the Syrian Armenian lieux de mémoire linked to the Genocide, while reproducing old meanings into contemporary conflictual urban spaces and religious settings.

In the Conclusions to The Syrian Armenians and The Turkish Factor, we draw on the seminal study conducted by Avedis Sanjian (1965), who sets his analysis against the background of the Armenian communities’ association with the regional area prior to the advent of the Ottomans. The communities were ‘one segment’ of the Armenian millet of the Ottoman Empire; their history was linked to larger groups in Constantinople and Asia Minor. Syrian communities were presented as a whole because the Armenian National Church was the major institution influencing Armenian community life, including the role that Armenians played in commerce and finance. Sanjian’s analysis of the Armenian millet and the Eastern question helped us to understand and contextualize historically the perceptions of today’s events among the Syrian Armenian communities. We aim to develop similar points about the Nagorno-Karabakh war and show how the Turkish direct involvement reproduces the same
narratives and polices in terms of real and perceived of ethnic and cultural cleansing while also penetrating the memory of the Armenian Genocide.

It is against this background that we will develop our analysis of the Nagorno-Karabakh context. Afterall, the fear of repetition of previous events is a key common theme in our ethnography of Syrian Armenian settings, where it is articulated in a variety of forms. We expect to find a similar fear in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Preliminary Findings
Building upon the findings discussed in The Syrian Armenians and The Turkish Factor, the new book will focus on a number of issues to be compared and contrasted between the Syrian War and the Second Karabakh War. Let us give a brief account of some of the indicative topics that we plan to address.

The Turkish Armenian Community as a Target
Since the beginning of the conflict, public opinion in Turkey focused on the military campaign in Nagorno-Karabakh. Anti-Armenian sentiments and slogans renewed animosity, while anger and protests broke out against Armenian communities, mostly in Istanbul. On 28 September 2020, a large group of cars paraded in front of the Armenian Patriarchate in Kumkapi. On 5 October, anti-Armenian demonstrations took place outside the Azerbaijani Consulate in Besiktas and in Beyazit Square, which symbolically reproduces the Genocidal past because on 15 June 1915 twenty Armenian prominent figures sentenced to death were hanged there. On that October day, convoys carrying Azerbaijani flags circled close to the Hrant Dink Memorial site (Barsoumian 2020).

In the words of Garo Palyan, an Armenian MP the Peoples’ Democratic Party in the Turkish Parliament,

‘Any hate speech towards the Armenian people makes our own citizens an imminent target. The Government is using this conflict for domestic consumption. Armenian-origin citizens have become scapegoats and the object of rising racism and hate speech’ (Palyan quoted in Barsoumian 2020).

In a similar fashion, the Armenian Weekly pointed to the motto, ‘Two states, one nation’. It reported,

‘The slogan essentially declares that the states of Turkey and Azerbaijan belong to the one Turkish nation. It is a dangerous phrase that is repeated by [Recep Tayyip] Erdogan [the Turkish President], [Ilham] Aliyev, their top ministers, newspapers and the public. It is a phrase that harbors genocidal aspirations. It is a phrase that in theory exiles Armenians, Kurds, Alevi, Assyrians and Jews from their borders’ (Barsoumian 2020).

The Issue of Denialism
Istanbul was a contested space linked with the Nagorno Karabakh war because Anti-Armenian sentiments and denialism had been reproduced there also in the past. The Istanbul
Armenian community had been targeted by the ultra-nationalist organization ‘Grey Wolves’ during the 1990’s First Karabakh War. In 1994, the Grey Wolves released an ‘official’ threat against Armenians’ existence in Turkey (Avagyan 2013: 97). More recent threats were made in 2012 and 2015.

Here, genocide denial is understood as an attempt to deny or minimize the scale and severity of a genocide. Denial is indeed an integral part of genocide; it includes secret planning and propaganda while the genocide is ongoing and the destruction of evidence of mass killings. Denialism creates an environment of hate and suspicion. Genocide denials are not just attempts at overthrowing historical facts; they are assaults on those who survived the genocide and on their descendants. Thus, the denialism that led the Turkish state to refuse to admit that the 1915 Armenian Genocide occurred is viewed by the Armenian community as an attack on today’s Armenians and, by extension, on any other minority that raises troubling questions about the status of minorities in Turkey (Siobhan Nash-Marshall 2018).

**The Issue of Resettlements**

The Ottomans used Muslim communities — Kurds, Turkmens and *muhajirs* — as tools of ethno-demographic engineering in pursuing their external policy against the Great Powers and in dealing with internal pressure against the Christian population of the empire, especially Armenians in the eastern provinces and Cilicia. The chronology of the resettlement during the Genocide indicates that the process was synchronized with the cleansing of Armenians from the areas in which the *muhajirs* were to be settled. We discovered that similar dynamics were reproduced in relation to refugees in northern Syria.

During the Nagorno-Karabakh war, Turkey both provided military support to Azerbaijan and engaged in the large-scale recruitment and transfer of Syrians to Azerbaijan; an operation that was carried out by armed factions. Some of these armed operators were affiliated with Jabhat al-Nusra, Firkat Hamza, the Sultan Murad Division and other Salafi factions. Some reports suggest that Syrian mercenaries remained in Azerbaijan after the end of the War. At the same time, those returning from the front suggest that Syrian mercenaries are sending for their family members to join them in Azerbaijan or settle in the southern Nagorno Karabakh areas on the Iranian border that at the end of the war reverted to Azerbaijan (Rubin 2020). Indeed, on 2 February 2021, Stanislav Zas, the Secretary General of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), said that ‘Mercenaries from Syria must leave Nagorno-Karabakh, their activities near the CSTO countries pose risks to the collective security of the Collective Security Treaty Organization’ (RIA Novosti 2021).

According to the Human Rights Organization-Afrin, Turkey engaged in registering ethnic Turkmen from northern Syria with the aim of settling them in Karabakh. Two offices were opened for this purpose in Afrin. As pointed out by Asbarez (2020),

‘According to the human rights watchdog, the effort is being coordinated by Turkish Intelligence Service and the terrorist Grey Wolves gangs who are predominantly pro-Turkey armed factions of Turkmen origin, such as Sultan Murad, Suleyman Shah, al-Hamzat groups.’
Such transnational migration aimed at changing the ethno-demographic composition of Nagorno Karabakh has taken place since the beginning of the conflict. Similarly, in 1989-92 the Azerbaijani government resettled in Nagorno Karabakh Turk Mesketin refugees from Central Asia (Ter Sarkissians 2015).

**The Holy Saviour Cathedral: A Witness of ‘Rebirth’**

The transformation of sacred loci and their profanation during the Syrian War penetrated the transnational dimension. These events were viewed as part of a Turkish ethno-political ideology linked to Turkmen and Turkish factors. In turn, the systematic destruction of the Armenian cultural heritage in Turkey was seen as part of the denialist policy (Cheterian 2015: 65; Chorbajian 2016: 173). In the Armenian narrative, the above paralleled the way in which symbolic and sacred spaces were used in the Karabakh War, as in the case of the Ghazanchetsots (Holy Saviour Cathedral) in Shushi.

For the Armenians of Karabakh, the Ghazanchetsots is a major symbol of history and identity. It was damaged during the March 1920 Azeri massacre of Armenians. During the First Karabakh War, Azerbaijan used the cathedral as an armoury to store missiles. The Cathedral became a main marker of the First and Second Karabakh wars’ narratives.

The transformation of sacred spaces became central in the Armenian narrative concerning the 1991-1994 Karabakh War. Shushi was captured by the Armenian forces on 9 May 1992. The restoration of the Cathedral began immediately and involved the Armenian Diaspora network. The Cathedral was reconsecrated on 18 June 1998. Yulia Antonyan suggested that the reconstruction of the Cathedral was ‘perceived more as a cultural process aimed at a restoration of the Armenian cultural heritage, a spiritual and physical “rebirth” of the Armenian nation’ (2015: 84). The Cathedral symbolized the ‘rebirth’ of Shushi and soon became a popular pilgrimage site for Armenians worldwide (Antonyan 2015). But on 8 October 2020, it was struck twice by the Azerbaijani forces. Two Russian journalists were wounded, one of them seriously (Yeghikyan 2020). According to the Human Rights Watch, this appeared to be a deliberate targeting in violation of the laws of war. It was argued that the Church, a major object of cultural significance, was an intentional target (Human Rights Watch 2020).

Referring to the Armenian Genocide, on 21 October 2020, Raffi Hovannisian, the Armenian Foreign Minister, wrote in the *New York Post* that,

‘the swirling dust kicked up by violence against a Christian house of worship can take back even the most modern-minded Armenian more than a century — to the year 1915’ (Hovhannisian 2020).

---

2 This is a Turkish ethnic group that formerly inhabited the Georgian region of Meskheti and was expelled by Joseph Stalin in 1944 to Central Asia. In 1989, following riots with Uzbek communities, many fled into exile.

3 This cathedral was built between 1868-1887 in a neighbourhood that at the time was inhabited by Armenians from Ghazanchi (Nakhidjеван).
For the International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS), the strikes on the Cathedral were,

‘part of the policy of the cultural genocide that the Azerbaijani government has been implementing over the past 30 years by systematically destroying the Armenian historical heritage’ (Armenpress, 22 October 2020).

_Indoctrination and Schooling_

One of the most symbolic acts, at the end of the Syrian War, was the decision by Erdogan and Aliyev to build a School in the captured city of Shushi. The leader of Turkey’s Nationalist Movement Party (henceforth, MHP), Devlet Bahceli, stated:

‘It is our goal to build a school of nine classrooms in Shusha [in Turkish] by the Ulku Ocaklari Education and Culture Foundation on my personal instructions’ (Bahceli quoted in Persecution.org 2021).

The Ulku Ocaklari (Education and Culture Foundation; full name, Idealist Clubs Educational and Cultural Foundation), is the official name for the Grey Wolves. In 1966, the founder of the Grey Wolves, Alparslan Türkeş, founded the so-called ‘idealist hearts’ (Ulku Ocaklari) (Jenkins 2008: 130). These were ‘local cells designed to attract and indoctrinate students and youth. This recruitment gave rise to the “Grey Wolves”, a fascist militia affiliated to the MHP [Nationalist Movement Party]’ (Bose 2018: 182). The Grey Wolves have often been described as a terrorist organization — even by Governments, like that of Kazakhstan (Hans 2011: 744; Sullivan 2011: 236-237).4

At the end of the war, the Grey Wolves’ leader Devlet Bahçeli announced that the Turkish and Azerbaijani Presidents were expected to lay the foundation of a school in Shushi. Meanwhile, representatives of the MHP and Grey Wolves presented the school project to President Aliyev, during their visit to Baku on 2 February 2021 (Panarmenian.net, 22 February 2021; Dayli Sabah, 2 February 2021).

According to Claire Evans, the International Christian Concern representative for the Middle East, ‘the opening of a Grey Wolf school in Shushi further proves that this war has had strong ideological foundations from its start’ (Persecution.org, 2021).

At the time of writing, the Turkish flag is clearly visible at the entrance of the Shushi border area, where the Azerbaijani control-zone has started since the area was captured by Azeri forces on 8 November 2020. In addition, the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States suggested that in 2022 Shushi should be declared cultural capital of the Turkic World; it stated, ‘We propose Shusha to be declared such capital in 2022 and holding many cultural events’ (Secretary-General of the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States, Baghdad Amreyev, received by President Aliyev on 19 January 2021, quoted in APA. Az 2021).

---

Something similar had happened in Kurdish areas in Northern Syria, where the changed ethno-demographical and cultural landscape involved the establishment of Turkish educational institutions. Two years earlier, in 2019, Arshak Poladyan, the former Ambassador of the Republic of Armenian to Syria (2011-2018), had denounced the start of this process. He stated:

‘The main goal is Turkey’s expansionist ambitions towards northern Syria, Afrin has essentially been annexed. Afrin […] is essentially Turkified. In Afrin they raised the Turkish flags, many faculties of Gazi Aytab [Gaziantep] University are already operating in Afrin, where the Turkish is the language of teaching […]’ (Horizon Shant TV, 15 October 2019).

In Nagorno Karabakh, this process of ‘turkification’ is symbolically reproduced in the towns’ landscape. Once Shushi was conquered, Aram Manukyan street was immediately named after Ataturk. Artur Yeghiazaryan, an Armenian from Shushi, said:

‘The street on which our house is located was named after the founding father of Armenia, Aram Manukyan. Do you know whom the street is named after now? It is not named after the founder of Azerbaijan, but the founder of Turkey, that is, Ataturk’ (News.am, 17 March 2021).

The dichotomy between Aram Manukyan and Ataturk is highly symbolic in terms of both memory and denialism policy. Manukyan (1879-1919) was born in Shushi. He was a leading member of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaksutyun) Party. In 1915, during the Armenian Genocide, he led the successful Armenian self-defence of Van. Manukyan is regarded as the founder of the First Republic of Armenia (1918-1920) (Virabyan 2009). On the other hand, Kemal Mustafa Ataturk is regarded as the founding father of the Republic of Turkey.

Many scholars argue that a main reason for the policy of denial is that the Armenian Genocide enabled the foundation of the Turkish nation-state. Therefore, a recognition of the Genocide would contradict Turkey founding myths. Göçek notes that,

‘The independence of Turkey emerged in direct opposition to the possible independence of Armenia; such coeval origins eliminated the possibility of acknowledging the past violence that had taken place only a couple years earlier on the one hand, and instead nurtured the tendency to systematically remove traces of Armenian existence on the other’ (2015: 19).

Exporting Violence and Denialism: Transnationalism in Progress
The Grey Wolves were directly involved in anti-Armenian and denialist activities during the Second Karabakh War. The Armenian Genocide Memorial in Decines-Charpieu, outside Lyon, France, was defaced with pro-Turkish slogans. The Memorial was daubed with the giant letters RTE in yellow paint with reference to President Erdogan, and the words Grey Wolves, which is a prominent movement in France. A nearby memorial was smeared with an
expletive against Armenia (France 24, 1 November 2020). Pro-Turkish tags appeared in the neighbouring town of Meyzieu, on the walls of the Plantées shopping centre (Yégavian 2021).

Décines-Charpieu had already faced inter-ethnic tension between its Armenian minority and local Turkish communities. On 24 July 2020, about 500 people, including officials, had gathered there to protest against the Azerbaijani attacks on the northern border of Armenia. Despite having received warning calls. Just a few streets away, Gray Wolves members gathered in response to the rally; the security forces prevented masked men branding bars and bladed weapons and shouting ‘Where are the Armenians?’ from assailing Armenian youths. Eventually, a few vehicles were damaged and the window of an Armenian shoe repair shop was broken. Ahmet Cetin, a member of the Grey Wolves who had made anti-Kurdish and anti-Armenian calls on social media for months and filmed himself on the streets of Décines-Charpieu, was later arrested and stood trial for ‘inciting violence or racial hatred’ (Ghazanchyan 16 November 2020).

It was, however, after the defacement of the Armenian Genocide Memorial, on 4 November, that the Grey Wolves organization was officially banned in France (France 24, 2 November 2020).

**Denialism in Progress: Revival and Glorification of Denied Symbols**

Turkey has been accused of using local Turkmen in Kessab and Aleppo. Turkmen were said to have had a leading role in the attacks against Kessab, which for Armenians symbolically reproduced the memory of the Genocide. The Grey Wolves supported Syrian Turkmen in the Syrian War because they consider them kinsmen (Xudosi 2019). MHP and Grey Wolves provided Syrian Turkmen Assembly with relief aid and fighters throughout the Syrian War. Something similar happened in the Second Karabakh War, when Turkey transferred from Syria mercenaries and Salafi-terror groups.

Most fighters who were transferred to Karabakh belonged to the Syrian National Army, SNA (Tashjian, 2020). This coalition today operates in Turkish-occupied Syria and includes members of the Turkmen Sultan Murad Division. Units from this Division were located in the Azerbaijani military base of Horadiz. Other units came from the Hamza Turkmen Division and the Turkmen Sultan Suleyman Shah brigade — the Al Amshat militia (Tashjian 2020). The Sultan Murad Division is a Syrian-Turkmen group that fought against the Syrian Arab Army and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces. This group receives support from Turkey. The Hamza Division is a Turkish-trained group that participated in the 2018 Operation Olive Branch to conquer the Afrin canton. The Al Amshat faction operates in Afrin canton and is led by Muhammad al Jassim, the commander of the Suleyman Shah Syrian-Turkmen brigade (Pugliese 2020). Imbued with pan-Turkish ideology, these three groups were experienced in urban clashes, having fought in Aleppo and Afrin. This expertise was

---

5 In December 2017, Turkey brought together all Syrian Arab and Turkoman military forces and founded the SNA; it consisted of 80,000-100,000 fighters (Tashjian 2020).
relevant, as the main target of Azeri Army was Stepanakert, the capital of Nagorno Karabakh.6

A 41-year-old Syrian Armenian man interviewed in Yerevan in November 2020 recalled that in mid-September 2020, just before the start of the Second Karabakh War, he had a meeting with an old Syrian Arab Army friend, a Turkman from Syria who had migrated to Istanbul and became businessman, and other Syrian Turkmens. They were all interested in Nagorno Karabakh. Our informant explained what was going on. They were surprised and said that they knew a different version of the story: ‘We were told other things’, they said. Our informant then found that they had strong anti-Russian feelings: they said that Russia had occupied Syria and the same was going to happen in Azerbaijan. For our informant, ‘they were brainwashed’.

On the one hand, Armenian public narratives often describe Turkey’s role in the Second Karabakh War as a continuation of the Armenian Genocide, particularly given Turkey’s continuous denial of the Armenian Genocide (Safi and McKernan 2020, Hincks 2020, Reuters 2020). Interestingly, on 10 December 2020, Erdogan delivered a speech at a military parade in Baku, symbolically reproducing a denialist narrative while turning the past into an ‘heroization’. Referring to the leaders involved in the 1915 massacres against Armenians, he said: ‘Today, may the souls of Nuri Pasha, Enver Pasha, and the brave soldiers of the Caucasus Islam Army be happy’ (Erdogan quoted in The Armenian Mirror Specter, 11.12.2020). In a report, the International Christian Concern (ICC) pointed out that the speech of the Turkish President, was ‘highlighting the narrative which is being pursued domestically by both countries [Turkey and Azerbaijan]. The language was purposefully cloaked in such a way that foreigners would have difficulty understanding the symbolism, but locals would grasp the full meaning’ (International Christian Concern 2021: 7).

Enver Pasha, the Ottoman Minister of War, was sentenced to death in absentia for the planning and execution of the Armenian Genocide. Later, in 1922, he died in battle with the Bolsheviks in Central Asia, killed by the Armenian Red Commander Hakob Melkumov (Suny 2015: 336, 346). On 10 July 1918, Enver Pasha had created the Islamic Army of the Caucasus, under the command of his half-brother, Nuri Pasha, in order to establish control in Eastern Transcaucasia (previously Russian Empire’s Baku and Elizavetpol provinces). This Army of Islam was a military unit of the Ottoman Empire (Erickson 2001: 189) meant to unite all Turkic nations under the banner of Islam and to capture the oil fields of Baku. On 15 September 1918, the Army took Baku and massacred between 10,000 to 30,000 Armenians (Hovannisian 1967: 227, 312). At the end of September 1918, Turkish units captured Shushi.

Ottoman and Islamic Army’s atrocities against Armenians in Transcaucasia are today considered part of the Armenian Genocide (Dadrian 1995, 347-355). When at the end of the First World War, the Ottoman Empire had to withdraw its troops from the Transcaucasia, British troops replaced them. Nuri Pasha was arrested and held in detention in Batumi (Georgia) awaiting trial. However, in August 1919, his supporters ambushed the guards

---

6 Later, a SNA military school in Ras al Ayn was renamed after Adel Al Shair, a prominent leader of the Hamza group killed in Nagorno Karabakh (Geghanyan 2020).
escorting him and helped him escape to Erzurum (Hovannisian 1982: 136-137). Yeghia Tashjian, a Lebanese Armenian researcher, has recently analysed these historical developments, including the Turkish involvement in the Second Karabakh War via Turkoman groups. He described the event as ‘Erdogan’s Enver Pasha Dream: The Revival of the “Army of Islam”’ (Tashjian 2020).

Mane Gevorgyan, Prime Minister of Armenia’s spokesperson, condemned the glorification of the ideology of the Young Turks (Armenpress, 10 December 2020). The Emirate-based Ahval News wrote that,

‘The Ottoman-style celebration in the Azeri capital of Baku on Thursday [10 December, 2020] – with hundreds of Turkey elite soldiers from Turkey present — gave Erdogan the opportunity to elaborate on his expansionist vision’ (Baydar 15.12 2020).

In July 2020, Erdogan had stated that they were going
‘to continue to fulfil the mission of their grandfathers, which was carried out a century ago in the Caucasus’ (Report on Xenophobia in Azerbaijan 2021, 33). According to IAGS this was: ‘a direct threat of continuing the Armenian genocide’ (Armenpress, 22.10. 2020).

On 30 January 2021, Erdogan wished a ‘blessed’ Friday to Turkey’s Muslim citizens, attaching a picture of the Armenian Cathedral of Kars that was converted into a mosque. In captioning the photo on social media, he added: ‘May our Friday be blessed, my dear brother/sister’ (Panarmenian.net, 30 December 2020). The following day, Turkey and Azerbaijan began a large-scale joint military exercise near the city of Kars, close to the Armenian border; the exercise ended on 12 February. For Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty this was ‘the latest sign of deepening ties between the Turkic allies after Turkey threw its weight behind Azerbaijan in its victory against Armenian forces of Nagorno-Karabakh’ (RFE/RL 02.02.2021).

Kars was the capital of the Armenian Bagratid Kingdom between 928 and 961. During this period, the Cathedral of the town, later known as the Church of the Holy Apostles, was built. It was to experience a troubled history. The Cathedral ceased to function as a church and was converted into a mosque in 1579, under the Ottomans. Then, between the 19th and the 20th centuries, during the Russian Empire, it was converted into a Russian Orthodox Church. In 1918-19, when it fell again under Ottoman control, it was reconverted into a mosque. Following the Armistice of Mudros (1918), the Turkish Army was required to withdraw to the pre-war frontier. So, the Republic of Armenia gained control of the city and the Cathedral was reconverted into an Armenian church. But in 1920 Kars was reconquered by Turkey, and the Cathedral again operated — briefly — as a mosque; soon, however, the Kemalist government put it up for sale. The municipality of Kars bought it with the intention to demolish it and build a school on its site, but the plan was never carried out. In the 1950s, the municipality used the monument as a depot for petroleum. Later, between 1964 and 1978,
it functioned as a Museum. When the museum was moved to a new site, the building lay derelict. In 1993, it was reconverted again into a mosque, under the name of Kümbet Mosque. According to The Economist (15 January 2015), this conversion of a museum into a mosque is a clear example of the attempt to eradicate the Armenian cultural heritage from Turkey.

This dramatic past, which has played a major role in the wider Armenian community, seems to re-emerge today both in Syria and in Nagorno Karabakh.

Conclusions
The Second Karabakh War became a terrain where Turkish involvement reproduced new forms of denialism of the Armenian Genocide as a complex whole of political practices and narratives. Throughout the war context, it included both Turkish and Azeri denialism. Denialism became part of the ideology of the Second Karabakh War because the war employed symbols, narratives and practices of denial. These were linked to transnational actors (Syrian Turkmen, Grey Wolves) and penetrated a transnational dimension (Shushi streets and heritage, Armenian Genocide Memorials in France) in a framework of denialism and exportation of violence.

The Turkish attempt to change the ethno-demographic composition of Nagorno Karabakh through cultural engineering and a process of Turkification builds upon contemporary Northern Syrian events and past genocidal events. In such a frame we note the exportation of violence from Northern Syria to the South Caucasus through the employment of anti-Armenian, ideologically-driven Syrian Turkmen militants. This process draws on transnational links to reproduce denial narratives and convert them into violence against Armenian diasporic communities. It seems not to be accidental that during the Second Karabakh War the first Armenian community to be targeted was that dwelling in Istanbul, where space, victims and persecutors were nominally the same as in 1915. A logical ideological progression of this transnational spatial and symbolic dimension reproduced denial narratives by glorifying Genocide-related prominent icons such as Enver and Nouri Pasha and the Caucasus Islamic Army, and by blatantly appropriating religious symbols (the Kars Armenian Cathedral) and linking them with war games, including military parades in Baku or Turkish-Azerbaijani military exercises at the Turkish-Armenian border.

References


