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The Housing Crisis and Homelessness: A San Francisco Ethnography

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Homelessness is the result of many factors. The nature of homes, or rather places of residence, versus temporary camps has been defined historically and culturally for the human species. Many animals create structures to live in, others excavate depressions. Still others live in caves or inhabit structures built and discarded by other creatures. In many cases animals simply find limited shelter in temporary settings — to avoid weather conditions or to rest — building nests to sleep in or utilizing existing foliage. Over the past two million years humans have behaved in all these ways. Human-made structures are relatively new, appearing in the last half million years, and some peoples continue to build only temporary windbreaks. The term ‘homelessness’ is a modern classification, although historical sources refer to its varieties. Most modern discussions of homelessness describe it as a phenomenon of modern industrial society created by the inequalities inherent in modern capitalism. This analysis of a specific community in San Francisco describes complex interactions that developed into what can be called, although temporary, a local ‘community’ among the homeless, local residents and business. This unexpected outcome provides insight and gives caution to contemporary planners and policy makers across the globe.

Keywords: Homelessness, housing, cross-cultural, urbanism, hobos, economics.

Introduction
The current credit crisis is often blamed on the crisis in the housing industry, but this crisis in the industry is rooted in the problems of housing America’s population. How much housing is needed? What kind of housing is to be built and how big should these houses be? The most significant question is: How expensive or ‘affordable’ should the housing be? Reductions in income cause some people to move in with friends and family and pressure on individuals can result in job or housing losses. Living in cars or in the street is one way of surviving and also maintaining one’s social connections in a neighbourhood. Interactions between the once housed and then homeless with former workers, bosses and neighbours is a complex task. Homelessness helps to create a multi-dimensional neighbourhood where people’s identities and spaces are temporary yet continue to define who they are. The extent of this phenomenon depends upon how dynamic their performance of self is required to survive.

In the past 50 years, after comprehensive studies of development practices in the USA and abroad, it has become clear to many architects, planners and social scientists that high density inner cities and sprawling suburbs produced not only economic and social problems like congestion and pollution, but also disease, both physical and psychological. In this article I present an analysis of the local environment and the way people negotiate their identities in various social contexts within the built environment. I agree with Harris (1988) that ethnographic fieldwork produces valuable information on human activities. Criticisms of fieldwork as distorting data produced by ideologically motivated agents is also unsupported by the evidence, though bias is a culturally constructed framework that has long been well understood. Some social scientists believe that theory is the only pure activity necessary to achieve knowledge, a considerable return to the armchair approach of the 19th Century, but the emphasis on theory can be just as distorting as a lack of organization and direction in fieldwork.

1 The final version of this article has benefited from the comments and criticism of three anonymous reviewers.
The field study material presented here is compared with studies made over the last century and provide a check on the nature of human action defined as ‘homelessness’. Some aspects of economic behaviour are described in this study, though not to the extent of that done by Pardo (1992). His study of metropolitan Naples shares a number of features with my study, both in its emphasis on use of the environment by different groups as well as interactions between different members of socioeconomic groups and their negotiating identities within these spaces and transactions. Prato and Pardo (2013) have contextualized urban anthropology as it has developed over the past 100 years and described its relationship to sociology and urban planning. Anthropologists became concerned with cultural change beginning with Rivers, Seligman and Haddon’s experiences in the Torres Strait Expedition in 1898. The horrors they found as indigenous people fell under the sway of colonial powers and the crushing products of industrial society led Haddon to change his discipline to Anthropology from Biology. Some way was needed to reduce these effects or at least to document these cultures, and languages, before they passed away. Haddon was shocked by the wanton destruction by missionaries of native cultures, especially their art and artefacts. Similarly, indigenous practices in native towns and cities were quickly impacted by military, missionary and mercantile needs.

In the years following WWI, but especially after WWII, anthropologists became disturbed by the effects of colonial rule and the accelerating destruction of native cultures. A few studies of urban settings were produced, generally they were superficial summaries like those by Sjoberg (1960) and Hull (1976), some limited their focus to small scale village or town life. By the late 1950s a number of new research techniques were beginning to bear fruit in the study of urban environments. There appeared to be significant differences between the work of social anthropologists in Europe, the UK and USA. These discrepancies led to a meeting organized by Raymond Firth to bring together those working in Africa, Europe, the USA and Central and South America in 1962. The gathering resulted in a volume edited by Banton (1966) which included articles by Mitchell on urban studies in Africa, Eric Wolf on South America, Mayer in India and others on Europe and the UK. These were developed to present and discuss new methods (as in the use of network analysis, sets and social field) in a collaborative setting. However, many African-American anthropologists found that these new techniques and approaches did not correct cultural bias inherent in the earlier work and a collection of their criticism appeared in 1999 (Harrison and Harrison eds 1999).

Cities and towns have often been regarded by some societies and religions as detrimental to morals and spiritual ideals. The famous prohibition of Isaiah (5:8) from the King James Bible, is one example: ‘Woe to those who join house to house, who add field to field, until there is no more room, and you are made to dwell alone in the midst of the land’. Although the New Living Translation Bible gives a different meaning: ‘What sorrow for you who buy up house after house and field after field, until everyone is evicted and you live alone in the land’. In a comprehensive world-wide study of cities, the United Nation’s Habitat’s State of the World’s Cities (2006) demonstrated that in terms of health people living in cities were not better off and sometimes worse that those living in rural areas. Davis’ (2006) analysis of expanding cities and suburbs argued that they leave little space for social interaction and produce crowded, poorly serviced living areas that are ripe for violence and crime. As to the Modern Movement in
architecture, the production of multi-storey, densely designed tenements was common in the late nineteenth century in America and even earlier in England. It is reasonable to say that throughout human history density has been relative, given the contrast in lifestyle between nomadic people and sedentary early urban societies.

A Space Problem not a Housing Problem: An Ethnography of Homelessness
The South of Market area in San Francisco has a long history of occupation by immigrants and workers amid scattered factories. The area was considerably depressed in the 1970s as many factories moved to lower rent locations in other parts of the Bay Area. Population shifts due to S. F. Redevelopment Agency activity in the eastern sector of the area resulted in the demolition of factories and single-room occupancy buildings. A general area plan emphasized clearance and redevelopment (Hartmann & Averbach 1974).

Some urban ethnographies focus on local people’s economic activities, as in the case of Mathews’ (2011) study of Chungking Mansions, Bourgois’ (2003) study of Puerto Rican drug merchants, and Pardo’s (1992) study of ordinary Neapolitans, which brings to the fore how people adapt to immediate economic opportunities with entrepreneurial creativity. Peripherally, in these studies we learned how people use housing as a temporary platform for economic survival. Mathews describes how merchants from Africa and India used the premises of Chungking Mansions as a multinational market using the smaller and cheaper spaces to carry out better their long-distance trade. For Bourgois, living spaces are temporary locations negotiated within fragile adult male and female relationships that dramatically affected changing patterns in New York’s economy, as well as racist concepts concerning minorities and female roles in the economy. In these circumstances, children learn not only the temporary nature of housing — moving between nuclear family arrangements to grandparents — but also the temporary nature of domestic male status.

In the present article, I focus on outdoor spaces and how home and the idea of ‘home’ is constructed by homeless individuals, local residents and workers. In 1980, I began living in the South of Market area on Fifth and Folsom Streets. Then, the presence of homeless individuals was minimal and relatively unnoticed by most residents. After the 1989 earthquake many buildings became uninhabitable and attracted homeless and semi-homeless individuals (drug users and suppliers, artists and sexual adventurers). The latter were partly homeless by choice as they used abandoned buildings as temporary locations for their activities and had, or claimed to have, other residences. My research project changed in nature when I moved out of the area in 1992, but occasional research trips continued into 2010.

My field research and choice of informants took the traditional form suggested by Pelto (1970), especially regarding gaining acceptance in the local homeless community. Studies of community have taken various forms since Arensberg and Kimball (1968) attempted to direct attention to this specific area of research. I spent much time with the local business and art communities and attempted not to align myself with either group yet form friendships and develop common ground for discussions. I avoided taking notes in front of respondents, but regularly jotted comments and brief sketches about interactions and central conversations (Emerson, Fretz and Shaw 2011).
Often local residents were involved in the interviews with homeless individuals. This had two *effects*. It allowed for a check on interviewer bias and also provided the opportunity for later conversations between the homeless individuals and these residents. This also allowed for hearsay and eavesdropping information, which has been found to be valuable by a number of researchers — both recent and in classical anthropology (Emerson, Fretz and Shaw 2011; Malinowski 1929).

To a certain extent, this research project could be said to draw on ‘participant observation’ as it was conducted in the context of the personality of the researcher known to the homeless individuals who also knew (in many cases) where he lived and some also visited his residence. The participation of a few female residents allowed a cross check for gender interpretations and discussions as well as the hearsay and eavesdropping data and reflected benefits of both participant observation and multivocality in research design.

**Types of Homes**

Since this study addresses homelessness, it seems appropriate to attempt a definition or at least a background context for what homelessness is, and a sketch of the urban environment in which it is most often described as a problem.

Studies of how people live and organize their living spaces are not new. One thinks of Lewis Henry Morgan’s comprehensive study of Native Americans, *Houses and House-Life of the American Aborigines*, published in 1881 and Edward T. Hall’s *The Hidden Dimension* published in 1956. The latter focused on the optimum space for people to live and work effectively from a cross-cultural perspective, with the least detrimental outcomes. In some contexts, homelessness and poverty are associated with the stranger. Ibn Abi l-Hadid, (1963-4) noted this regarding the poetry of Halaf al-Ahmar (d.796 C.E.): ‘Don’t think that a stranger is the one who is far away! Rather, a stranger is the one who has little or nothing (al-muqill).’

In the 1960s a transformation of housing took place under a number of architects, including Mies van der Rohe and Frank Lloyd Wright. Since then, a wave of criticism has appeared of the theories of modern housing, especially where large housing projects in the post-WWII period were associated with crime and poverty. In Europe, Le Corbusier’s projects have been blamed for the negative social conditions that contributed to the recent riots in France and those in the 1980s and 1990s in England (Aspden 2006).

**The Character of Homelessness**

Forms of housing and homelessness were discussed in numerous articles in the American Anthropology Association’s newsletter *AN* in December 2008. Recently, ways of living and of ordering people in different societies and in different economic systems have been important issues in the popular media, but without the input of anthropologists.

In her book on continuities in cultures Margaret Mead (1965) emphasized that often housing has encoded instructions for life and guidelines for behaviour in its design and
construction, as well as the landscape in which it is set. We should indeed be more concerned with how people respond to changes in housing. My experience with people being relocated from various areas of San Francisco by the Redevelopment Agency in the 1960s and 1970s taught me the truth of Max Weber’s (1948 [1904–5]) reflections on mass relocations in nineteenth-century Europe.

Nevertheless, we must consider carefully the choices people make about housing, or to refuse housing. The suppression of neighbourhoods in nineteenth-century Paris and the creation of wide boulevards made cities easier to control by authorities. Today’s cities are monuments for transient life, with a workforce without job security and an atomized population without coherence or roots. Increasingly, people are periodically homeless, transhumant between temporary living arrangements and jobs.

‘Voluntary’ and Economic Homelessness

Homeless individuals have existed throughout human history. In some cases, they have been known as sages, like Confucius and many other thinkers and teachers of his time in China. Similarly, in India the sadhus and sramana, or holy men, wander in the forests and towns (Hartsuiker 1993). The Mediterranean has a long history of secular and holy ascetics and saints who acquired their daily bread by begging. Travelers have often found refuge in towns and cities, in temples or parks (Nels 1961, Weaver and White eds 1972). Today homelessness and the homeless, however, are generally regarded in economic terms. Tolerance of the homeless can be measured in cultural and economic terms throughout history. This is also reflected in the history of terms used to characterize homeless individuals. In parts of the USA, especially in the 19th and early-20th century, homeless or transient workers were often called ‘hobos’ or ‘tramps’ or ‘vagrants’, depending on their availability for work (Bruns 1980, Higbie 2003) or local concepts of criminality (Cook 1979). Indigenous people without established homes are often called nomads or pastoralists, depending on their technology and ethnic origins. They may also be classed as hunters and gatherers. Notably, economic change can upset established long-term relationships and produce homeless individuals from an underclass, as in 16th- to 19th-century England (Polanyi 1944). Temporary urban settlement, or homelessness, caught the attention of many 19th-century sociologists and historians, including Max Weber (1958), as temporary residence has had a role in economic development and urbanization.

Robert Ezra Park, was among the first to study the domain of the homeless (Park 1952), following the work of McKenzie (1933) on the ecology of communities. McKenzie and Park had witnessed the dynamic mobility of Americans during the Depression and WWII and were interested in how quickly people adapted to changes of residence and homelessness (Park, Burgess and Mckenzie 1967). What is most interesting in their work, in regard to contemporary problems with those homeless, is the idea of domain that people construct about themselves, their residence and the environment. In contrast, Bohannan and Curtin’s (1971) survey of post-WWII neighbourhoods in developed countries show that ethnic enclaves, paralleling Medieval

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2 In developed countries these ancient patterns imported from aboriginal contexts are used in the design of the most expensive housing (Lawlor 1994).
cities (Sjoberg 1960), have become largely replaced by land and property marketed as investments reducing choices for self-identified communities. They conclude that by the 1970s communities were mainly formed by realtors and developers and no longer by cultural membership choices. This may be a consequence of the decline in the generational representation of wealth in locations and homes.

Definite differences exist in homelessness, its relation to life history and its duration and form between men and women (Passaro 1996). People who are homeless are often temporarily so, and regard the condition as one that is of a desired or necessary short duration. Often these are alcoholics who abandoned their homes to ‘binge’ or to escape the confinement of home, spouse or job routine. Neighbours and city authorities tolerate such individuals according to their cultural traditions, religious background, education and the standing of the individuals in the community (Asander 1980, Guzewicz 2000). So, such ‘temporary’ homelessness allows some people to maintain a degree of resilience in their relationships. The domain of homelessness exists in an extended home and status in the community. The community tolerates the behaviour as an extension of the functional life of some individuals. Some scientists see certain forms of economic homelessness as an increasing aspect of modern life — where people are often one pay check from losing their residence — that reflects a lack of stability; for example, in economic conditions and social welfare (Jencks 1994, Barak 1991). In 2008, the head of San Francisco’s homeless programme, Daruish Kayhan, commented on the difficulties in dealing with homelessness in a citywide study (Nevius 2008). San Francisco has apparently succeeded in reducing some forms of homelessness and overall numbers of habitual forms as the result of the City’s ‘Care not Cash’ programme. In this programme, cash allocations in the form of welfare payments were replaced by individual provision for shelter and supplies. This programme’s success contradicts the World Bank reports that cash allocations to the poor are more effective means of providing assistance that leads to sustained incomes out of poverty. San Francisco’s results parallel those in New York City reported in March 2009 (NYCDHS 2009). However, the methods used to count those homeless are varied and under some criticism (Marcus 2006, O’Connor 2009, Allday 2009, Harrell 2009) and, given the current economic crisis, we should see numbers of homeless go up in the near future. Data provided by a San Francisco Chronicle study indicate, however, that by June of 2014 there has been little change in the number of homeless individuals, and that about 19,500 people have been moved off the streets into various forms of lodging (Knight 2014). While Noy (2009) argues that various actors in the city failed to cooperate and thus wasted efforts and resources, it is also possible that the new numbers represent the massive relocations and evictions of low-income people due to rent increases, changes in properties from rentals to tenants in common or ‘owner move in’, and renovation projects allowed under the Ellis Act (Sabatini 2014). Nevertheless, New York’s homeless numbers show the same resilience to programme change with the New York Coalition for the Homeless reporting homeless on the streets in excess of 62,000 (NYCH 2017). New York City’s Department of Homeless Services also provides similar numbers (NYDPS 2017).

Arguments have also been made that many of the homeless are veterans, former mental health patients and victims of failed health care programmes. In a comprehensive analysis, Bourgois and Schonberg (2009) addressed these issues and the tendency to criminalize
homelessness. In some cases, as in my research in San Francisco, those homeless provide long-term services for residences; they watch homes when residents are at work or cars at night, or keep tabs on neighbours and in some cases, watch the activities of police.

Many communities have attempted to eliminate homelessness and some, as in New York, have been rather successful but only temporarily. Usually these efforts are temporary, as municipalities often cannot afford to continue to direct resources to prevent homelessness, and campaigns to do so are usually politically motivated and short-lived. It seems that the first problem to overcome is addressing the attitude about homelessness as an acceptable alternative lifestyle that people are free to choose. This is a cultural and legal issue. To eliminate homelessness requires the provision of resources that most public entities do not have, ethically prohibit, or cannot deliver effectively. Most municipalities do not have a history of a consistent social policy necessary to deal with such a problem. Since homelessness has been with us since the appearance of cities, perhaps we also need to consider its benefits.

The South of Market Milieu
In 1980 I moved into an industrial building where several artists had been relocated. This followed the eviction of ‘squatting’ artists of the Goodman Building in the west Tenderloin/Central City district of San Francisco. Artists were moving to the South of Market area and out of the Haight, Castro, Fillmore and Tenderloin districts due to increased pressure in housing costs spurred by renovations and real estate speculation. Between 1980 and 1989 this process was characterized in the press as a transition to a ‘live-work’ ghetto for artists, but by the late 1980s old warehouses had been renovated and turned into commercially available ‘live-work’ condominiums occupied by professionals. Evictions of artists began to be a routine event as a truce between artists and the city’s planners and public health authorities gave way to open condemnation of artist housing.

The 1989 earthquake put a temporary stop to this process only to resume with renewed vigour in the guise of determinations that many buildings formerly occupied by artists were now damaged and uninhabitable and unsafe. Many were tagged for demolition, others were abandoned. Thus began another transition involving large numbers of transients and homeless individuals, the potential value of the abandoned buildings, and police enforcement of vagrancy laws. Long-time artist residents and blue-collar workers responded with some concern, and mass meetings to fight evictions succeeded in obtaining temporary permits for artist live-work spaces. The issue of the new homeless began to be addressed.

As with the process of relocation of low-income residents that had been perfected by the Redevelopment Agency in San Francisco in other areas, the process in the South of Market area was organized and efficient. Officially managed public relations efforts were combined with

3 There have been towns in history without homeless individuals, but these are unique cultural and historical situations.
4 This was one of six buildings that were either residential or artist live-work spaces.
5 This project followed an earlier one located in the Western district.
6 Owners were given assurances that if buildings were damaged, permits and processing renovations and rebuilding of sites would be given priority. The removal was thus accelerated.
community meetings by the Planning Department and Police to facilitate removal and relocation. Most of these meetings were advertised to provide information and services and still held out the idea that some residents would be allowed to stay if certain code violations would be corrected.

Observations of Homelessness and Business/Resident Response

My observations from late-1980 to 1989 suggested a distinct character of the homeless situation in South of Market. It was generally minimally visible and there was a low impact on residents and business owners. The central research area was between Fourth Street and Fifth and Folsom and Harrison. This area consisted largely of two-story commercial buildings of brick or concrete construction, with a few wood-frame buildings. There were no vacant lots, with the exception of a parking lot on the corner of Fifth and Folsom on the north side that had been a parking lot during the entire study period (1980-2010). Nearly half the buildings housed sole-owner small businesses. Thirty percent were partnerships with single location businesses, and the remainder were occupied by artists and a few outlets of larger corporations (for example, a gas station). There were few vacancies, and artist occupation of buildings began to rise from 1970 to 1980. This reached a high point in 1985 when rents began to rise, especially long-term rents signed in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The area was starting to attract businesses to its new ‘bohemian’ atmosphere and cheap rents.

An unlicensed homeless centre opened in the late 1980s in the middle of the block on the south side, but was quickly closed down due to check-cashing fraud which brought nightly police intervention. The centre temporarily increased the visibility of the homeless in the area, but this quickly subsided. From 1980 to 1989 the visibility of homeless individuals remained stable and the local meetings of residents and businesses focused on problems surrounding housing, weekend violence and drunkenness, and legal and illegal dance clubs and bars. Informal surveys of homeless (never taken with a clipboard or obvious writing instruments) demonstrated a number of ‘regulars’ who moved from Market Street to Harrison Street where there was a Freeway grassy area. This was used as a congregation point and trading centre on a daily and weekly basis; that is, some people attended daily, while others only visited once a week. Numbers ranged from under 10 in the winter to over 25 in summer. Most slept in the alleyways between Folsom, Harrison and Howard in nooks between buildings or in recessed fronts that provided some shelter from wind and rain.
Figure 1. This photograph was taken by A. Sheldon, a resident on Folsom Street in 1990 at night, seconds after having heard glass break.

As already noted, visibility of the homeless was low and interviews with business owners and workers tallied with residents’ ideas that it was not a problem that few homeless individuals used the area. Some business owners provided water, sellable recyclable materials and occasional meal, and some clothing to particular homeless individuals; others simply ignored them. A few business owners and residents repeatedly said that they had seen homeless individuals regularly pick up trash and dispose of it in proper receptacles. I observed this several times, but the same individual was responsible on each occasion. Another claim, less often reported in my surveys, was that homeless individuals spread garbage or set fire to it. I could not verify these claims. However, I did once observe a resident of the East Bay who stopped her car (a BMW) outside our warehouse at Fifth and Folsom and placed a large bag of her household garbage in our garbage can. She defended her action saying that we had large garbage cans and she did not and she had routinely done this for several years. This behaviour was common and contributed to the presence of garbage and of people from outside searching for drugs, sex and ‘joyriding’. Thus the residents of the South of Market area could be said to suffer from a variety of negative contacts from outsiders. Women who lived there often reported being shadowed by cars or approached by men who suggested sex for money.

Another aspect of the neighbourhood was the economic behaviour involving the homeless, semi-homeless and residents. Some businesses functioned as banks, in that they cashed checks for people who had no bank accounts. Harvey’s (Figure 2), a liquor and grocery store, was run by a middle-aged Chinese-American businessman who was a long-term resident of the city and whose children and relatives worked for him. He allowed the homeless, and many residents and workers, to establish ‘tabs’ listing merchandise they had taken on credit. Harvey discounted interest on tabs depending on how people paid. Some made partial payments

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7 That a regular group did use the area was not lost on many, but the idea of a general problem was absent.
8 I use this term, conveyed to me by a man in his late 20s who said he lived in Palo Alto, as a catchall expression for adventure or unusual experiences.
weekly, others monthly and some asked for more credit to skip payments. People who did not have a bank account could also deposit money with Harvey for safekeeping. He would offer chits or account letters of balances and deduct from them credit and purchases.

Figure 2. Harvey’s Place circa 2010. Photograph by Niccolò Caldararo.

In the 1980s and 1990s bicycle messengers accounted for a large proportion of his clientele and many, like homeless individuals and other residents and workers, engaged in a vibrant local money changing business where cash, checks and food stamps would be exchanged at a discount for cash or for goods and services not authorized by the issuer. This behaviour, which he neither encouraged or discouraged, took place outside Harvey’s, and when I asked him about it, he simply shook his head and said, ‘People have to eat’.

Many local businesses provided aid to the homeless; some at the initiative of employees, some by the owners or both. Harvey acted as both a business and a charity and I often wondered how he balanced his books in the end. I was sure he took losses with his customers but also that the risk they represented provided significant potential for gain in interest, in charges and in the fees for services. He often stored people’s valuables, allowed use of his telephones, provided a message service and other useful services for a fee. So, Harvey was a bank, but played a role that regular banks eschewed. By charging interest, he was able to cover his losses from bad loans, but he provided credit and food to people who had no other recourse.

After the Earthquake

On 17 October 1989 at 5.04 PM the San Francisco Bay Area experienced a 6.9 magnitude earthquake. Buildings were severely damaged in several parts of the city and across the wider area. The Bay Bridge was closed and some Freeway sections collapsed or were damaged. Fires broke out in a number of places and some people were killed by falling debris. In my study area, many buildings were ‘red-tagged’ and could not be occupied. Others were ‘yellow-tagged’ — meaning that occupation was limited until the buildings could be inspected. Still others were ‘white-tagged’; that is, judged to be undamaged and suitable for use.

Almost immediately people tried to remove their possessions from the buildings. In the first nights after the earthquake there were no lights on the block. Residential buildings were
empty of occupants in the first week. In the second week two buildings were re-occupied by their tenants. A strange silence fell over the block day and night, broken only by trucks and cars arriving to carry away possessions or bringing workers to attempt repairs. A considerable disagreement developed between residents and the inspectors from City departments concerning the level of damage and safety. At night, some residents entered their buildings to take away their belongings. I helped one group.

In the second week, we began to notice a change among the local homeless population. I had not seen my usual informants in the first week. In the second, some returned. By the third week their numbers increased. Larger groups usually included ‘caravans’ of five to ten individuals of mixed sex and age moving in with shopping carts, dogs and cats from across Market Street; that is, north to south. In the nine years prior to the earthquake the local homeless population included one child and one animal, a cat. The new groups of homeless had more of both. On one weekend in March 1990 I counted three children in one afternoon. Over the next 90 days, interviews with a number of new homeless revealed that police pressure was a factor in their movement. There also seemed to be an increase in private security firms unfamiliar with homeless individuals which were pressing them to move from North Beach/Chinatown and the Financial District across Market.

Prior to the earthquake, residents and business employees seldom reported car break-ins. After the earthquake, these increased dramatically. Many car owners sought garages to place their cars in both day and night. They were few and expensive. Some homeless individuals were found in cars in the morning; appearing to have broken into them. They argued that the cars were already broken into and they just took the opportunity to get out of the weather. On one occasion, I stood by as a resident, furious that his car window had been broken, accused a homeless person in front of a policeman. The officer simply demonstrated how easy it was to break into a car; he deftly picked up small rocks and pieces of metal and then tossed them against a wall to show how objects could be thrown to produce the best results. I never saw anyone arrested for this crime. Residents complained to the homeless they knew about the situation and slowly a solution was mutually crafted. Eventually, residents came to accept the local homeless argument and simply left their cars open at night, thus allowing them to sleep in their cars. The residents would then establish a time in the morning when they wanted to use their cars and would come down to find them empty. Some people rolled down all the windows in good weather, others put signs up stating, ‘Doors unlocked, do not break windows’. Eventually the break-ins stopped.

Also, an unofficial alliance of residents and workers developed whereby, at night, homeless groups of individuals (and some small families) would arrange themselves in front of certain buildings acting as ‘watchfolk’, as one group called themselves. Many had whistles around their necks; these apparently were taken from the gay community’s neighbourhood

9 Shopping carts appeared with the newcomers; they seemed to be an adaptation to an expectation of movement for a longer time to greater, less secure locations.

10 A number of these homeless individuals moved in groups through the South of Market farther south into the area along Fourth Street towards the Islais Creek area and beyond.
watch programme that gave out whistles to prevent attacks on people in the Castro area at night. While I never personally heard one of these used at night, I was told of a number of instances during which their use protected homeless individuals from abuse by drunks outside local nightclubs and bars. In some areas, like Fifth Street and Dore Alley, this unofficial watch extended to daylight hours. Many people reported that they had lost mail, and I saw our mail disappear after delivery when a man sitting in front of our door used a piece of metal with a wad of gum to fish it out through the mail slot in the door. This rash of mail theft disappeared as soon as whistles were used to signal such attempts.

Figure 3. General South of Market Area, San Francisco including the area of study.

By late in 1990 a number of empty lots had been created by the demolition of buildings. Some, as those at Fifth and Folsom, became the scenes of art events at night. Several groups of artists projected films on the walls of buildings at midnight or put on performance art pieces or sculptures in them. Homeless groups of individuals used these lots both during the day and at night. Use by local artists was usually limited to weekends and from 10.00 pm to 2.00 am, leaving the sites available for the homeless.

One garden appeared on the block at Fifth and Folsom. Several others were organized between Fifth and Fourth Streets by homeless individuals, residents and workers. These were short-lived in 1990 but reappeared in 1991, though also briefly. Some people planted edible plants, others gardened discarded houseplants or plants they found at other locations.

A more sinister result of the earthquake was the number of homeless and people using abandoned buildings for parties or illegal ‘raves’. In 1990 and 1991 almost all the meetings with police and City staff were oriented toward closing down the buildings, having them rehabilitated or torn down. Fires broke out across the Howard and Harrison areas with increasing frequency after the spring of 1990. Interestingly, in contrast, most of the community meetings held in the area prior to the earthquake were organized by artists to try and legalize live-work space code changes.

By 1995 the homeless situation had again changed, partly due to the change in occupancy of the buildings and the new constructions. Rents were skyrocketing and artists were being
pushed out by eviction or rent increases. Small shops and blue-collar industries were also being priced out of the area. Interviews with new residents in the period 1992–1998 revealed a new population of young professionals and service industries, especially those that were part of the dotcom boom.

Local community accommodations with the homeless disappeared as the homeless population seemed to become more unstable. While vacancies increased after 2000 following the dotcom crash, there was no new visible population of homeless, though small numbers could be found on a daily basis. A community of residents, workers and homeless had not survived the earthquake. One additional factor may have been the increase in private security firms in the area.

Overall, the number of homeless seen on the streets has not changed and this appears to parallel the trend in the city. Problems that are often associated with homelessness, like panhandling, are still present in many parts of the city, but in my study area the frequency of panhandling is about the same as it was in the 1980s. As I have said, another aspect of homelessness is the diversity of its performance. Many people cycle into housing and even when placed in housing centres they spend their time on the streets in much the same way as when they are not resident in homeless shelters or city temporary housing. While homeless numbers have dropped from a high of 8,640 in 2003 to a steady figure of about 6,500 in 2013, in the same period the formerly homeless individuals in ‘supportive housing’ have increased from 2,000 to 6,000 and the ‘supportive housing’ units have increased from 1,000 to 5,300. This stasis is frustrating for city officials and homeless advocates but may reflect a saturation point of homelessness in the San Francisco environmental context.

Final Considerations
One might suggest that the common experience prior to the earthquake would have produced a form of communal spirit and resilience among the homeless, resident and business employees. However, the community seemed more fragile than expected. Neglect produced by the economic effects of the earthquake left property available for a number of non-economic uses, and the bonds — temporary yet useful — that were formed as a result produced reciprocal benefits. This symbiosis however was short-lived. Economic pressures after 1992 began to eliminate some of these conditions and created new ones that did not favour community formation and actively militated against its survival.

This process of creation of community, whether in South of Market before the earthquake in San Francisco in 1989 (or that in 1906) or during encampments of Occupy Wall Street from Oakland to New York, points to a transition from stranger to acquaintance to community. In the case discussed in this article, the bonds of community between homeless individuals, residents and workers shifted from sympathy and antipathy to solidarity depending on the nature of the issues differentially impacting the lives of individuals in each group. Parallels to this process are seen in the literature on established communities and the homeless in other locales and historic periods, as in the case of hobos.
The fact that no self-organized neighbourhood groups appeared in the South of Market area in the entire period from 1980 to 2000 reflects the economic status and lifestyle of the residents and workers. The day-to-night shift in population, with most workers and owners living outside the area, while many artists and residents worked elsewhere, was not conducive to the formation of strong local community organizations. Previously, in the 1950s and 1960s a powerful organization of residents, property and business owners and workers was formed — TOOR (Tenants and Owners in Opposition to Redevelopment) — but became inactive by the 1980s (Hartmann and Averbach 1974). Hartmann and Averbach attributed much of the success of TOOR to the large population of active retired former union members living in the area’s single room occupancy buildings and in union-owned retirement housing.

The lack of organization of 1980-2000 was reflected in the failed attempts by artists to organize code changes to allow live-work spaces to be legalized. These efforts were compromised by builders and architects who used the issue to change codes to accommodate the rehabilitation of older office buildings and warehouses into condos and rental lofts at prices most of the artists could not afford. Another example of the lack of intergroup cooperation of

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11 This information is derived from interviews at meetings in the SOMA area in the period 1979 to 1990 and with San Francisco Planning Department employees.
the South of Market area was that this was the only district of San Francisco that denied parking permits to residents. Meetings were organized by SOMA residents to establish such permits and petitions were circulated but no organization appeared to follow through with the necessary political process to achieve this end. My experience with other San Francisco neighbourhoods demonstrated that such success was largely dependent on the existence of community organizations with long-standing influence in local politics, and a stable resident base as renters, owners or both.

Table 2. Settlement Population - Graph

It is obvious that the redevelopment of modern cities around the world is resulting in systematic deviations from the space utilization described in Narol’s (1962) charts above. The recent exposure of substantial private ownership of allegedly ‘public spaces’ during the Occupy Wall Street and other similar locations outside New York City are another symptom (Hammond 2013). Similarly, in my fieldwork in Istanbul in 2010, I identified a definite trend of demolition of smaller units occupied by working class Turks for building larger expensive luxury units. In an interview by Dombey (2012), Abdullah Baysal, head of Istanbul’s construction association, reports an increasing demand for large towering structures. He related how Vedat Asci, head of Astas Holding, the firm behind the new Macka Residences, argued that even when older housing is replaced, the former tenants demand units larger than their old ones.

The only trend I have seen that does not conform to this increase demand for private space is in preliminary surveys I conducted in Lisbon, where new construction on the outskirts of the metropolitan area had provided affordable units consistent with the previous small family spaces. India does not fare much better. In cities like Mumbai at least half the population lives in slums of makeshift structures that are unlikely to survive severe weather. In the case of these structures, whether in Mumbai or favelas in Brazil, the difference between ‘homelessness’ and living in an illegal structure on private or public property is a narrow one. This is not only due to eviction when development takes place but, significantly, also to of the unsanitary conditions and poor protection from the elements.
Recently slum housing has been almost celebrated (Brand 2010), ignoring the suffering of the population, lack of security, violence, the poverty traps and lack of services, including education. This literature has focused instead on the ‘entrepreneurial’ opportunities of ‘self-made’ living conditions. Kotkin (2005) has argued that the past failure of cities to provide security for all their residents has been a significant factor in their disintegration. In these definitions of city life, the idea of what is a home and what constitutes a living space come into focus as blurred visions of the struggle for simple survival for the majority of the world’s population. Cities may no longer be recognizable as coherent social entities, as they rise and expand wherever people can survive long enough to produce and consume. This future looks much more like the medieval city described by Sjoberg (1960) than the ordered cities of Sumer and Mari that have defined our ideas of city life for over four thousand.

What is interesting in these theoretical contrasting visions of the city, is that out of uncertainty, homeless and residents unexpectedly created forms of community in common spaces. The autonomous nature of these associations produced services of reciprocal exchange, which continued as long as the spaces were unclaimed and residential stability provided continuity. My recent research in San Francisco indicates that where local residents have been given control of neighbourhood parks (specifically, Brooks Park) they have organized and built gardens, controlled graffiti and policed litter. This is the same conclusion reached by Schuessler (1992) in her study of parks in Providence. However, as described above, individual choices and the economic conditions that lead to homelessness are dependent on local policy. The personal abilities and problems of the homeless also cannot be dealt with uniformly. Any policy has to be plastic, giving government employees, neighbours and homeless individuals the ability and option to modify responses. Utah has instituted a new approach (partially implemented in San Francisco) of providing free housing for those who are homeless (Laine 2015) and as a result overall spending on the chronically homeless has been reduced substantially. The effectiveness of this approach and its durability could provide new insights into the problem of homelessness.

It is also obvious that homelessness affects individuals and families across many urban and rural landscapes. Homelessness also creates its own community with a fluidity that finds people moving in and out of housing, across towns and into suburban or rural areas depending on opportunities and personal contacts. Questions about the sustainability of cities and social life is seldom addressed comprehensively (Calderaro 2004). It is my contention that without such a comprehensive view that takes into account issues such as homelessness, our cities will become expansive slums with most of the population ill-housed and neglected (Neuwirth 2006, Thakur 2008, Xinhua 2005).
References


The Visual Impact of Islam:  
A Special Focus on Turkish Migration to the United States and Europe

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This paper employs a visual sociological and semiotic approach to attempt to connect the ordinary practices of Muslim and Turkish migrants to ideas about global diasporas. After a selective review of some pertinent theories about urban culture and public space, the authors offer theoretical discussions of spatial semiotics as well as data about Turkish migration from a wide variety of sources and a small sample of photographs. The images have been selected from thousands taken in fifteen Turkish and/or Muslim neighbourhoods in nine European cities as re-presentations of quotidian local life (Berlin, Brussels, Copenhagen, Frankfurt am Main, Darmstadt, Gothenburg, Oslo, Paris, and Rome). It concludes with a closer, comparative, look at how Turkish migrants in the New York City show themselves to others in spectacles of a prideful national parade and religious celebration. Other images capture glimpses of residential family life as well as commercial activities in both concentrated and dispersed Turkish urban villages or enclaves.

Keywords: Visual studies, Islam, Turkish, migration, public space.

In this visually enhanced essay we investigate the ways in which urban spaces are both the context for and the product of ethnic cultural transformations. Starting with a phenomenological insight, that people change the meaning of social spaces by changing how those spaces look, we develop a semiotic interpretation of visual markers that reveals the visual basis of ethnic neighbourhoods in global cities. Because a major complication for Turkish migrants is that ‘Turkish’ serves as both an ethnic identity and, increasingly, a religious one, we will look at Muslim and Turkish spaces in a variety of geographic and demographic environments.

In recent decades, cities on every continent have been deluged by migrants from cultures very different from those of their native-born residents. Consequently, as ‘cultural strangers’ live and work within the same political and/or geographical boundaries, the sense of community is tested during the course of everyday life in the shops and public spaces of urban and suburban neighbourhoods. Visual analysis of such changing and changed neighbourhood communities is not merely an aesthetic exercise of finding images to illustrate relevant sociological concepts (Krase and Hum 2004, Krase and Shortell 2011). Rather, it is an increasingly important way to investigate those social, political and cultural dynamics that are usually framed within notions of ‘multiculturalism’.

There is a visual aspect of multiculturalism. Discussing different approaches to the ‘politics’ of equal recognition, Charles Taylor explains, ‘The projection of an inferior or demeaning image on another can actually distort and oppress, to the extent that the image is internalized’ (Taylor et al. 1994: 36). Meanwhile, Muslims are increasingly, and globally, appearing in public spaces qua Muslims, adopting visible religious ‘micro-practices’, such as the wearing of veils, that are part of what Ammann calls ‘Second-wave’ Islamism: a social movement that has become a cultural movement (2002: 277-79).
In sociological and cultural studies, the word ‘space’ has many meanings, and Barbara Metcalf provides an extensive overview of how the term is used to explore the cultural life of Muslims in North America and Europe. As visual clues of many Muslim migrants’ ‘vivid sense of “displacement”, both physical and cultural,’ she cites, besides the simplest beards or head coverings, ‘the ever-increasing array of objects distributed by Islamic shops and catalogues: posters, hangings, mugs, bumper stickers, key chains, jewellery and so forth’ (1996). Although the outsider may look for homes, mosques, shops or neighbourhoods that seem ‘Muslim’, some Middle Eastern architectural styles, such as arches and domes, serve as symbols of self-indulgence, luxury and decadence in clearly non-Muslim casinos and theatres. Even so, Metcalf reports, some Muslims have turned to such conventional styles (1996).

Ball and Gilligan (2010) have noted that a growing number of social scientists have developed diverse visual methodologies to study migration, such as that of guest workers in Germany. In this regard, they argue that although all methods have their limits, especially as to issues of timing and movement of migrations, ‘Visual methodologies can provide insights that are not available through other methods, but they can also complement, corroborate and/or challenge non-visual methodologies’ (2010). For example, attention to the visual semiotics of difference is especially important as American and European cultures increasingly interact with Islamic cultures. In the wide array of visual representations of Islam common in the US and the EU, many in the media are negative and often derogatory. One search for ‘Islam’ conducted for this essay on December 12, 2011, found 390,000,000 results. Among the first twenty-five were: (#11) ‘death to Rushdie’, (#21) a bloody scimitar, and (#22) a child with suicide bomb strapped around him.\footnote{The search string was: https://www.google.com/search?q=%22islam%22&hl=en&prmd=imvnsb&source=lnms&tbm=isch&ei=iOwET9_qNdLfggfL25GIAg&sa=X&oi=mode_link&ct=mode&cd=2&ved=0CCMQ_AUoAQ&biw=1665&bih=935, accessed 12 December 2011.}

Here, however, we do not look at how others portray the nation and the religion but instead at how Turks and other Muslims display themselves in the vernacular landscapes of urban neighbourhoods outside Turkey. In contrast to ‘the symbols of permanent power expressed in the “Political Landscape”’, explains Jackson, the social activities that make up day-to-day life for the non-élites define the neighbourhoods that belong to the vernacular landscape (1984: 6).

In this essay, we focus on three major metropolises: Berlin, Paris and New York. In Berlin, slightly more than a third of the 443,064 registered foreigners in 2004 were from Turkey. In 2003, in the Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg borough, non-Germans were 23 percent of the population and of those 57,600 foreigners, 23,500 were Turkish (Kil and Silver 2006). According to recent census estimates, there are about 325,000 Turks in France; they are 1.4 percent of the population in Paris, and between 1 and 5.3 percent in the immediate suburbs (Laurence and Vaisse 2006, Shortell 2011). They are the largest predominately Muslim group in France after North Africans. In New York City, 36.7 percent of its 8,128,223 residents were foreign-born in 2008, and of those, 10,156 were from Turkey. In the neighbouring state
of New Jersey, of its 8,682,661 residents, 1,718,304 were foreign-born and of those 12,664 were Turkish migrants.

Late twentieth century globalization has set in motion not only people but also visual signs that challenge time-honoured concepts of home and place, making the visibly ‘foreign’ so commonplace that ‘foreign’ is losing its meaning in the landscapes of most global cities. What happens when so many people of different cultures migrate to such cities — whether they maintain their distinct identities in the pluralistic urban culture or they merge and form a new adaptive culture — depends largely on the reaction of the receiving society to the differences displayed by the newcomers. Often, such visible signs of difference, as skin colour, clothing, foreign language signage and social practices in public view, symbolize a greater challenge to native cultural dominance than do the actual numbers of migrants themselves. When migrants are not visible, or are confined to their separate spaces, they are symbolically less threatening and therefore do not appear in the virtual space of public discourse.

Proclaiming the failure of multiculturalism in Europe, Buchanan (2010), the well-known conservative American commentator, has chronicled examples of how the large-scale influx of racially and culturally different immigrants and the symbolic transformations they represented were met with political and cultural resistance in Austria, Switzerland, Hungary, Sweden, Norway and Denmark.

On the other hand, observing intercultural interactions on the public B68 bus along Coney Island Avenue in Brooklyn, sociologist Jerome Krase described the kind of intercultural intuition common in global cities:

‘In a sense it’s a marvelous thing to see. Because we see Orthodox Jews and we see Muslims. We see Mexicans, people from Pakistan. We see people who might be warring with each other in some other part of the world—and maybe even the day before they got here—all getting on the same bus. They just kind of understand. They kind of grasp, almost immediately, that this is not the place for that’. 2

In discussing the distinction between cultural pluralism (and the attendant interactions) and multiculturalism as a ‘political project’, Prato (2009) points to the subtle risks of those projects that might in fact result either in mere ‘tokenism’ or in the ‘ghettoization’ of minorities.

As Simmel (1924) explained, urban life makes people interdependent and forces people to interact in ways that they might not choose to otherwise as a part of the day-to-day rhythms of local life. Simmel also noted the importance of ‘visual impressions’ in making sense of the urban environment. Krase and Hum (2007) and Shortell (2012) have emphasized that visual analysis of changing urban neighbourhoods is an increasingly important way to investigate social change.

In this regard, the expression of negative reaction to Muslim migration known as Islamophobia has, as one ubiquitous local expression, the opposition to the building of mosques and cultural centres. For instance, the purposely misnamed ‘Ground Zero Mosque’ controversy in New York City over the building of an Islamic Cultural Centre and mosque can be seen as tethered to one in Rome some decades ago when it was feared that a new minaret would be built higher than the cross on St. Peter’s Cathedral, thereby challenging the hegemony of Roman Catholicism — or simply insulting it.

Spatial Semiotics of Urban Neighbourhoods in Global Cities

Our simple analysis, based in part on the work of semioticians, such as Jacobson, and of symbolic interactionists, such as Lofland, is that ordinary people change the meanings of places and spaces by changing what those places and spaces look like. We believe that this is a neglected aspect of migration studies, especially from the point of view of those who see ‘difference’ as challenging the visual hegemony of the dominant culture. It goes as much for large mosques as it does for veils, skin colour, suki-like markets, street life and so forth.

Drawing upon Jacobson (1960), we find that the visual markers of collective identity in neighbourhoods of global cities represent two different types of signs. Expressive signs are intentional enactments of some aspect of a person’s identity for the purpose of signalling that identity to others whether they share it or not. Urban dwellers often use national colours or symbols in this way. In contrast, phatic signs of collective identity are produced in the quotidian activities of the community. Religious dress, for example, is a phatic sign because it is meant to enact the shared culture of the community, to affirm one’s membership, to express piety — or some combination of such motives. Although these phatic signs signal collective identity to members of both the in- and out-groups the production of phatic signs is not primarily about advertising identity. The main difference between expressive and phatic signs thus is similar to the distinction Goffman makes in contrasting ‘the expression that he gives, and the expression he gives off’ (1959: 2, emphasis in the original). The former is intentional communication; the latter involves the interpretations observers make.

The signs of collective identity in immigrant neighbourhoods have meanings that relate to the patterns, rhythms and places of urban life. Because the vernacular landscape includes both the social and the built environments, social interactions in public spaces give as much meaning to the vernacular landscape as do its physical properties, though we often overlook the significance of people in public space since the presence of strangers in urban settings is so common. Yet urban dwellers are generally adept at reading public spaces, even if they do not always realize when they are doing it.

The code for messages of ethnic identification includes verbal and visual signs. For example, there are visual codes that relate colours to identity and codes for alphabets as

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physical signs of geography. These codes tend to signal group boundaries. This is one of the reasons that unfamiliar language scripts, such as Arabic, are so powerful in communicating collective identity. The inscrutability of verbal messages (on signage, facades, posters and so on) creates anxiety as a clear signal that we are not ‘at home.’

Assimilation strategies partly determine the interpretations of signs of Muslim culture (Cesari 2000). The global Islamic diaspora has both ethnic and religious dimensions that create a ‘triangular relationship’ between the ethnic minority, the home country and the host nation (Cesari 2000: 93). That relationship then varies according to the differing migration policies of the host nations. For example, Germany’s ‘guest worker’ model generates ethnic enclaves of effectively permanent ‘temporary’ workers whose long-term status is accepted but who have no path to political belonging or participation in the host community. In France, the assimilation model makes citizenship easier and more predictable but renders minority cultural practices problematic. The UK and US ‘ethnic minority’ model fosters accommodation, meaning ethnic minorities can be mobilized and minority cultural practices integrated into majority institutions. Within all three migration-policy models, ethnic mobilization, whether through political action or cultural practices, creates political feedback. One consequence of this nativist backlash is social isolation. As immigrant spaces become contested, a distinct kind of social conflict centres on ‘visibility’, which concerns what is noticed (including how it is framed) more than what is perceivable and is not directly related to demographic trends. In fact, members of the ethnic majority tend to overestimate the size of minority groups; those with less education tend to overestimate by a larger margin than those with more education (Strabac 2011, Sides and Citrin 2007, Alba et al. 2005).

The group-threat interpretation of ethnic competition posits that those in lower-class positions are more likely to be anti-immigrant because they view immigrants as economic competition. While overestimating the size of minority populations makes them appear more threatening, the mass media tend to frame migration in terms of social problems — cultural differences, strain on social welfare, increased crime and so on — and political parties, particularly but not exclusively on the right, regularly engage in scapegoating for short-term political gain. The persistence of the threat interpretation, is, therefore, hardly surprising. Within this dynamic, seeing signs of ethnic identity in urban public space is not a simple matter of perception. Rather, given that, visibility is a matter of competing interpretations of the signs of collective identity (Demerath and Levinger 2003) conflicts arise when those signs are interpreted using a group-threat hermeneutic.

Most cultural practices are relatively diverse and unnoticed, because they are part of the common and ordinary ‘background noise’ of dynamic urban life. Practicing certain styles of dress, dietary norms and forms of socialization are among the things that urban dwellers ‘just do’. But communication of identity also includes more spectacular activities, such as ethnic parades, holiday celebrations, and even forms of public protest (Micaleff 2004).

When the group-threat frame of interpretation contributes to the process of ‘othering’ minority ethnic groups, however, the quotidian activities of commuting, working, shopping, socializing, and everyday cultural practices, such as religious worship and participating in voluntary organizations, become spectacularized. In other words, urban dwellers sometimes
misinterpret the signs of out-group members to be expressive when they are not, as recent controversies over mosque building illustrate. To opponents (both explicit nativists and others), the building of a mosque is perceived as a declarative act — often interpreted as ‘they’ are ‘taking over’ space that belongs to ‘us’ — when it is nothing more than a phatic practice.4

Diaspora populations have attachments to both home and host places. First-generation immigrants tend to have a ‘dual frame of reference’ that colours their affective attachment to the host community. The second generation, on the other hand, tends to feel less connected to the places of the home nation, having been socialized in the host culture (including its language), but also to feel less confident in the social institutions of the host communities, having experienced their institutionalized prejudice and discrimination (Roeder and Muelhau 2011). As a result, the signs of collective identity among immigrants are multilayered and often contain ambivalent or conflicted meanings that get ascribed to and transform the urban landscapes where such migrants are present.

According to Lofland (1985), because of a city’s size, residents generally have no personal knowledge of most of the people with whom they share its space. Instead, social life in the city is made possible by an ‘ordering’ of the urban populace in terms of appearance and spatial location that enables people to ‘know a great deal about one another by simply looking’ (Lofland 1985: 22). As a result, public space is transformed into private or semiprivate space by the creation of home territories and urban village (ibid, 119). Lofland explains:

‘In its ideal form, the concentrated urban village is a small settlement, set intact in the middle of a large city. All its inhabitants know one another personally, their relationships are long-lasting—from birth to grave—and whatever one knows, the others are likely to know too. The ideal neighbourhood village neither needs nor requires the intrusion of ‘outside’ organizations. It polices itself, it cares for itself, it plans for itself.’ (1985: 133).

Fast and efficient means of local transportation and instant communication, however, have given rise to dispersed urban villages that are not concentrated in one neighbourhood. For example, Turks and others groups can reside and work in many different parts of a city and easily travel through public spaces to their own home territories to gather for religious, family and cultural events, or to patronize preferred shopping venues. In the following vignettes we will consider a range of concentrated to dispersed Turkish villages in Europe and the United States.

4 Social psychologists have long discussed the fundamental attribution error, in which we tend to attribute the negative behaviours of others to dispositional factors but cite situational factors for our own behaviour. It can be somewhat oversimplified as, ‘Your mistakes show you are a bad person, but mine show how unlucky I am’. For its demonstration with group dynamics, see Allison and Messick (1985).
European Cases: Berlin and Paris

In Germany, a significant proportion of urban population has origins in foreign lands, and approximately four million Muslims, especially those from Turkey, are part of this mix. As a result, the sights and scenes of religious and ethnic diversity have become commonplace, but in Germany and elsewhere, religious, racial and ethnic difference can produce negative reactions. Currently, visible signs of Islam or of nationalities historically associated with Islam have attracted the most attention. For example, plans for building a large mosque in Cologne announced in 2007 resulted in loud opposition that continued even as the cornerstone was laid in 2009 (Landler 2007). Similar sentiments have spread in Germany in relation to the construction of new mosques or the conversion of other structures for religious uses.

Likewise, vocal opposition to what are essentially even more visual aspects of Islam, from headscarves to burkas for women, have become a common feature in European politics as the Muslim population has grown in size and assertiveness. In this context, phatic signs of collective identity, such as styles of dress, can become expressive signs when the migrants themselves adopt icons of their identity in the face of nativist backlash. Here, separating religious from racial and ethnic visual signs is not easy, so other Middle Easterners and South Asians who wear turbans and other head coverings or long dresses often are mistaken for Muslims.

The Berlin neighbourhood of Kreuzberg has a ‘Muslim’ reputation (Krase 2011). As we mentioned earlier, in 2003, 23,500 Turkish immigrants lived in the Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg borough. Central Kreuzberg can be described as a concentrated immigrant urban village with a distinctly Turkish flair. There, Kreuzberg Center, a residential and commercial complex built in the 1970s, offers community and recreational centres, a mosque, a municipal library, as well as the Kreuzberg Museum. Despite such well-intentioned development efforts, the area still suffered from a mix of old tenements and high-rise, mostly social-welfare housing estates, and from continuing social and economic problems that in 1999 led to creation of the Neighbourhood Management area Zentrum Kreuzberg/Oranienstrasse of the Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg district. As is true today, at the time, about 4,500 people lived in the area, about half of whom did not hold a German passport. Migrants make up almost three-quarters of the residents, with almost half the total population receiving state aid.

Although known for nightlife, criminality, the drug scene and poverty, Kreuzberg has attracted students, young professionals and young couples, as well as mostly Turkish Muslim immigrants. The attendant gentrification and its own visual claims on the streetscapes compete with the almost ‘oriental’ pan-Muslim appearance of the commercial vernacular landscapes, making the language in commercial signs as important phatic sign of the residents’ collective identity and, as a result, an expressive sign of the identity of the neighbourhood. For example, in Turkish places barbershops are likely to sport Berber Salonu as well as Schneiden, the Turkish and German terms, respectively. In a related way, while food stores will advertise products for Middle Eastern customers with signs in Turkish, German, Arabic and South Asian languages, Orientalische Lebensmittel or Spezialitaeten are often-repeated commercial signs on food stores. As we have noted in global cities around the world, food is one of the most significant phatic signs of ethnic identity (Krase and Shortell...
Thus, some of the most well-known visual markers of Turkish Islam in Germany are signs offering *Doner Kebap*; its prevalence and popularity have made it almost a ‘German’ food. Less conspicuous foreign-language signs announce separate religious and entertainment activities for women. Especially noticeable during the World Cup soccer tournaments are Turkish and other Muslim-themed national flags hanging from windows or prominently displayed as expressive signs of collective identity. Newspaper racks found in multi-ethnic residential and commercial neighbourhoods are also good indicators of diversity.

To see a ‘Turkish’ neighbourhood, tourist guidebooks and immigrant taxi drivers alike direct visitors to the Kottbusser Tor, near large signs on opposite sides of an imposing underpass announcing *Kreuzberg Zentrum–Kreuzberg Merkezi* in Turkish (see figure 1).

Figure 1. *Kreuzberg Zentrum – Kreuzberg Merkezi*. Berlin, 2008. Photo by Jerry Krase.

The Kottbusser Tor, at an important traffic and public transportation junction, supports a busy commercial area with Turkish shops, ‘alternative scene’ locales, bakeries, bookshops and artists’ studios, as well as banks and other services. Kottbusser Tor and Oranienstrasse have long been well known to tourists and the young for nightlife and as a hub for drug and alcohol addicts as well as the homeless. Moreover, according to local officials, the concentration of migrants has periodically produced inter-community conflicts as better-off Germans and Turks moved out, leaving the poor and older people behind. Over the years, Arab, Kurdish, Bosnian, Kosovar and Lebanese refugees, and asylum seekers and ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe have joined the Turkish workers and their families there.²

The pedestrian route to Kottbusser Tor passes through ethnically mixed areas. At its start, few stores cater especially to Turks, and Turkish-language store signs are not dominant. Female clothing, however, is an important phatic indicator of Islam that contrasts especially to the style of dress for young Berliners, and the clothing stores along the route feature

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headscarves and long dresses displayed on modest mannequins. In addition, Turkish and other Muslim pedestrians remain segregated by gender if they are in groups on the streets.

Unlike the many Doener Kabep shops decorated in red and white and sporting Turkish flags, other phatic sign of Turkishness are unobtrusive such as the higher number of satellite dishes to receive television broadcasts from home outside apartment windows closer to the center of Kreuzberg. A much more cryptic, but expressive, sign above the doorway of a building adjacent to the Fleischerei Kasap Ziya contains the three faded, hand-written words: ‘HEREKETA ISLAMIYA KURDISTAN’, which is the Kurdish Islamic Movement in southern Turkey. On the second floor of the same building, near a satellite dish, are displayed, ‘MIZGEFTA SELAHADDINE EYYUBI’ and a drawing of a large domed mosque with two minarets, the sign for the Selahadine Eyyubi Mosque named for the general of Kurdish origin better known as Saladin. In Germany, small places of Islamic worship typically have been tucked away in immigrant areas.6 Similarly, the Maschari Islamic Centre, one of Germany’s largest mosques opened in Kreuzberg in 2010, was designed to be indistinguishable from modern office buildings at street level. Nevertheless, many native Germans not only see these phatic religious signs of collective identity as expressive, but also occasionally impute nefarious motives to them.

Approaching Kottbusser Tor, or ‘Little Istanbul’ (Kucuk Istanbul, Klein Istanbul), the pedestrian density increases; women wearing head scarves, most accompanied by children, as well as older, white-haired ‘Germans’, mixed groups of young men and women looking like students and workers pass each other on the busy streets. It is in these spaces that phatic, and inevitably expressive, signals compete for attention and meaning. A young deliveryman pushes a hand truck loaded with halal chickens even amid the evidence of commercial gentrification and of competition for street-level retail space while Turkish restaurants, such as the Istanbul Passage, appeal to outsiders with menus in German and other languages for tourists (see figure 2).

Figure 2. Istanbul Passage, Kreuzberg, Berlin, 2008. Photo by Jerry Krase.

The most visible Turkish neighbourhood in Paris is centred on Rue du Faubourg Saint-Martin and Boulevard de Strasbourg toward Boulevard Saint-Denis/Boulevard Saint-Martin, near Place de la République in the Tenth Arrondissement. Many of the businesses advertise some connection to Turkey; cafés and food shops offer ‘spécialités turques’, such as Yunus (see figure 3), and the street has many halal boucheries (butcher shops). Because it is near a busy transit hub, there is a lot of foot traffic during the day; many of the shoppers appear to be French, whereas, the shop workers appear to be almost exclusively immigrants. Although in the Parisian Muslim neighbourhoods, especially North-African enclaves, it is common to see women wearing traditional dress, in particular headscarves, our field data collected in November 2010 and November 2011 show that in this Turkish neighbourhood the only women wearing hijab were panhandling while sitting on street corners.

Figure 3. Yunus, Turkish Specialties Shop, Paris, 2011. Photo by Timothy Shortell.

Figure 4. Arabic Script for Turkish Business, Paris, 2011. Photo by Timothy Shortell
There also are a few Turkish businesses on Rue Marx Dormoy between Boulevard de la Chapelle and Rue Ordener. This enclave is separated from the one just discussed by a South Asian neighbourhood of Indians, Pakistanis and Sri Lankans on Rue du Faubourg Saint-Denis. Both Turkish enclaves are adjacent to primarily North-African neighbourhoods, in part because North Africans are the single largest Muslim immigrant group and the dominant visible presence in areas of Belleville (in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Arrondissements) and in La Goutte d’Or (in the Eighteenth Arrondissement), and the Tenth arrondissement sits between them. Among the visual similarities between the Turkish blocks and surrounding migrant areas are food-shops advertising ‘halal’ (see figure 4) and the use of the Arabic script, which obviously connects signage for Turkish businesses and North-African ones (without knowing the languages, it is very difficult to distinguish between Arabic, Persian, Turkish or Urdu signs).

In many cultural markers, though, the Turkish enclaves look more like the South-Asian than the North-African ones. Western styles of dress are more common and there is more mixed-gender interaction visible on the streets, including parents with children. This may be due to the relative secularization of the various Muslim groups in Paris, as well as to the defensiveness that results from anti-Arab sentiment in France.

**New York City**

The visual appearance of Islam in the neighbourhoods of post-9/11 New York City has been altered since federal law enforcement authorities combed areas that were identifiably ‘Muslim’ and therefore, according to panicked security experts, potential havens for terrorists. As noted by Mohammed Ravzi, the founder and Director of the Council of Pakistani Organizations in Brooklyn, after the fall of the Twin Towers at the World Trade Center, agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Immigration and Naturalization Service descended upon the area to roundup many South-Asians and others who had ‘Muslim’ names similar to those of suspects they were looking for. It was about this time that local immigrant businesses owners began to display American flags outside their shops or in their store windows (Krase 2012). More recently, Muslim leaders have complained, the New York City Police Department Terrorism Unit has practiced the surveillance, targeting and infiltrating of Muslim neighbourhoods and organizations.

Nevertheless, immigration of increasing numbers of Muslims to New York City has changed the appearance of some areas by altering their temporal dimensions (Laguerre 2003, 2004). According to Laguerre, Muslim immigrants engage in social practices that are regulated by America’s civil society while also living in a kind of temporal enclave, or chronopolis, that maintains their connection to a more global Islam. Like those of other religions, Islam’s calendar gives direction to believers for appropriate, and to the more orthodox for required, daily, weekly and annual activities that often intersect and crisscross with each other. Muslims residing in the non-Muslim world, however, find it necessary to adapt their religious activities to business and government regulations, as well as other local rhythms. For instance, Friday has the dominant position in Muslims’ secular week because of the Quran’s prescription of noon prayers at a mosque on that day, but Sunday for Christians.
and Saturday for Jews are New York’s more or less official days of rest, and most public and private organizations do not yet recognize the rhythms of the Muslim week. Thus, Muslims face challenges in their temporal adjustment and make temporal accommodations that allow for the creation of a locally distinct, yet Muslim, timeframe.

Some Muslims come to New York City from Countries that impose the Islamic calendar on everyone, while others come from places that have already adopted globalized Western temporal norms. In countries such as Saudi Arabia, Friday is the official day of rest. In contrast, Turkey has adjusted to the Western weekend calendar to facilitate international trade and inter-state relations, and Sunday serves that purpose (Laguerre 2004). In New York, immigrants from either country could continue to engage in Friday communal prayers if allowed by employers. Already they can more conveniently gather to observe Muslim holidays now that New York has added them as exceptions to on-street parking regulations.

Given the relatively small size of the Turkish population in New York City, there is no definable Turkish enclave; in Lofland’s terminology they comprise at a dispersed urban village. One of the events for which they periodically gather together is the annual Turkish Day Parade. Fox Graham, who has studied the transformation of Mardi Gras and similar urban celebrations, finds they provide ‘... possibilities for new expressions of local autonomy and resistance against social marginalization and exclusion.’ Even though they are really intended ‘to pacify people, ferment political indifference, and stimulate consumption,’ they would exemplify expressive signs of collective identity. According to Graham, ‘They have the potential for creative encounters and enabling social practices. They can also produce a host of unforeseen [sic] and irrational consequences, including period manifestations of social revolt’ (Graham 2005: 242-3).

Indeed, for Turks, as for other ethnic groups, the annual parade in Manhattan is an opportunity to celebrate their heritage and display a positive image to the wider community. In 2011, the thirtieth annual parade was held on Saturday, May 28, but its organizers, the Federation of Turkish-American Associations, linked it to the celebrations in Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus of ‘19 May Youth and Sports Day, the anniversary of the day Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey, landing in Samsun 92 years ago …, which Ataturk also considered as his birthday’. More cryptically they added that the New York observance had begun in 1981 ‘as a Protest March’. 7

In any case, the annual parade enables New York’s Turks to show the diversity of their nation and visually counter anti-Islamic images. In 2004, many of the marchers and floats represented Turks from various regions as well as professional associations, local cultural associations and sports clubs (see figure 5). Only a small proportion of the women marching in that year’s parade wore traditional Islamic hijab. In definite visual contrast to them was a popular float carrying Azra Akin, the Dutch-born Turkish model who had won both Miss Turkey and Miss World honours in 2002 (see figure 6). Perhaps the most unanticipated sight was a large float for a Turkish rap artist that, while resting on a side street, was surrounded by a crowd of African American New Yorkers. Visually and symbolically, it was a far cry from the 1991 Muslim World Day Parade in Manhattan, which Slymovics described as ‘an outdoor mosque’ (1996).

Historically, the Turks’ popular image in the West has been influenced more by the term ‘Ottoman’ than ‘Muslim’. In contemporary times and until recently, in New York City the image of Turks was defined primarily by a relatively small number of professional and business Turkish men and women in Westernized dress, the positive reputation of Turkey as an ‘almost’ European nation and fellow NATO member was enhanced in New York by its close relationship with the State of Israel. In addition, favourable images of Turks and Turkey have been actively promoted by the Turkish Consulate in New York City,8 and, by an array of organizations including the Turkish Cultural Centre of New York,9 the Turkish Cultural Foundation,10 the Council of Turkic American Associations,11 and the Turkish American Business Improvement & Development Council of New York.12

Brooklyn

Kemal Karpat’s historical survey of Turkish immigration provides important notes on Brooklyn, which is our final location. The second wave of Turkish emigration to the United States, between 1950 and 1970, was more of a ‘brain drain’ than a mass migration, for many of the 10-15,000 emigrants were physicians, engineers or technical personnel whose high standing and income and ease of interaction with American élites, had a considerable, positive impact on the local reputation of the group. These Turks were geographically dispersed so no definable local urban enclaves were established. As the number in high-status occupations continued to grow in the 1980s, numerous professional and cultural associations were established, especially in New York City (Karpat 2008).

Since 1970, a ‘third wave’ of about 200,000, Turkish immigrants have settled in metropolitan areas and smaller towns in New York, New Jersey and Connecticut. While members the second wave identified themselves as ‘westernized Turks’, those in the third wave refer to themselves as ‘Muslim Turks’ (Karpat 2008: 179). Moreover, in contrast to the earlier professionals, the overwhelming majority of the third-wave Turkish immigrants are semi- and un-skilled workers from central and northern Anatolia (Karpat 2008: 180). Although they are less educated and less likely to speak English, many still have made their marks in small businesses, such as restaurants, groceries and home-repair services. Karpat further notes that, for the third wave, mosques and schools play a central role in community-building, serving not only religious but also important cultural and educational roles.
In Brooklyn, the Turkish population is small and widely dispersed (see map 1). According to the American Community Survey for 2007-09, there were 3,950 foreign-born Turks and 7,228 other residents of Turkish ancestry among Brooklyn’s 2,551,440 residents. Given this scarcity, opportunities for visual display are characteristically minimal. As both Guler’s data and our own show, the newer immigrants from rural Turkey are not poorer than other Brooklynites, but are less educated and more likely to work in less prestigious occupations such as food preparation and service or construction. They also tend to be religious (Guler 2008: 158). As a consequence, Turks also have a narrow visible presence, primarily limited to the Turkish food establishments that can be found in many part of Brooklyn.

Although there is no visibly identifiable Turkish neighbourhood in Brooklyn, there are several such ‘Muslim’ areas. These are usually defined by the traditional dress of the populace (especially of women), by commercial establishments displaying national colours, symbols, flags, foreign-language signs, and by the religious centres of the dominant nationalities — all phatic signs. Most notable are ‘Little Pakistan’ on Coney Island Avenue, ‘Little Bangladesh’ in the Kensington area, and ‘Little Beirut’ in Bay Ridge. Further north in Brooklyn is Cobble Hill, where Christian and Muslim Middle Easterners and North Africans (Moroccan, Syrian, Lebanese, Yemeni, Jordanian and Palestinian) have co-existed for decades. The less affluent

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13 ‘Turkish Community in Brooklyn’, Center for the Study of Brooklyn, Brooklyn College, October 2011.
Muslims in this area, however, are now under great pressure from gentrification and are likely to be displaced. Further eastward along Atlantic Avenue is another visibly identifiable Muslim area where primarily North-African Muslims congregate around halal food trucks, restaurants and car services and religious facilities.

Nominally ‘Turkish’ restaurants can be found in a wide variety of neighbourhoods but mostly in areas defined as Middle Eastern, Eastern European, Central Asian or South Asian. On Coney Island Avenue one can see the Sahara restaurant with its gaudy allusion to the Sahara desert under Ottoman control (see figure 7). In 2010, on the other side of the street, there was an establishment offering Turkish and ‘Mediterranean’ food. In the popular seaside neighbourhood of Sheepshead Bay one found another Turkish restaurant which, in 2012, was renamed ‘Sinbad’. All three, as well as the Istanbul Restaurant Park in highly gentrified Park Slope and the Turqua Restaurant on Coney Island Avenue, given their stereotypical symbols and English-only signage, are obviously appealing to wider ethnic markets (see figure 8).
Our final example of how Turks and Muslims display themselves in Brooklyn concerns the Fatih Mosque on Eighth Avenue in Sunset Park, Brooklyn. Karpat (2008) noted the establishment of this modernist Islamic mosque in 1980 by its first imam, Burhan Satar, who taught his congregants to be ‘good Muslims, Turks, and U.S. citizens’. According to Karpat, the mosque has 8-10,000 congregants and attracts 400-600 for Friday services and 3,000 on major holy days. It seems that the congregation was well received that Karpat quotes Stephen G. McAllister, head of the Sixty-Sixth Police District, as saying it had ‘… embellished the neighbourhood and increased the area’s security’ (2008: 183). At the time, Turks had settled in houses in the area near the mosque and opened many places of businesses, most notably the Birkal Market, next door to the mosque. The Fatih mosque also housed a small gift shop and had signs in English, Arabic and Turkish, the most prominent of which read ‘United American Muslim Association of New York, Inc. May 29, 1980’ (2008: 183) The imam wanted the mosque to have an exterior dome and minaret, but could not obtain the required permits.

In a twist of architectural irony described by Slyomovics, the refashioned Al-Fatih mosque building was originally an Oriental Moorish Arabesque Revival style movie theatre. As one enters, on the left is the former ticket booth, now a religious bookstore; on the right, a wall decorated with beautiful Turkish tiles serves as a ‘wall of donors’.

What was once the lobby of the movie house is now divided into sections by a series of arcades layered with marble added by the Turkish carpenter, a genuine Oriental addition to the original Oriental decor. The arcades serve no structural purpose but provide a decorative and emotional tone. Once, the Oriental touches made the movie theatre feel like a luxurious, privileged space, set off from ordinary life; what they do now, say the Turkish leaders, is ‘to make the interior feel like a mosque’.

The main part of the praying area is the actual screening auditorium, the back wall of which serves as the qibla, with a wooden minbar and a tiled mihrab. The stage where the screen once was has become a cordoned-off women’s section. The Turkish mosque is thus a very powerful reinscription of interior space: American moviegoers once faced in the opposite direction to present-day Muslim worshippers, who literally turn their backs on the space where sex goddesses were once displayed on the screen, which is instead now occupied by women screened off from view (Slymovics 1996).
Since 1980, the Sunset Park neighbourhood around the mosque has become home to such a large number of immigrant and American-born Chinese that Eighth Avenue is now Brooklyn’s largest Chinatown and most businesses, including those owned by Turks, have been replaced with those owned by Chinese (See figure 9). However, in 2012, the mosque, the association and small gift shop were still there as was a smaller Turkish market around the corner, where once a Turkish restaurant stood. In 2010, one of the authors (Jerome Krase) was invited to attend services during the celebration of Kurban Bayrami in Turkish, or Eid al Adhar in Arabic (Feast of the Sacrifice). Before entering, thousands of worshipers from the dispersed Brooklyn Turkish village, the vast majority of them male, overwhelmed the sidewalks and streets of Chinatown. In anticipation of the annual crowd, the local police precinct had closed off several blocks of the main shopping street so that cars could park close to the mosque (See figure 10). Inside, even the balcony space normally reserved for women was filled with male worshippers. When the service ended, the traditional sharing of food gave the interior spaces an equally crowded but chaotic appearance. Over the years there have been no obvious negative expressions by the dominant Chinese community to the activities of the mosque where signs of the two communities peacefully compete to define the spaces.
Suggestions of moving the Al-Fatih mosque to a more convenient location could prove problematic since controversies over the building of mosques seem to be globally ubiquitous. However, in reference to anti-Muslim attitudes it is important to note that in 2011, the tenth anniversary of 9/11, although there was a particularly hateful reaction to the building of a mosque supported by the non-Turkish Muslim American Association in Sheepshead Bay, the building of a new ‘Turkish’ mosque not far away in the Brighton Beach neighbourhood drew the following headline in a local newspaper: ‘Ground Zero Animosity Isn’t Seen in This Area: New Mosque Welcomed in Brighton Beach’ (Handy 2011). In this regard, we hope the reader will allow us some semiotic speculation. As discussed earlier in this paper, until recently in New York City and Brooklyn, as in the United States generally, Turks have not received much negative reaction. The often erroneous, stereotypical Ottoman images of scantily-clad belly dancers and Turkish taffy, as well as Turkey’s well-promoted, secular, modern images and NATO membership have served it well. Turkey, in other words, is still not seen as distinctly ‘Muslim’ but rather as a secular or perhaps, for the others less informed, an exotic/orientally-imagined nation.

Final Comments and Speculations
Our observations in New York mirror many of those we made in Berlin, Brussels, Copenhagen, Frankfurt am Main, Darmstadt, Gothenburg, Oslo, Paris and Rome. On their basis, we suggest a major difference in the spatial semiotics of condensed and dispersed Turkish populations that corresponds to the kinds of signs embedded in public spaces and the variety of interpretations those signs promote. The concentration of phatic signs in condensed communities, or concentrated urban villages, in Berlin and, on a smaller scale, in Paris serves as a powerful frame for urban dwellers to ascribe the neighbourhood as Turkish. That is, these phatic signs come to be interpreted as expressive for the neighbourhood as an ethnic enclave.
In dispersed urban villages, like that in Brooklyn, this ascription does not occur, and it is the actual expressive signs, such as flags and commercial signs for ‘Turkish’ food or products, that draw the attention of those who share these spaces. Meanwhile, a whole range of overlapping factors — the number of immigrants, their proportion in the local population, the educational and occupational skills they bring with them, the migration policies of the host nation and the availability of fast, efficient means of transportation and communication — lie behind the development of those urban villages as either concentrated or dispersed. It also appears that the dispersal of the Turkish population and enterprises in Brooklyn, as well as the current lack of connection in the public mind between Turkey and Islam, has made Brooklyn a more comfortable mental and physical space for the community.
References


The Zone à Defendre of Notre-Dame-des-Landes in France: An Ambivalent Space for Social Critique

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In public discussion forums in France, occupied *Zones à défendre* — or ZAD — have been overshadowed by terrorist attacks, mass protest events against a labour market reform and hooligan riots during the 2016 European football championships. This article deals with one of these ZADs. It examines an area near Nantes that has been occupied to prevent a large airport project. The so-called ZAD of Notre-Dame-des-Landes takes on a key role as a model and place of reference in the network of French ZADs. The discussion addresses the questions whether and to what extent an occupied area can be described as a space for social critique, what spatial dimensions can be discerned and what geographical-local, symbolic-ideational and action- and interaction-related characteristics and codes enable us to grasp the element of social critique and its spatial components. I address aspects that are analytically relevant in answering these questions and offer insights into an ongoing research process. The analysis of the ZAD of Notre-Dame-des-Landes as a multi-dimensional, heterogeneous, spatial phenomenon subject to a continuous process of reconfiguration shows that it and its inhabitants cannot be subjected to any classification schemes and that the occupiers are border-crossers *par excellence*.

Keywords: Liminoid spatial phenomena, Victor Turner, anti-structure, ritual, infrastructural project.

Introduction

Whether it is urban development projects or plans to construct nuclear power plants, infrastructural projects bring about the politicization of public space, they trigger conflict-ridden debates on legitimacy, public trust and civic participation and regularly become objects of public protest (Pardo and Prato 2011: 15 ff.). As a collective public action against experienced political or social grievances or for or against political decisions, protest is not merely about being *for* or *against* something. It is simultaneously linked with demands to shape social change. The range of protest actions is broad and can comprise street demonstrations, occupations, violent riots, etc. The protesting actors are just as heterogeneous as the forms of protest they partake in. Often they emerge through social movements as mobilized networks of groups and organizations (Rucht 1994: 77).

In this article I examine the so-called ZAD of Notre-Dame-des-Landes, an area of protest located north-west of Nantes (department Loire-Atlantique). The area is occupied since 2009 by protesters aiming to prevent a large airport project. The project Aéroport du Grand Ouest, an international project to urbanize rural land, had been planned since 1963 and was declared a public necessity in 2008 (Kempf 2014). The ZAD is publically well known for the militancy, the persistence and the innovative potential of its inhabitants. The abbreviation ZAD stands for the official French term *zone d’aménagement différé* (designated construction area), *de facto* it also means *zone à démolir* (zone to be destroyed) in the French technocratic language. The

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1 I wish to express my sincere thanks to the anonymous reviewers for *Urbanities* whose comments helped me very much in clarifying the structure and in refining my argument. I should also like to thank the inhabitants of the French ZAD of Notre-Dame-des-Landes, Echillais, the Ferme des Bouillons and the ZAD of Agen, who cordially welcomed me and helped me by providing accommodation, information and further contacts.
opponents of the airport project reinterpreted the term ZAD with the militant meaning *zone à défendre* (zone to defend). The abbreviation ZAD in its neologistic meaning is a linguistic symbol that refers to the elementary meaning of the spatial component especially for occupation as a creative form of protest. However, the abbreviation *per se* is not linked to concrete locations, it rather embodies mental constructions, ideas and visions of life, which indeed take on a concrete spatial dimension in the design of the symbolic space of the ZAD of Notre-Dame-des-Landes, but in part also exist exclusively as ideals, plans and wishful thinking at the spiritual and virtual level.

I address the questions to what extent the area can be described as a space for social critique and to what extent we are able to grasp the ambivalence that characterises the occupied area. In order to capture the ambivalent nature of the zone, the writings of the Scottish ethnologist Victor Turner on liminoid social threshold phenomena were selected as the theoretical foundations for the analysis.

The largest share of the analysed information originates from my participative observation in the ZAD of Notre-Dame-des-Landes. I visited the occupied area and took part in the daily life and the interactions of the occupiers. I compiled observation protocols, field notes, verbatim logs of informal discussions as well as transcripts of unstructured interviews. In order to create a basis for trust, I refrained from using audiovisual research material. The authentic, usually spontaneous discussions as well as optic impressions enabled me to generate the information on which the article is based. Additional data come from a qualitative interview conducted in Montpellier with Anna, a former occupier of the ZAD of Notre-Dame-des-Landes. The empirical material was assessed on the basis of the method of structuring content analysis (see, for example, Merkens 1992 and Lamnek 2005), which is a multi-level procedure for the category-based evaluation and hermeneutic interpretation of data.

**Liminoid Social Phenomena and the Notion of Space**

Victor Turner understands society as a dynamic process subject to continuous change: the purportedly static structures of the social and state order are questioned during symbolic liminoid\(^2\) threshold conditions in recurring conflictual social processes. In these phases of transition Turner recognizes the process of the similar division of classical theatrical acts as consecutive processes. He defines these processes in their entirety as *social dramas* (Turner 1974: 23 ff.). By using this term, he refers to the same term for theatre performances, whose dramatic plots and characters are characterized by their social conditions and by means of which social grievances are to be pointed out.

Turner distinguishes four ritual-like *acts* of dramatic social processes: the introductory phase of breach of social norms which generally occurs publically; this is followed by the expansion of the crisis situation. The third phase, which is attributed key significance and which Turner defines as the remedial process aimed against the spread of the crisis, is the sphere of *anti-structure* and *communitas*. This is the liminoid sphere of critical reflection of the triggers of the crises and the deconstruction of interpretative patterns and decisions made in the status

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\(^2\) From *limen* (Lat.), meaning threshold.
systems. It is the phase in which a great variety of strategies can be applied to overcome conflicts. *Communitas* is understood as a community of equal individuals who are not differentiated by different social means to take action, social status properties and hierarchies — it is the ‘community of the threshold condition’ (Bräunlein 2012: 54). During this phase the social norms of the *status quo* are temporarily suspended. *Communitas* comprises a phase of *anti-structure*, which is deliberately experienced as a contrast to the criticized existing social structure characterized by differentiation, hierarchy, and more and less. *Anti-structure* is accompanied by an euphoric optimistic mood, promising perceptions of freedom and comradeship by its very own rules. Ambiguity, the reversal of norms, reflexivity and creativity shape this ambivalent phase, which has the potential to exert effects on the social *status quo*. However, Turner’s *communitas* is only a temporary opposite pole, a fluid state of transition, which ultimately supports the existing order. According to Turner, the *anti-structure* which emerged as a form of critique of the hierarchization and institutionalization increasingly tends towards a greater degree of structure and hierarchy in its own right. It produces its own manifestations of dominance and subordination and thus becomes the basis of social structure. Turner sees the *communitas* and social structure as being in a dialectic relationship according to which every society requires the threat potential and the pressure of critical public opinion to shed light on perceived grievances and thus facilitate strategies to regulate the status system. This in turn serves to ensure its stability. Turner describes the *final act* as a process characterized either by the reintegration of the group questioning the status system or by the legitimization of an unrepairable breach between the conflicting parties. (Turner 1974: 37 ff.).

In contemporary societies Turner distinguishes so called liminoid threshold phenomena of breaking out from the *status quo* into spheres, in which control mechanisms and social conventions lose their binding character (Turner 1988: 72 ff.). They can retroact from the margin on the centre; they make it possible to reflect on the existing structures and transform them. This phenomenon, at the beginning of which times of social change occur, frequently is linked with social critique. According to Turner, those who are at the bottom of the status system regarding their positions, their social image and their means of influence are the ambivalent key actors of liminoid threshold phenomena in every society (Turner 2005: 95). He mentions the music festival in Woodstock (USA 1969) as an example of such a spontaneous, rapidly dissolved experience of the *communitas* (Turner 2005: 125; 131).

Anti-Structure refers to counter-spaces and at least temporarily opens up free spaces for self- or co-determination, the evolution of identity and community. Liminoid spaces are ritually designed social boundary areas and as areas of transition thus bear the potential of opening up new living spaces. At this point it is important to define the notion of space as a key concept of Turner’s ritual theory. Dieter Läpple (1991), a Professor of International Urban Studies, has developed a dynamic concept of social space. It connects concrete physical places and social structures and is characterized by the interaction of structural and action-related elements. Läpple’s model of a *matrix space* allows for the interpretation of social spaces according to their development context and their social operational framework. One of Läpple’s space dimensions is referred to as the *material dimension* in the form of a material-physical substrate. This analytical category refers to persons, human artefacts attached to a certain place as well as
material structures of utilization of nature acquired and overstrained by humans such as buildings, plantings, greenhouses and pastures. Läpple views the material level by means of different forms of communication as being incorporated into a natural whole which was not created by humans. As a second component of social spaces, Läpple identifies a dimension of action in the form of social practices of production, usage and appropriation of the spatial substrate by social actors. Institutionalized and normative systems of regulation define how space-structuring artefacts are dealt with. Sign, symbol and representation systems linked to the material substrate of the spaces which continuously shape themselves allow for the social functions of space-structuring artefacts to be cognitively recognized and convey affective means of identification (Läpple 1991: 194-197).

Aéroport du Grand Ouest
The municipality of Notre-Dame-des-Landes is supposed to provide nearly 80 percent of the entire planned space for the airport project. It has had the status of a designated construction area since 1974; during the same year the airport project was incorporated into the urbanization plans of the region. A total sum of more than 500 million Euros excluding taxes will be required for the project, around 43 percent of which will be subsidized by public funds. The project, which provides for airport buildings and infrastructure, two runways, enhanced road transport connections, as well as smaller areas for environmental compensation measures, threatens an area of approximately 2000 hectares of land. The concerned landscape comprises wetlands of significance for environmentalists, a unique Breton landscape with agrarian land surrounded by hedge banks as well as residential space (Renard and Rialland-Juin 2013, Avry 2012).

Citizens’ initiatives have accompanied farmers’ protest against the infrastructure project since its launch. Besides the cost-benefit factor which has been negatively assessed, the arguments for their opposition refer to the enormous disruptions and changes to the living conditions of the local population and nature, climate policy considerations and the fact that the existing airport of the city of Nantes, which is to be replaced, currently does not operate at full capacity (Avry 2012: 180).³

The ZAD is in a transitional stage regarding the implementation of the project (status 01/2017). In 2010 the Société Aéroports du Grand Ouest, a branch of the consortium VINCI — a global player in the construction, financing and operation of infrastructural facilities — became the concessionaire of the project.⁴ However, due to protests and ongoing court procedures, the construction of the airport was postponed by policy-makers in 2012.⁵ Some land owners agreed to the sale of their property and moved away, while others were

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³ cf. ACIPA: Ce qu’il faut savoir. URL: www.acipa-ndl.fr/ (09 January 2016).
⁴ See Decree No 2010-1699, 29/12/2010, which ratified the agreement between the State and the concessionary company Aéroports du Grand Ouest for the concession of the airports of Notre-Dame-des-Landes, Nantes-Atlantique et Saint-Nazaire. URL: www.legifrance.gouv.fr/ (14 June 2016).
⁵ See the newspaper article, Notre-Dame-des-Landes: Jean-Marc Ayrault veut calmer les esprits’ in Le Point, 26/11/2012. URL: www.lepoint.fr/ (14 June 2016).
misappropriated. Several farmers still refuse to accept eviction notices and to surrender their farmyards and land. In 2016 President Hollande proposed a referendum which was locally organized; on 26 June the electorate of the département Loire-Atlantique was called on to answer the following question: Are you in favour of the project to transfer the airport Nantes-Atlantique to the community of Notre-Dame-des-Landes? A majority of 55.2 percent of people voted ‘yes’. Meanwhile the anti-airport activists declared that they will keep on resisting. In January 2017, Bruno Le Roux, the Minister of the Interior, publicly declared that the French government would not implement its plan to evacuate the zone until the end of the ongoing judicial procedures.

Zone à défendre

Opponents and critics of the status system from France and other mainly European countries began to occupy the zone following the campaign gathering Camp for Climate Action in 2009 (Kempf 2014: 29 ff.). According to the occupiers’ estimations, approximately 150 people lived in the ZAD during the author’s visit in February 2015, although the number of inhabitants fluctuates significantly as many of them only stay there temporarily. A fundamental motive for taking action is based on broad social critique. The discussions conducted by the author reveal propagated worldviews, political attitudes and value-based demands and visions which draw on grassroots democratic and green anarchistic ideas as well as philosophical ideas from deep ecology in the broadest sense. As a linguistic code, the slogan Against the Airport and the World around it! points to social and system-critical value orientations with a global reference which might be called ‘ethics of environmental rationality’ (Prato 1993: 178). These value orientations are verbally conveyed on the basis of an inwardly integrative and outwardly expressive approach, demarcating anti-establishment rhetoric and anti-globalization discourse. The following core substantial aspects can be recognized:

- Hierarchical relationships of subordination and inequality in the private as well as public political sphere, which are disguised and preserved not only through disciplinary state power, but also through apparent freedoms such as the freedom of movement, democratic participation rights, relative prosperity and consumption possibilities.

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6 Interview with Sylvain Fresneau, farmer, historical resident of the ZAD. Les Domaines, 13 January 2015.
10 A thought leader of deep ecology is the Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss (see, Næss 1973).
11 Informal discussions with occupiers, ZAD of Notre-Dame-des-Landes, 08-14 January 2015.
The imposition of self-interests by powerful political-economic networks through *pseudo-democratic* political orders which ignore the legitimate interests of the population.

- A global capitalist system of profit-oriented sale of goods, resource-intensive and conflict-ridden trade and the appropriation, modification and destruction of natural resources.
- Uncontrolled freedom of action of multinational companies under the aegis of the rhetoric of growth, progress and consumption possibilities and to the detriment of social needs.
- Superficial social relationships due to the functional logics of the status systems and a lacking social consciousness that a life beyond the experienced compulsions is possible.
- The uncontrolled expansion of urban spaces (metropolization), the disappearance of agrarian land as a traditional foundation of life and the disrespectful handling of the common good of nature as the basis of all life.

Many occupiers stated that they see the airport project as one of numerous emblems of the perceived global status system. Boundaries are drawn between the occupiers on the one hand and the farmers and citizens’ initiatives on the other, though they are equally opposed to the airport project by means of these framings which are conveyed through discursive processes as well as written opinions of occupiers (L’Insomniaque 2013). Thus, the second part of the occupiers’ appeal *Against the Airport and the World around it!* is rejected in the discourses of the farmer representatives and citizens’ initiatives.

It became evident that nature and community, as well as freedom as the foundation of social coexistence, as a basic right, value and ideal condition are the most significant driving forces behind the involvement of the occupiers. When questioned by the author about their personal motivation for living in the ZAD, they frequently expressed the desire to actively send out a signal of resistance to a *status quo* they criticize. United in solidarity and in tolerant, collective, grassroots democracy — as free and self-governed as possible — they declared their wish to reflect on, develop and try out alternatives in an area of relatively untouched nature. They are supposed to learn to live together in a community with people from a different social background and with different ideas and visions, while protecting the wetlands and its biodiversity. The ZAD is regarded by numerous occupiers as a laboratory of life in multiple ways. According to them the zone constitutes a space for experimenting with ways of life and ideals which distinguish themselves from the regulatory mechanisms, expectations and practices of the status system. Activities related to various forms of social critique are to be concentrated in one place in the occupied zone. Numerous inhabitants are involved in largely autonomous collective housing and agricultural projects based on the principles of environmental sustainability and solidarity. They also engage in diverse forms of protest against the airport project and for the preservation of the ZAD as an autonomous zone. Many occupiers are involved in militant projects both inside and outside the zone, for example against right-wing extremism.12

Anna was attracted to and motivated by the evolving proactive flair as well as the prospect of creating a free space for action:

12 Informal discussions with occupiers, ZAD of Notre-Dame-des-Landes, 08-14 January 2015.
‘I realized that we had the opportunity to create something […] instead of being always against things, one could really stand up for something there, and this something was life! It was really about fighting for life, creating a living environment, preserving, protecting the living environment… it really appealed to me. Because fighting against things works for a while, but what do we have to offer afterwards? […] In Notre-Dame-des-Landes there was […] reflection, a desire to create together...¹³

In the ZAD, previously vacant homes were occupied and partially renovated or redesigned, while huts were built on the ground and in trees. Recyclable scraps and used materials from requisitioned remaining stock play a key role in these processes of a reconstruction and a re-definition of space. As elements of a culture of reprocessing and as symbols of local autonomy and a rejection of the market logic these recycled materials clearly have an identity-forming function and mark the aesthetic of the appropriated space.

As measures and symbols against the neglect of soil, gardens and permacultures were planted and are maintained in a sustainable way; spirulina was cultivated and plant-based sewage systems developed. A bread bakery and a beer brewery were constructed to increase food self-sufficiency. In addition to vegetable growing projects, occupants of the zone breed animals. The repertoire of projects includes theatrical, film and music groups, a medical plants group, joint efforts concerning repairs and the reconstruction of the historic structures of houses and the establishment of internet and communication rooms. The meeting rooms, a library and accommodations serve as common spaces for the development of a vivid discussion culture.

Critique of capitalism is also lived out through the restriction of private property to elementary personal necessities and the rejection of profit-oriented trade. All household objects are common property and divided resources. The transfer of goods takes place through informal economic exchange relations and — in the case of bread, agricultural products and cheese — by sale without a fixed price: the purchaser pays an amount that he/she is able to and that appears appropriate to him or her, which also includes the possibility of not paying at all. The aim is to cover production costs.¹⁴

Every inhabitant decides freely whether to participate in the projects and where to live in the zone. The compositions of the groups of residents fluctuate due to the mobility within and beyond the zone. Thus the different habitats of the ZAD are constantly transformed living places of ‘temporary communities’ (Gwiazdzinski 2016: 9). Trustful relationships based on common affiliations within friendship-based and interest-related networks have proven to be a significant foundation for the makeup of the residential communities.

Decisions are made by discussions in the groups as well as at the general meetings, where participants determine common positions and share experiences. The promoted fundamental principles of human interaction, respect, equality and tolerance not only shape the outward

¹³ Interview with Anna, former occupier of the ZAD of Notre-Dame-des-Landes, Montpellier, 22.06.2015. Emphasized words are marked in italics.
¹⁴ Informal discussions, participant observation in the ZAD of Notre-Dame-des-Landes, 08-14 January 2015.
rhetoric, but are also encouraged, practiced and debated time and time again as the guiding principles within the zone.15

Social critique as well as alternative forms of life are reflected in numerous symbols and in diverse linguistic codes with expressive and cognitive effects. Inscriptions, banners, slogans and graffiti ensure the public visibility of the protest action. These codes are symbolic references to the framing and the illegal status of the occupiers which play an important role for their self-staging and identity construction.

Other areas in France were also threatened by large infrastructural projects and occupied during my visits in 2015. The occupants of these zones defended similar objectives, resisting in situ (Gwiazdzinski 2016: 4) and demanding transparent and horizontal decision-making processes concerning the use of the occupied space. The occupied areas were also referred to as ZAD in the abbreviation’s militant sense by the occupiers, the media and in public debates. The ZAD near Nantes is linked by means of various personal and virtual networks (homepages like http://zad.nadir.org, blogs and social networks) with other occupied places in the country and beyond. The occupants temporarily change their places of residence and permanence, while maintaining diverse mutual relationships, personal contacts and relations of exchange. The ZAD near Nantes takes on a key role as a model, place of reference and point of orientation within the network of French ZADs. The reasons for this are the duration of the occupation, the complexity of social life within it, the consideration of ecological aspects in discourse and residential projects, its politicization and its confrontational nature.16

The occupations have to be regarded in the context of other contemporary forms of mobilization which also imply the (re-)appropriation and the transformation of (public) space, for example occupations of places and buildings, Guerilla Gardening, artistic projects and manifold innovative and festive forms of protest (Gwiazdzinski 2016: 3-6). The type of militant which is assigned to these recent forms of direct action is characterized by multiple individual (militant) affiliations and deep mistrust concerning ideological promises of salvation, formal organizational structures, institutions and hierarchies as well as centralized decision making. Their involvement in protests is marked by pragmatism and a demand for individual freedom, autonomy and enjoyment and is motivated by a readiness to experiment in order to develop and effectively use new potentials for action in the scope of plural, fluid social relations (Jeanneau and Lernould 2008: 141 ff.). The coordination of their projects takes place via informal networks of trust online and offline as well as via horizontal decision-making processes (Pereira 2010: 148 ff.). The socio-cultural background of the militants is very heterogeneous concerning their individual identities and their social strata. Nonetheless, they are united on the basis of their wish to reconstruct public space ‘here and now’ within the scope of concrete common projects and to experiment with non-discriminatory, responsible forms of social and economic

15 Informal discussion with I., ZAD of Notre Dame-des-Landes, 08 January 2015.
16 Participant observation, informal discussions in the ZAD of Notre-Dame-des-Landes, 08-14 January 2015, in the ZAD of Echillais (Charente-Maritime), 16 February 2015, in the ZAD Ferme des Bouillons (Seine-Maritime), 10 June 2015 and in the ZAD Agen (Lot-et-Garonne), 18 February 2015.
exchange and cooperation (Daniel 2014: 116-118). The following motivating factors for these recent mobilizations in France and beyond are apparent:

- A severe lack of legitimacy of the political parties and actors.
- The shrinking credibility of the trade unions and comprehensive, ideologically motivated projects of social change.
- Widespread perceptions of social insecurity and youth unemployment.
- A labour market and social policy which seem to only obey the principles of increasing capital gains and capitalist urban speculation.
- The increasing inequality of opportunities in life between the elite and masses, the bourgeoisie and social milieus of the city suburbs.
- Last but not least, generation gaps (Martínez López 2013: 871 ff.; Jeanneau and Lernould 2008: 141 ff.).

Generally speaking, the struggle for public space is an expression of ‘tensions between state morality and community and individual moralities as they are encapsulated in the ambiguities and distortions that often mark the processes of government, bureaucracy and legislation’ (Pardo and Prato 2011: 1-2).

**Heterogeneity and Ambivalence**

As I have mentioned earlier, the occupiers of the ZAD are extremely heterogeneous with regard to their political views, concepts of society and worldviews, their social backgrounds as well as their always very personal motives for living and taking action in the zone. The ZAD unifies bourgeoisie and working class children, people with university degrees and people who have not completed any formal education. People previously in high-ranking professional positions, former military personnel, university dropouts and previously unemployed people live with and among one another in the ZAD. People with a professional background in line with the demands of the status system live under the same roofs with, or in direct vicinity of people with a criminal past, former or current drug addicts and with people from the squatters’ movement. People from social milieus characterized by conservative values interact with people from autonomous leftist milieus. People from different age generations also come together in the ZAD. The fact that the inhabitants of the ZAD come from different regions and countries with different mother tongues reinforces the heterogeneity.\(^{17}\)

Also discernible are group-related patterns of self-identification and the identification of others — for example, feminists, environmental protectionists, anarchists, which are reflected by affiliations to their own group — and partly gender-specific residential groups in specific locations in the zone. There are thus more or less distinct demarcations between the groups. The affiliations with such spatially defined group-specific collective residential units seem to constitute a significant cleavage in the ZAD.\(^{18}\)

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\(^{17}\) Informal discussions, participant observation in the ZAD of Notre-Dame-des-Landes, 08-14 January 2015.

\(^{18}\) Informal discussion with I., 08 January 2015.
Substantial differences are also apparent with regard to the residents’ motives for action, which frequently point clearly to their individual life histories. In this regard various unaffiliated, partly overlapping kinds of loose individuals can be identified.

Numerous residents are explicitly politically active in promoting their more or less ideological worldviews and their self-perception. They can be described as militant free spirits. They want to make political statements with their alternative ways of life and simultaneously develop islands of personal freedom to live out their own lifestyles beyond the perceived social mainstream. They frequently regard the ZAD merely as one of many global islands of freedom that have evolved as autonomous counter-spheres and are linked by loose personal and virtual networks. They are nomads not bound to a certain place and often view the area of the ZAD not only as threatened nature and agrarian land, but rather as a useful ‘gap in the system’, as a means to the end of sabotage of the status system. They are frequently involved in non-partisan, network-like organized forms of cross-border social struggles outside the ZAD, which include anti-racist activities as well as activities against the oppression of disadvantaged segments of the population in general, for example for the recognition of the refugees in Calais or in support of the Mexican Zapatista movement. However, fervent supporters of anarchistic ideas have little understanding for advocates of grassroots democratic approaches within the status quo. Militant feminists see their own position in the zone as being undermined by macho behaviour and combat pathos as well as manifestations of sexism and perceive the propagated notions of equality as a pseudo-reality in the ZAD. Inhabitants who are primarily involved in nature protection activities sometimes explicitly distance themselves from the opponents of institutions, the police and the global capitalist system, which they perceive as being too confrontational and conflict-oriented, while others distance themselves from political ideology per se. Militant animal rights activists and vegans regard agricultural animal breeding as a form of oppression and exploitation in its own right. Their position collides with the interests of farmers.19

Apart from these militant groupings, there are other, very heterogeneous individuals who primarily use the zone as a personal island of freedom for the realization of a deliberately self-determined lifestyle and use the space — which was acquired, shaped and defended by militant free spirits and through their protest activities — either individually or as small collective units. Based on discussions conducted by the author, these people tend to be less militant. Their occupation is an end in itself. Since they do not or only seldom take part in collective protests and are sometimes perceived as moochers, who wish to acquire everyday necessities by violating the unwritten rule of reciprocity, they were described by one militant free spirit as individualist opportunists.20 Yet the latter by no means implies that they are not willing to confrontationally defend the ZAD against attempts to control it from the outside.

Equally heterogeneous individuals of a further spectrum seem primarily to want to live in a community, to belong to a collective social unit linked by a feeling of togetherness based on

19 Informal discussions, participant observation in the ZAD of Notre-Dame-des-Landes, 08-14 January 2015.
20 Informal discussion with I., 08 January 2015.
Turner’s notion of *communitas*; some of them may even been looking for parental authority. At the same time, no form of authority stemming from the status system is accepted. They can be regarded as *homeless people searching for a community*, whereby the term home is understood here both as a concrete place and a spiritual place. The motivation of the search for community as well as the difficulties in adapting to the demands and expectations of the status system, which manifest themselves in a feeling of being excluded in life outside the zone, unite this kind of people with the many militant free spirits. Many people without a home experience cohesion, solidarity, community and acceptance in the zone for the first time in their lives. They see the zone as the epitome of a true, simple and slow-paced life, as a place of spiritual liberation and as *refuge of non-conformists*. They see social acceptance as not being linked to status symbols such as *achieving the most* and *making money*, while their feeling of responsibility is frequently based on their efforts to manage nature responsibly. Numerous people searching for a community sympathize, though in different degrees, with the libertarian political ideals spread by the militant free-spirited inhabitants and engage to different degree in militant activities.\(^21\)

They are often, but by far not exclusively one-time homeless people, individuals from socially disadvantaged and conflict-ridden family relationships, people who had previously committed criminal offenses or people with a history of alcohol or drug addiction. They have frequently experienced limitations to their opportunities in the status system. Anna sums up:

> ‘Those excluded from the system who come together in these zones because they are kind of the last bastions where they are still welcome, because what we really want in the ZAD is for there to be no discrimination, no exclusion, for everyone with all their differences to be welcome and to succeed in living together in peace…’

There are occupiers who opt for this living space while fleeing from persecution in the status system or intentionally seeking a lawless zone. These *internal rule-breakers* do not represent any particular form of social critique. These generally less community-oriented individuals are not the ones who shape the political character of the ZAD. However, their conduct, for example the sale of hard drugs and aggressive physical assaults, does at times violate the informal rules of conduct and *codes* of social interaction respected by the majority of inhabitants. Their conduct reflects a dimension of illegality which the adherents to the alternative living projects view as illegitimate and undermining the community. How the inhabitants collectively deal with internal rule-breakers is a matter of controversial discussions regarding tolerance and the legitimacy of sanctioning and the danger of the reproduction of the sanctioning authority of the status system.\(^22\)

The range of individuals’ willingness to take community-related and protest-related action significantly differs and spans from the dedication to only living their own lives individually, to active community-oriented involvement in collective residential units and projects in and beyond the zone and the engagement in non-violent resistance on to a repertoire of more militant forms of protest.

\(^21\) Interview with K., ZAD of Notre-Dame-des-Landes, 08 January 2015.

\(^22\) Participant observation in the ZAD, informal discussion with I., 13 January 2015.
As a sphere of confrontation, the ZAD produces not only different communities of values, partnerships of convenience, loose temporary networks as well as group-based cleavages and discourses, but also informal hierarchical tendencies in social action. These are in part the expression of socio-psychological dynamics and communication structures in collective processes. They at least partially reflect the social positions or the social milieu segmentations of the inhabitants previously existing in the status system. One female occupier stated: ‘There are people here who have more to say than others.’ Not without resignation, Anna observed that ‘the big mouths’ are the ones mostly listened to during discussions and the decision-making process:

‘The human dynamics […] create leadership. After a while when there is an established group, everyone knows each other, the differences have been respected […] nevertheless human nature generates domination and the desire to impose ideas… Even if they are very nice one does not have to impose his own ideas because all tastes are in nature, everyone is different and every path through life has to be respected. And then there are power struggles which take place. I have a lot of difficulty with this.’

A heterogeneity factor at the individual level, which is partially linked to the social origin of the residents and relevant for the level of action in the zone, is the number and actual openness of ‘doors’ to the status system that individual occupiers have preserved. Such doors exist through social welfare benefits, occasional jobs in the surroundings, in the form of social opportunities based on their family, educational and professional background and by being incorporated into family and friendship networks beyond the zone. These doors offer prospects for leaving the ZAD and returning to the status system. While numerous occupiers have one or several such doors, others no longer have stable links to the status quo. This difference and the individual awareness of the existence or non-existence of such personal doors and social networks surely have an influence on their self-perception as well as on the patterns of individual behaviour and social interactions within the zone.

These puzzle pieces rudimentarily elaborated on already make it clear that the critique of the airport project itself as well as the critique of the status system in the discourses of the individuals and groups cannot be construed in the same manner and transformed to the level of action and interaction. The opinions and demands for action, whether and to what extent precisely the ZAD constitutes or can or should constitute a counter-sphere of experienced contrasts to the status system differ significantly among the groups. With regard to the level of action in the zone, militant free spirits criticize a divergence of living demands and social critique on the one hand and the practical reality of life on the other. In the opinion of several of these critics, the ZAD is ‘everywhere, not just here’. One militant free spirit angrily told the author that declared opponents of the consumer society categorically refused to collect leftover food from supermarket containers to be prepared and consumed in the zone. ‘It is as if we were putting one foot out the window’, says an occupier regarding the practical reality of life.

23 Informal discussion with Z., ZAD of Notre-Dame-des-Landes, 10 January 2015.
24 Informal discussion with C., ZAD of Notre-Dame-des-Landes, 10 January 2015.
in the ZAD. She justifies her regular visits to the zone with the opportunities for participation that it offers: ‘There are alternatives. And at least I can co-manage affairs here a bit.’ The multidimensional heterogeneities and ambivalences at the individual and collective level indeed result in controversial discussions not only regarding fundamental political and social issues, but also with respect to the legitimacy of violent protest strategies as well as the future design of a ZAD project in case the airport project is abandoned.

Anyway, it is apparent that the level of action in the ZAD is by no means subject to individual or collective arbitrariness despite or precisely due to the ambivalence, the cleavages and conflict potentials. The level of action rather plays out within a complex, partially ritualized system of formalized and informal grassroots democratic negotiations and social control. Indeed, collective practices of self-management, self-help and social cooperation are necessary and indispensable tools for the management of everyday life in areas of ‘a political action that is embedded in daily life’ (Pattaroni 2014: 72). These collective practices also have to include individual needs, routines and contributions, for example maintaining and cleaning the site, preparing meals, or just the need to withdraw from time to time (Pattaroni 2014: 73). The project work, everyday life and the organization of protest are significantly based on continuous processes of negotiation and compromises and attempts to construct a sustainable ZAD community are great challenges. These insights underline the importance of the general findings that moral values and orders per se cannot be assumed to be irrevocable, they are negotiable and changing and that legitimacies are always defined in the interplay between values, interests and orders (Pardo 2000: 8 ff.).

However, the widespread disappointment among the occupiers regarding the pressure of expectations, control mechanisms and inequalities in the status system, as well as the perception of lacking opportunities to assert particular interests in the perceived status quo, are an effective overarching basis for the construction of a ZAD identity by means of distinct anti-globalization and anti-establishment rhetoric, and the corresponding expressive codes. Perhaps it is precisely the plurality of friendly partnerships, partnerships of convenience and exchange relationships and networks that emerge in the everyday life in the ZAD that gives rise to trust and creativity and brings about a feeling of togetherness through the perception of being part of a self-determined social experiment. Perhaps it is these moments of pro-active optimism and perceptions of freedom and camaraderie detached from positions fixed by law, by tradition and by convention — which manifest themselves time and time again in discussions, project activities and celebrative culture — that at least temporarily constitute effective catalysts of the milieu-specific segmentation previously existing in the status system and the in part very different world views and motives for action of the occupiers.

The ZAD is a highly politicized and confrontational multidimensional space, which is constructed and constantly shaped by spatial artefacts and numerous codes and logics of work and social interaction in the sense of Läpple. The threshold character of the ZAD can be visualized in the form of a spatialized boundary: the D 281, a rural road that was appropriated by opponents of the airport project in June 2013, leads into the ZAD. Within it and at its edges

25 Informal discussion with Z., ZAD of Notre-Dame-des-Landes, 10 January 2015.
there is a broad range of artefacts with symbolic value including numerous living places and road blocks set up to defend the zone against law enforcement forces. The visual impression of the threshold character is reinforced by the landscape structure of the ZAD: the small pastures and fields surrounded by hedges, which symbolize life and authenticity in the eyes of many occupiers.

Drawing on Läpple, the ZAD is constituted as a synthesis of numerous individual cultural, residential and living spaces, which demonstrate their convertible characteristics and functions as continuously transformed and reassessed sub-spaces in the reality of life and the framing of the occupiers. Thus the zone also has manifold internal thresholds. As ‘aggregate artefacts’, most of these places with their often imaginative names and with their special functions in the zone comprise complex spatial symbolic and representative systems with integrative effects. Many of these places take on key significance for the identity-shaping narratives conveyed by the occupiers that they can achieve autonomy beyond the state’s control mechanisms and norm-setting powers. The key narrative is based on stories about the Opération César, the de facto failed police operation aimed at clearing the zone in 2012 (L’Insomniaque 2013).

Despite all ambivalences there exists a diversity of individual and collective interactions with the status system and feedback effects of the ZAD as a constructed, enacted collective body on the status system. This includes varied ways in which the occupiers frame their activities by means of publications, media, textual and audiovisual material both online and offline (L’Insomniaque 2013). During their interactions with representatives of the media, numerous occupiers state that their first name is Camille, which is gender-neutral in France. The pseudonym not only serves the purpose of anonymization. It also is a linguistic code for interactions with the outside to demonstrate unity and the capacity for action on the basis of a common ZAD identity which is detached from concrete locations, times and key figures. This code is the symbol of the construction of not only a new, dynamic group identity, but also for individual social identities which are continuously evolving.26 These identities are also dependent on the constructed opposition to adversaries in the form of the state as well as public institutions and economic actors. In the construction of these identities, breaches of norms of the perceived mainstream as well as physical expressions reflecting naturalness and authenticity, which are manifested in hairstyles and clothing, take on a key cognitive and emotional significance.

Informational events as well as often creative protest events are organized within and outside the ZAD. Furthermore, there are small cooperative projects focusing on alternative agriculture with ‘historical’ inhabitants who have involuntarily become occupiers due to their looming expropriation. An alternative market called Non Marché, at which agrarian products are offered without a fixed price, is held at a commonly accessible cross-way. Acquaintances of the occupiers are present in the ZAD as visitors, while cultural programs like concerts and lectures are open to everyone. The informal network Naturalistes en lutte consisting of

26 Informal discussion with I., 08 January 2015.
representatives of environmental NGOs, academics and interested citizens regularly organizes guided tours of the plant and animal life of the zone.\textsuperscript{27}

The common motivation for preventing the airport gave rise to a movement, whose strategic framing is focused on the disadvantages of the project: citizens’ initiatives and residents, environmental protection activists, farmers and zone occupiers as well as leftist parties, labour unions and committees of social critics from the entire country protest together on the streets and by means of common press releases and statements online and offline. As part of the general resistance to the airport project and against the clearing of the ZAD, people make use of a large repertoire of protest. This also includes large-scale demonstrations, which are regularly accompanied by parades of several hundred tractors. Last but not least, the occupants are supported by parts of the local population in diverse ways. For example, they provide them work material and were also visibly willing to save them from the \textit{Opération César}, the clearing of the zone by special forces in autumn 2012, by means of non-violent resistance on site (L’Insomniaque 2013).

\textbf{Conclusion}

This case analysis demonstrates the contemporary relevance of Turner’s insights on social threshold spheres as performative forums of social negotiation dynamics, of symbolic communication and transmission of messages in processes of social crisis and conflict. The ZAD indeed demonstrates a threshold character in manifold dimensions which span from the abstract-ideational dimension to the material dimension onto the spatial-geographical dimension and comprise both the individual and the group level. Ambivalence and the zone’s threshold character stimulate a critical discussion with the categories of \textit{anti-structure} and \textit{communitas}: must the terminological categorization be seen as substantively diffuse or maybe even as one-dimensional and idealizing? Or is, by contrast, the processual and ambivalent component, which became apparent while elaborating on the analytically relevant aspects of the ZAD, inherent in it? The zone can indeed be regarded as a counter-space for social critique, which originated at the margin where the norms of the status system lose their binding character: in a confined, narrow rural area on a territory with a disputed status and disputed ownership relationships. The appropriated experimental space is deliberately experienced as a contrast to the criticized control, hierarchy and social up and down in the status system. On the one hand, the counter-space brings about a great deal of reflexivity, creativity as well as its ‘own rules’ through the plurality of partnerships and horizontal exchange relationships and networks of trust. The ZAD is an emblem for spheres of identity, freedom, self-presentation and the creative staging of protest.

On the other hand, the ZAD demonstrates — in line with Turner — clear trends towards returning to routines, hierarchy and structure. It invokes individual and group-related cleavages, hierarchization tendencies, disparities in influence and diverse clashes of interest. At least partly they are manifestations and consequences of the socialization, social background and resources of individuals during their lives within the status system, and they bring forth conflict potential.

\textsuperscript{27} Participant observation in the ZAD, informal discussion with L., 13 January 2015.
Dynamics of collective processes correspond with those in the status system. The question arises whether the ZAD could ever have brought forth an *anti-structure* at all. Instead we might be inclined to speak of a social microcosm and generally question whether and to what extent such categorizations are justified at all. In the ZAD, *communitas* indeed manifests itself time and time again in the form of fluid, impulsive moments and forms of social interaction with a dynamic of their own.

The ZAD is a symbol of the increasing conflicts over the extensive transformation and exploitation of natural resources on a global scale. It is one of numerous *local* forms of expression of growing social dissatisfaction with the *national* political and socio-economic *status quo* in a centralized French state as well as with a perceived *global* status system. It is a spatially defined ‘burning glass’, which directs the focus towards conflicts that constitute comprehensive social change. The ZAD can indeed be interpreted as the liminal phase of a social drama in the sense of Turner, which is brought about by perceptions of crisis and which is characterized by numerous strategies to deconstruct and to (re)invent social reality and cultural orders.

The classification schemes for the ZAD as a bastion of utopists and as an Eldorado of violent vandals as well as categorizations of the occupiers as a consistent collective body (hippies, anarchists, anarcho-punks), which are propagated in public discourses, are categorically wrong. The actors of the threshold process are not permanent contact partners for political parties, are not partners of tactical alliances, and cannot be politically persuaded during electoral campaigns. They are border-crossers *par excellence*. 
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The First Ever Lebanese Non-Religious Marriage: An Ethnography from a Beirut Secular Setting

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This article focuses on how the Lebanese multi-confessional social, legal and political system has been challenged by the first non-religious marriage contracted in the country on November 2012 by a couple of Lebanese citizens, in spite of the current state laws that allow religious celebrations only. Through the personal status law system, the Lebanese Republic officially recognized seventeen religious communities and gave them absolute legislative power on family law. Supported by some civil society movements in the less confessional neighborhoods in Beirut, this couple legally challenged the current system through a rule that was established during the French mandate to protect people who did not belong to a religious sect. The discussion addresses the link between administrative and legal challenges in the Beirut urban environment to illustrate the dynamics by which this important event took place and its significance in the Lebanese social, political and legal system.

Keywords: Lebanon, confessionalism, civil marriage, Beirut urban setting.

Introduction

This article focuses on the challenge posed to the Lebanese multi-confessional social, legal and political system by the first marriage contracted in the country on November 2012 by two citizens, Nidal Darwish and his wife Kholoud Succariyeh, who do not belong to any religious sect. They made their marital consent before a non-religious authority. The discussion extends to other Lebanese couples who have made a similar decision, looking at the potential political significance of non-religious marriage celebrations in the Lebanese territory. My analysis draws on field research and interviews carried out in Beirut in March-June 2014 and April-May 2016 with professors, lawyers, religious authorities and activists who are directly involved in arguing the right to have a valid non-religious marriage within the Lebanese borders. For security reasons engendered by political and religious opposition, I was not allowed to interview the couple who celebrated the first non-religious marriage or the notary in whose presence they made their mutual consent to marry. I had to study their case through documentary sources.

Since the Lebanese Republic gained independence from France in 1945, the country’s legal structure has always referred marriage and family discipline to religious laws, preventing State authorities from celebrating marriages. The issue of non-religious celebration of marriages first appeared on the Lebanese political scene in 1998. Now, due to these couples’ legal actions, it has acquired new life. On February 2013, the Supreme Advisory Board of the Ministry of Justice officially authorized the transcription of the Darwish act of marriage, which had been contracted in the presence of a notary. Five more contracts of non-religious marriages followed, until the former Minister of Interior and Municipalities, Nouhad Machnouk, decided on February 2015 to refer civil marriage contracts to the civil courts of the country, asking them to examine their legality (Chbaro 2015).

The above mentioned couples have varied urban and rural provenance. Their most relevant common point lies in the legal, social and human support that they have received from civil society movements and NGOs located in Beirut. None of them received official support or legal help from the Lebanese political parties. Every couple’s private decision to have a
secular marriage faces a fairly long administrative procedure\(^1\) and strong opposition led by religious authorities and some political parties. I shall examine these dynamics in Beirut’s Gemmayzeh quarter, where civil society movements and NGOs have been working for decades, and where Mr Darwish and others couples struggled to establish their non-religiously sanctioned union.

In order to understand the relevance of this secular urban setting, we must address the sectarian partition of the Lebanese legal system and the territorial and the religious control at social level. These are some major consequences left behind by the Lebanese Civil War. Started in 1975 and ended in 1990, the war caused both state and society to implode, leading to deep religious fracture between Muslims and Christians. Once the war ended, the Lebanese people kept living in religiously homogeneous neighbourhoods, where they continue to share the same values, way of life and social control over religious rules on private and family life (Mollica 2011). This, however, contributes to limit unions between people belonging to different religions; unions that are not socially and legally accepted because they infringe religious rules. People aiming to marry in spite of religious norms can only do so by going abroad in any country that allows non-religious unions. If then, they decide to live in Lebanon, the newly married couples are legally allowed to register the act of marriage. However, social and family pressures could lead the couple to be excluded from the community’s social life; the new family would not be allowed to live in their own family’s village or urban neighbourhood and may also face violent reprisals.

For example, in the absence of a state secular law, Druze religious family laws do not allow unions with non-Druzes. So, Druzes are often forced to go abroad to get married to a non-Druze partner. A paradigmatic, and famous, case is that of a Shia man who married a Druze woman in 2006. He was forced to ask Hezbollah, the Shia political party, for humanitarian protection and financial support after being refused residence by the woman’s family and village (Australian Refugee Review Tribunal 2006).\(^2\) For the couple to be allowed residence, the Druze bride had to convert to the Shia faith. Raising a key theme in urban anthropology, this strongly exemplifies how living in an urban area is a matter of living in ‘a place of meaning and identity’ (Prato and Pardo 2013: 97); an identity that, in the case in point, is a religious rather than a national one.

From this perspective, the definition of ‘urban setting’ is expanded as to include both the spatial and the social dimension; it is a ‘highly spatial density of social interaction’, which differentiates it from rural settings (Prato and Pardo 2013). In this sense, the present discussion meets an urban anthropological approach that casts the urban setting under study in the broader context of national politics, economy and culture. The neighbourhood where I conducted my fieldwork is a Christian-Muslim mixed area of Beirut. There, a large number of civil society movements and NGOs have their headquarters. It is also home to Saint Joseph University, one of the most prestigious, religiously mixed academic establishments. Being a cross-religious

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1 This procedure starts with the removal of the couple’s religious affiliation from the official Register.
2 As I have indicated, ostracism can take violent forms. For instance, Druze relatives frequently try to kill or seriously harm the non-Druze partner.
space means that, on a political level, here civil society movements have traditionally gathered crowds who participate in organized marches and other forms of popular protests to pressure Parliament and to pass new legislation on civil marriage and, more generally, to reform the political system (Martel 2015).

Looking at the way authorities deal with the support for secular marriage manifested by this mixed, secular and political active segment of Lebanese society, is a useful way to study empirically how the legitimacy of governance is perceived in a context that is fairly distant from religious influences (Pardo and Prato 2011). Specifically, the celebration of the first civil marriages in the country can help us to understand whether Lebanese politics is strong enough to address the instances of people who only ask that their national identity should be reinforced, not the religious one. From an anthropological point of view, the analysis of Lebanese political stances in relation to civil marriage offers interesting insights to our understanding of state legitimacy, as it gives practical significance to the idea of ‘guaranteeing civil rights’ as part of the abstract political concept of ‘citizenship’ (Pardo and Prato 2011, Mollica 2011).

A Beirut Urban Setting Facing the Multi Confessional System
A starting point in the present discussion is the large number of non-religious unions celebrated abroad. In spite of strong social and religious oppositions, these unions increased after the end of the civil war in 1990, mostly among highly educated Lebanese people who were born after 1990. The great majority choose to fly to Cyprus to celebrate a civil marriage; this is especially the case with Christian-Muslim unions (Abboud Mzawak 2012). According to the statistics published by activists, these couples reported to have met their partner at university, in a mixed context, and described themselves as weak religious believers. Their high level of education gave them access to information about the legal procedure on how to celebrate a secular union abroad, but they still could not escape from social ostracism in Lebanon (Abboud Mzawak 2012).³ This complexity is the main reason why civil marriages in Lebanon represent a new and interesting step in the process of separation between religious and state power as regards family law. These couples embody the secular principle of the separation between personal faith and state rule and their actions raise the issue of the duty of the state institutions to protect and enact citizens’ freedom to choose their personal faith, as stated by Article 9 of the Lebanese Constitution of 1926 (Kanafani Zahar 2000).

According to the leaders of the civil society movements whom I interviewed in 2014, some of these citizens chose to oppose the multi-confessional system using the legislation currently in force by celebrating a non-religious union inside Lebanon. They intended to provoke a political reaction. Their broader aim was to point out that the current social, legal and territorial sectarian division is a consequence of the state’s failure to affirm itself as the supreme legislative power in the country; such a failure must be read in a context marked by the power of the various religious sects. Their attempt to make Lebanese politicians take a clear position on the need to pass a secular law on marriage reached an important point in 2015, when the

³ The statistics published in 2014 by the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs show that some 560 Lebanese couples chose to celebrate their marriages in Cyprus.
Ministry of Interior Affairs decided to halt the official transcription of non-religious marriages celebrated in Lebanon. It asked Parliament to pass a law on this matter arguing that such a delicate problem could not be disciplined through case-by-case administrative procedures.

Many activists also supported the more general political struggle on Lebanese multi-confessionalism reforms. I carried out interviews with religious authorities, academics, lawyers and civil society activists who for years have played prominent roles regarding civil marriages and secular status laws. Among the different groups of people involved in the civil marriage issue, I interviewed two Catholic bishops and several priests who worked as ecclesiastical judges and defenders of the bond at their respective Church’s Court of first Instance and Court of Appeal. I also interviewed a prominent Sunni Sheikh, who is a judge at the Sunni family court and a professor at Lebanese and European Universities and is therefore directly involved in the issues related to civil marriage.

As I mentioned in the introductory section, I could not interview the couple who celebrated the first non-religious marriage or their notary. There were serious security reasons involved, as they were subjected to strong opposition from religious authorities and political parties (Abgrall 2014). Such opposition continued even when both spouses publicly reaffirmed their personal Muslim faith and said that their motivation to have a non-religious ceremony was to stress the importance of distinguishing and keeping separate religious belief from state law (Skatvik 2013). Accordingly, they formally requested the Ministry of Interiors Affairs to remove their religious affiliation from public registry. Therefore, I studied the cases of couples who celebrated non-religious marriages in the country since 2012 in an indirect way, by collecting information from people who work with them or, on the contrary, have long opposed them.

Most interviews were held at Saint Joseph University and at different lawyers’ offices. The setting of Saint Joseph University for these interviews played a major role because this academic establishment is currently one of the major interreligious meeting places, where students belonging to all sects can meet, overcoming religious rules and weakening confessional control. Lebanese universities have played a key role in interreligious relations. Significantly, those established by Christian religious orders (as Saint Joseph University led by Jesuits, Saint Esprit University guided by the Maronite Church, Balamad University founded by the Greek-Orthodox Church and Sagesse University) have always been opened to Muslims. Saint Joseph University played a major role during the Civil War because it was located on the Rue de Damas, alongside the so called ‘green line’; that is, the urban line dividing the West Christian neighbourhoods from the East Muslim neighbourhoods. The University continued to offer courses during the fifteen years long war, opening its buildings to all students. Saint Joseph University, distinguishes itself also because it has long established a Master degree in inter-confessional dialogue opened to Muslims and Christians students.

As local academics told me, this role played by universities in granting free and non-religious places where students and young people can meet and share everyday life is a great

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4 I conducted the interviews at the archbishoprics and at Ecclesiastical Courts’ offices.
5 A non-religious place was chosen for these interviews.
tool in support of the idea of a common ‘Lebanese citizenship’ and state institutions. At the same time, they stressed a key aspect of this mixed space: studying together, young people can easily choose to live with a partner from outside their community. As one of the professor said, in mixed universities young students may fall in love with people from different sects and they can decide to give religious faith a less relevant position than the feelings that they experience.

A relevant role in my ethnography has been played by interviews with members of the Lebanese Association for Civil Rights. This association specializes in supporting couples who decide to have non-religious marriages inside the Lebanese territory. As it is suggested by its official denomination, this association intends to cast the struggle for a Lebanese civil law in a broader effort to enforce civil rights in the country. I did the interviews in their headquarters, talking to some of the leaders. I spoke with those working at a legal level, drafting the law on civil marriages and with those leading the social media office, who gave me information on popular support to their activities. The activists defined themselves as ‘just Lebanese’ and no one accepted to tell me their religious affiliation. On the contrary, some declared to be atheist and expressed the will to remove their official religious denomination from the civil registers. Some chose to go abroad to marry people belonging to a different sect; others simply chose not to place their unions under a religious law.

This association is basically non-confessional. It was founded in 1997 to fight against the death penalty and the use of violence at political level. They helped to rebuild a social coexistence after the Civil War. From this perspective, their support of civil laws allowing non-religious marriages is a way to open up the multi-confessional system and to let citizenship become the only, or at least the prominent, legal element in the Lebanese Republic. The choice of locating their headquarters in the Gemmayzeh neighbourhood embodied this non-confessional principle, as this is one of the less religiously homogeneous and richest areas in Beirut, even if it is part of the Christian Achrafieh district. Located to the east of Beirut’s Port, next to the Rue de Damas and Saint Joseph University, Gemmayzeh has been Christian since the Ottoman domination, as it was the Greek–Orthodox predominant quarter (Kassir 2010). Being a mercantile zone, this area has always seen the presence of different people working together. After World War I, Gemmayzeh hosted a consistent Armenian community. After World War II, the Christian Maronites increased their presence; so, when the civil war erupted in 1975, this neighbourhood became inhabited by a Christian heterogeneous population. Given the Christian-Muslim polarization in Lebanon and the urban religious segregation among different Beirut’s neighbourhoods, Gemmayzeh become the Christian counterpart of Basta and Hamra, the Sunni homogeneous quarters (Colombijn and Erdentug 2002, Mollica 2016). Being one of the Christian districts next to the ‘green line’, it became a sniper alley during the civil war and an urban example of the state institutions’ collapse and the society’s confessional fracture between Christians and Muslims. Following the end of the civil war, Gemmayzeh became the eastern edge of the post-war downtown reconstruction project. Since the beginning of 21th century, its low-rent rates have made it economically attractive (Mayaram 2009).

Over the last fifteen years, Gemmayzeh has become a modern, young, religiously mixed and sparsely confessional quarter that is famous for its trendy bars and restaurants (Beauchard 2012). It is now one of the most attractive urban spaces where people — above all, young people
— from all religious communities can meet escaping religious social control. Gemmayzeh and the richest zones in Beirut’s town centre should not, however, be seen as exemplary of Lebanese social reality. Those neighbourhoods represent the most modern urban part of Beirut and the whole of Lebanon, clearly showing deep social fractures in the country. In addition to the religious fracture, other divisions should be taken into consideration: the opposition between urban and rural areas, the economic gap keeping separate rich urban districts and the poorest zones and lastly the specific role played by Beirut as the capital city. Beirut was the main battlefield of the fifteen-year-long civil war and is now inhabited by 1.5 million Lebanese who share that urban space living in religiously homogeneous neighbourhoods. In most of Lebanon, then, the great majority of population live next to people belonging to the same sect. In mixed villages and cities, there are always different quarters. Christians and Muslims live in their own neighbourhoods. Different Muslim communities do not share the same quarters (Mollica 2016). The Zokak el-Blat neighbourhood is a good example of this territorial division along sectarian lines. Up to the eruption of the Civil War, it was a mixed urban area. It became inhabited by Shia refugees during the Civil War and nowadays is influenced by the Shia Hezbollah party (Marot and Yazigi 2012).

People generally choose to live in sectarian urban quarter or rural area because being a minority in a religiously homogeneous zone involves facing religious legal prohibitions from buying and selling properties outside the community and being forced to abide by alien cultural and legal norms and values (Mollica 2016). Moreover, people who survived the Civil War still have memories about inter-confessional atrocities and keep their religious rules as a basis for their social life. Schools are a good example: in Christian areas they are closed on Sundays; in the predominantly Shia areas in south Lebanon weekly holydays are on Fridays. Such confessional separation can still be seen in Beirut itself and the division between Sunni and Shia zones has been reinforced by the current growing political opposition between the Sunni-led Future Party (mostly against the Syrian regime) and the Shia Hezbollah movement (mostly pro-Syrian regime).

Empirical and theoretical studies have largely demonstrated how this social and territorial sectarian division is a direct consequence of the fifteen-year-long Civil War and the political actions carried out during and after the war. However, we have to look at the national Lebanese legal and political grounds in order to understand the weakness of the state in relation to religious community power in family law matters.

The Family Law System and the Lack of Division between Religious and State Power

The Lebanese Republic is a typical multi-religious society led by a multi-confessional political system; citizens’ religious affiliation is at the base of its architecture. According to Article 95 of the Constitution of 1926, the allocation of political and public administration offices and parliamentary seats should be based on a religious sectarian quota system. In 1990, at the end of the civil war, all political factions agreed to modify this article, introducing the principle of personal competence as the basic requirement to be hired as civil servant. This constitutional reform could be seen as a serious step taken by the state institutions to overcome the confessional affiliation-based system. Meanwhile, confessional quotas continued to be the basic
criteria in the election of Deputies (Members of Parliament). Moreover, the reformed article 95 for the appointment of civil servants has never been implemented.

The old version of article 95 continues to have legal power, making it impossible for personal competence to become the decisive element in Lebanese public administration. (Messarra 2003, Gannage 2013). Lebanese political parties have never engaged in legally implementing the constitutional reform on which they agreed in 1990. This is a consequence of their electoral basis and their political structures being related more to religion than to political ideology. The link between religious and political affiliation is observable in the current Lebanese political framework, which is controlled by the two coalition parties that resulted from the Sunni-Shia religious opposition, leading to two frameworks of regional alliance. The Shia party, Hezbollah, leads a coalition with the Christian-based Free Patriotic Movement; this coalition supports the Assad regime and Iran. The Sunni-led political party, Future, leads a coalition with some Christian parties, such as Kataeb and Lebanese Forces; this coalition is strongly anti-Assad because the Syrian regime was involved in the Lebanese civil war from 1975 to 1990 and then de facto occupied the country until 2005. The political fracture between Sunni and Shia communities has increased since Rafiq Hariri, the former prime Minister and Future party’s leader, was killed in a car bomb attack on 14 February 2005. The Sunnis continue to accuse the Syrian regime and Hezbollah to be responsible for the attack. Furthermore, since the Syrian civil war started in 2011, Hezbollah has been sending huge numbers of his Lebanese members to fight for the Syrian regime, while the Future movement has shared the Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Gulf states’ support for the anti-Assad rebels, though only at political level.

As a consequence, these parties have little interest in modifying the public administration system and relinquish their religious quotas of civil servants. More relevantly, inaction in implementing the constitutional reform highlights a common interest of religious and secular power in avoiding granting fundamental rights to citizens, regardless of their religious faith.

At the same time, according to Article 9 of the Constitution, the multi-confessional system leads to state recognition of religious-based personal status laws, granting confessional authorities absolute legislative and jurisdictional competence over family law. This legal set-up, inherited from the Ottoman Empire, recognizes religious affiliation as the only legally relevant element in personal and family relations, which are considered to be the only legal way to pass core values, especially religious values, from generation to generation (Messner 2011).

The 1923-1943 French mandate established a lawful option for atheist and secular citizens, including all kinds of wedlock that breached religious norms. Thus in 1936, through a law approved by Parliament, the French High Commissioner ratified the Article 14 of the Arrêté (Decree) n. 60, providing the creation of the so called ‘communauté de droit commun’ (community common law). That law should have disciplined family law issues under a set of secular and state legal principles. At the same time, that Arrêté officially recognized 18 religious communities and their different religious laws, granting them the full right to apply their legal principles to marriages between their members. This would have been the legal way to prevent the primacy of religious affiliation over national citizenship and allow state power to balance sectarian power (Gannage 2001). However, since Lebanon gained independence from France in 1945, the legislative power has never managed to pass a secular family law. Moreover, the
civil law passed in 1951 officially forbids marriage celebrations by non-religious authorities, recognizing only non-religious unions contracted abroad. Since independence, Parliament has rejected all draft laws on civil marriage and on the implementation of civil courts’ jurisdiction on this matter. Consequently, the French Arrêté (Decree) 60/1936 is still in force (Dubois 2002).

Legally, this personal status system became a ‘closed matter’ based on the personal religious affiliation’s principle instead of on the principle of the general territoriality of the state law (Messaara 1994). This has been named ‘closed system’ because people have the right to change their religious affiliation but the state law does not allow them to regulate their family matters under non-confessional rules if they choose to reject religious affiliation altogether. Thus, until the first non-religious marriage was celebrated on 10 November 2012 and officially registered on February 2013, non-religious unions were allowed under Lebanese law only if people married abroad and then had their civil marriage recorded in a Lebanese Public Register under article 25 of Arrêté 60/1936 (Tobich 2008). Even if the Ta’if Agreement — signed by all political factions in 1990 to end the Civil War — proclaimed the end of the confessional principle on a political and administrative level, there continues to be no legal way to be a Lebanese citizen and fulfil civil and political rights without belonging to any religious sect (Tobich 2008).

On a theoretical level, this situation could be seen as religious affiliation prevaricating state citizenship. It could be seen as a weakness in the bond between state and citizens. On a practical level, the lack of the state power in this key legal field has relevant consequences for Lebanese citizens who have no religious affiliation, including those who were married by a non-religious authority in Lebanon. These people have no parliamentary representation; they are not allowed to fulfil their right to be elected to Parliament, are legally unable to apply for a public job and have no legal protection regarding family issues. Their only legal recourse is the Arrêté 60/1936, which as I have indicated would allow Parliament to pass a secular family law. This legal vacuum and political lack of state power became particularly relevant when the Darwish couple had their first child; their baby was the first Lebanese citizen without any religious affiliation and with serious limitations to his civic and political rights.

The Civil Marriage in the Lebanese Political and Social System
Since the country’s independence in 1945, Lebanese political parties, groups of lawyers and civil society organizations have drafted various proposals on marriage laws. Especially after the end of the Civil War, politicians and civil society activists produced draft laws on family matters, introducing the institution of civil marriage. None of those projects has ever been voted on by the Lebanese Parliament because strong religious opposition has always influenced all political parties not to do so. Let us not forget that, due to the parliamentary sectarian quota system, the electoral base of each political party is religiously homogeneous (Karam 2006, Tobich 2008).

Religious prevarication over the State was highlighted in 1998, when the President of the Republic, the Christian Maronite Elias Hraoui, officially presented to the Government, led by the Sunni Muslim Deputy Rafiq Hariri, a draft law on optional civil personal status. By letting civil marriage become an option (as opposed to a compulsory religious ceremony), he intended
to give the state a legal supra-religious dimension that would respect both confessional requirements and citizens’ freedom of belief (Karam 2006). Nevertheless, religious authorities opposed this legislative proposal and the former Prime Minister, the Deputy Rafiq Hariri, along with all political parties, refused to let Parliament debate the Bill (Ofeish 1999). This parliamentary impasse allowed the Darwish couple — who, as we know, contracted the first non-religious marriage on 10 November 2012 — to challenge the Lebanese legal system through the 1936 French Decree’s provision of a community common law compelling state authorities to recognize that a de facto ‘community common law’ now existed. So, for the first time in Lebanese history, a private decision was supported by sections of Lebanese society as a direct way to pressure the legislative power on such old legal issue. Further considerations will help to explain why civil society movements, such as ‘The Civic Centre for the National Initiative’, and legal experts decided to support the Darwish’s plan (Muhanna 2013).

Mr Darwish and his wife lived in Beirut and belonged to two different Islamic sects. He was Sunni, she was Shia. They described their families as ‘conservative’, even if they did meet in a non-religious setting, an English language course given by Mrs Darwish in Beirut. Even in such a problematic family milieu, an inter-Muslim union would not become a problem if celebrated by a Muslim judge; this kind of marriage is indeed frequent in Lebanon (Tobich 2008). So, their union challenged the legal system distinctly because they chose to celebrate the wedding ceremony in the presence of a notary, not of a religious authority.

This choice made by the Darwishes is integral to their political motivation to enforce secular state institutions, and to do so through any kind of initiative, including private and non-publicly organized ones. This would challenge the religious-based personal status laws system, bypassing legislative impasse through a simple implementation of the Decree 60/1936. As a consequence, they had to organize a secret ceremony including only her brother as a witness. The urban Beirut context helped them to be supported by a structured civil movement led by legal experts and lawyers (Brophy 2013), which raises the question whether such a decision could have been taken by a couple living in a rural area, or in a more religiously controlled city, far away from NGOs and civil society movements. Here, I shall remind the reader that they received no concrete support from the political parties; even those that officially supported their decision failed to engage in a parliamentary debate to approve a civil marriage law. Moreover the couple had to face strong opposition led by every Muslim authority and even by some Christian authorities. This needs attention.

Decisions officially taken by the Gran Mufti (the highest Sunni religious authority), Sheikh Mohammad Rachid Kabbani, show clearly the depth of religious control over family matters in Lebanon. On 28 January 2013, immediately after the couple sought for the official transcription of their act, he called a Dar el-Fatwa’s meeting. There he declared apostate every Sunni Lebanese citizen who would undertake a non-religious marriage and every Sunni Lebanese Registrar who accepted that act of marriage and recorded it in the Public Register (Papi 2016). Similarly, the highest Shia authority — although did not share such serious charge against couples, notaries and registrars — stated that this kind of marriage is ‘illegal because it is in contrast with the Shari’a law’. He added, however, that a dialogue between state and religious authorities was needed to address their different meanings of the institution of
marriage (Sadaka 2013). The majority of Christian religious leaders also opposed any law on civil marriage, though some of them did stress the need to respect the freedom of belief. This could also mean freedom not to have a religious faith and to discipline family relations only according to a civil regulation.

The opposition of the religious authorities led to the current political impasse. If in 2013 and 2014 Muslim politicians like Saad Hariri expressed their personal support to the Darwish couple and their struggle for a civil marriage law, they did not act consistently at legislative level; they made no effort to make Parliament debate any of legislative proposals that had been drafted over the years. Christian-led parties — like Lebanese Forces, Free Patriotic Movement and Kataeb — tried and failed to pass a civil marriage law and Michael Sleiman, the (Christian Maronite) President of the Republic until May 2014, publicly endorsed the first act of marriage’s official transcript.

This situation replicated the 1998 religious and political opposition to the draft optional civil personal status law presented by the President of the Republic Elias Hraoui. The Parliamentary impasse throughout 2013 mirrored what had happened fifteen years earlier. In May 2014 the mandate of the President of the Republic expired and a long vacancy followed, which prevented the Deputies from legislating. The new President, the former Christian Maronite general Michael Aoun, was elected on 31 October 2016. The forthcoming general election, scheduled for April-May 2017, contributed to keep the secular family law issue away from parliamentary consideration.

At the time of writing, other Lebanese couples, who in 2014 and 2015 followed the Darwish’s administrative procedure to remove their religious affiliation from public registers, got married in front of a notary. They are asking for their marriages to be officially registered. It would seem that the civil movement cannot be stopped despite the intervention of former Minister Nouhad Machnouk who, on February 2015, referred civil marriage contracts to the civil courts in order for their legality to be examined. He asked the Government and the Parliament to legislate along these lines after the election of President of the Republic (which, I have said, happened on 31 October, 2016). This act prevented forty other couples from registering their acts of marriage and, besides failing to eliminate the legal problem posed by non-religious unions, it did leave those forty families legally unprotected (Chbaro 2015). The Ministry’s legal action did not, however, affect the acts of marriage already registered. So, a group of Lebanese people with no religious affiliation is currently living in the country; they are officially protected by the Decree 60/1936 on ‘community common law’, while waiting for a state legislation that codifies the status of the secular family.

Where Will He Live? Critics of Administrative Procedure and Marriages
According to some experts whom I interviewed, family law is a much too sensitive legal issue to let it become disciplined by a case-by-case approach. Children, for example, are affected by legislative decisions and the lack of a civil code heavily conditions their lives as their civic and personal rights are limited. Some experts strongly support a Parliamentary action that passes a

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6 Saad Hariri is the leader of the Sunni Party ‘Future’ and Prime Minister since November 2016.
complete and general state law on non-religious marriage, arguing that this is the only way to define clearly which state authority will be entitled to marry people, and to rule on matters such as the rights and duties between the couple and towards the children, the procedure to file for divorce and to establish the monthly allowances for the poorest family members. Legal problems will grow, considering that the Darwishes’ first child is now born. As Lebanese law transmit the father’s religious affiliation to children when they are born, this is the first Lebanese baby who does not belong to a religious community, and if a civil law is not passed he will face the aforementioned problems in his social, economic and political life.

The number of people in the same situation will obviously increase in the near future, as other children will be born to the officially non-religious families. Two options seem to be on the table. The first is to dismantle the multi-confessional legal and political system in favour of a democratic system where faith would be considered a private matter. The second is to ‘open’ the current multi-confessional system to people without religious affiliation, keeping religion as a main element in governance. The latter would lead to the complete application of the amended version of Article 95 of the Constitution and would help to keep a political balance among the confessional communities, at the same time giving the state the role of a real and unique supra-religions institution (Messarra 2003).

The legal experts and academics whom I interviewed in 2014 and 2016 stressed the historical and current role played by religion in Lebanon and believed it to be paradoxical to ask Parliament to abolish the multi-confessional system because Parliament is elected according to a confessional quota system. Lawyers mentioned past examples, such as the protests organized by their association in 1951 against proposed legislation on non-Muslims personal status laws and in support of a secular law. This protest was joined by the great majority of Lebanese lawyers but failed to gain strong popular support and, after a 50-day-long strike, they had no choice but continue to apply religious rules to the family procedures for which they were responsible.

Some of these experts and academics underlined the risky strategy chosen by the civil society movements that led protests in some of Beirut quarters. Secular activists’ actions, they noted, need more popular support in order to be able to exert a stronger pressure on Deputies. Civil society activists explained to me that, as their legal strategy met the persistent parliamentary impasse that I have described, they have chosen to engage in administrative procedures aimed at making politics (meaning, political interests) face a de facto situation. At the same time, their interviews in the national press and their social activities helped to advertise their actions and gain popular support, at least among the young. The youngest and less religious generation of Lebanese citizens is indeed their best hope to garner poplar support for a general reform of the multi-confessional system.

These informants’ reference to general reforms led me to ask three, more complex questions: If the multi-confessional system is overturned, what kind of legal and political system could be set in its place? What does ‘secular’ system really mean in a country where 18 different religious communities have been living together for centuries? Would it really be possible to limit personal religious affiliation to a private dimension that did not affect the legal and political sphere? Their answers to these questions focused on the creation of a secular
political regime as a response of the huge religious variety. Secular movements have been engaged in this struggle since the end of the civil war, arguing that only a legal and political system completely detached from religious affiliations could prevent the country to experience again a civil war between Christians and Muslims.

It is from such perspective that these groups of civil society activists generally supported the Darwishes’ struggle and their and other couples’ choice to have a non-religious marriage, asking the Ministry of Interior to recognize these marriages under the French Decree. On the other hand, legal experts and professors who support the need for an organic family law to be passed by Parliament argue that at the moment a complete overturn of the current multi-confessional system could be politically and socially impossible. So, they suggest, it would be more efficient to reform the legal and political system, opening it to non-religious people, thus implementing both the French Decree on the ‘community common law’ and the Constitution, which protects the right to conversion; that is, the right to convert from a religious faith to an atheist stance. According to them, only a Parliamentary law disciplining the whole matter of family law could open the political and legal system to non-religious Lebanese citizens granting them the same rights and duties enjoyed by the Lebanese who belong to religious sects.

**Conclusion: Will a Lebanese Secular Family Law Emerge?**

The study of the complex problems surrounding civil marriages in Lebanon has exemplified the issues marking the division between religious power and secular state power in the country. Looking at civil marriage and family law reforms in relation to the sectarian partition of the state’s administrative, parliamentary and political institutions has highlighted the impact of religion on politics. Religion gives strength to political identity. Here, major political parties are religiously-based and politicians are elected on the basis of their religious affiliation. It is therefore unsurprising that, as we have seen, since the end of the civil war in 1990 the political establishment has failed to redefine the relationship between religious power and state power; it has failed to make political ideology more relevant than religious affiliation in politics, administration and Parliament. The civil war ended because a political agreement — the Ta’if agreement — was reached between Muslim and Christian political parties on the basic principle that living together in a united Republic would be better than fighting each other in order to build a religiously homogeneous state. However, the state institutions and politics have failed in reaffirming their supremacy over religious affiliation (Mollica 2011). The draft law on secular family code is a relevant example of how religious affiliation has kept control over politics, making governance increasingly unable to answer citizens’ non-religious requests and, thus, gradually losing its legitimacy. Other examples abound of how Lebanese have reacted to this situation and fought for reform. One thinks of the law on domestic violence against women; this legislation was opposed by Muslim religious leaders and was finally passed by Parliament on April 2014 following a compromise with Muslim Deputies. A compromise was reached after ‘marital rape’ was removed from the definition of domestic violence; it continues to be ruled by Muslim law. This example is useful for two reasons. First, Christian and Druze religious authorities considered domestic violence to be part of their legal competence; so, while they supported this draft law, they also stressed that it would reinforce the protection of women
grant by their religious norms on marriage. On the other hand, the Muslim religious authorities who opposed the law argued that it was contrary to their religious rules. Their opposition led Muslim Deputies to oppose this law in Parliament until the Commission charged with studying the issue came up with the aforementioned compromise. The second reason is related to the social context in which this law was drafted. Before it reached Parliament, civil society movements had led a widespread campaign to defend women from all forms of domestic violence, underlining how the lack of a state law was affecting women and limiting their rights, as they were subjected to the laws of religious communities (Massena 2014).

Several civil society movements and NGOs led by the feminist and secular Lebanese NGO named KAFA (Enough) are located in the Gemmayzeh neighbourhood. Their members often say that they do not follow a religious faith, despite their obligation to belong formally to their father’s community as per Lebanese law. The urban secular setting in Beirut was for these movements a safe place to protect women belonging to religious sects and to develop their initiatives. The everyday work addressing the needs of women who live far away from the richest and less religiously controlled Beirut quarters has allowed KAFA and other associations to enter the most religiously homogeneous areas of the country, such as the Bekaa where religion plays a major role in social control. The political compromise reached by the Deputies on the religiously sensitive article of the draft law that I have discussed has enabled the state to give some kind of protection to battered women and to affirm for the first time the supremacy of its legislative role over religion.

There is of course no complete parallelism between this case and that of civil marriage. However, in this case civil society secular movements notably accomplished a major objective: a reform that codifies the legal protection of women and that reached through a compromise between political and religious authorities. The current Parliamentary sectarian quota system seems to make Parliament capable of passing laws that modify specific aspects of the legal multi-confessional structure. However, as all political actors are more or less explicitly religion-oriented, a general overhaul of the political and legal system appears to be an unachievable goal (Karam 2006). Parliament’s approval of the new law on domestic violence against women also highlights the need to gain the support of people living far from Beirut’s urban secular neighbourhoods in order to gain Deputies’ support (Salameh 2014).

Although the support of civil society and legal experts to the Darwishes’ private decision to challenge the legal system would seem to indicate a growing popular consent, most of Lebanese society still appears to reject this kind of secular reform. As some legal experts clearly said when I interviewed them, widespread support for civil marriages could be easily achieved if this institution was seen as an option and not a secular imposition by the state against religion. Linking this kind of marriage to the official cancellation of religious affiliation could bring people to think that this is an attempt to fight religion. On the other hand, the Lebanese state institutions should implement fully the laws still in force, despite religious opposition, thus affirming the supreme role of the state as the body uniquely entitled to protect the rights and freedoms of all Lebanese citizens, including those who decide to be secular. The real challenge is to gain support beyond the most secular neighbourhoods. Only if the idea of a supra-religious civil legislation on family matters is shared in the most religiously controlled areas of the
country, the son of the Darwish couple will have a chance to choose freely where to live and will not need the support of civil society movements to exercise his civil and political rights.
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EDITORIAL NOTE

On the Anthropology of Corruption

The complexity and elusive nature of corruption makes an empirical investigation notoriously difficult; a task that is made more complicated by the ethnographer’s encountering and having to account for not only corruption that breaks the law but also corruption that does not break the law or that is made to fall within the boundaries of the law.

Unlike other social scientists, anthropologists have generally stayed away from this topic. With a few exceptions (for example, Gupta’s ‘Blurred boundaries: the discourse of corruption, the culture of politics, and the imagined state’, 1995 and the contributions in Pardo ed., *Morals of Legitimacy: Between Agency and System*, 2000 and in Pardo ed. *Between Morality and the Law: Corruption, Anthropology and Comparative Society* 2004), this has been the case, until recently. As what is becoming a sub-disciplinary field is rapidly growing, this seems an opportune time to encourage reflection on the complex issues involved in the ethnographically-based study of this topic; hence this Special Section.

While bribery, extortion, tax evasion and illicit exchanges of favours would seem to recur across different societies, there is considerable historical and ethnographic variation in the occurrence, dynamics and extension of corruption, in the perceptions of corruptness and in the interpretations of the legitimacy of corrupt acts. Ideas of what constitutes corrupt behaviour, the deceits of language by which corruption becomes routinized and the ways in which corruption and bribery are legally defined change in place and time. Steering clear of cultural relativism, corruption needs to be examined contextually and diachronically. In particular, attention needs to be paid to ambiguity in official definitions of what constitutes — morally and legally — illegitimate behaviour in public life. Anthropology has a unique contribution to make.

The two essays that follow testify that an in-depth investigation is an effort worth doing if the objective is to develop an analysis that moves beyond legalistic ‘certainties’. They are reproduced here with the aim of encouraging discussion and, hopefully, stimulate further contributions from our readers.
Who is Corrupt?
Anthropological Reflections on the Moral, the Criminal and the Borderline

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Drawing on historical and contemporary evidence from Great Britain and Italy, this article examines actions that fall under official definitions of corruption and actions that are not illegal but are widely regarded as morally corrupt. As a social anthropologist, I argue that when dealing with the complexity of corruption and abuses of power, we need to identify what aspects of the system encourage or generate illicit practices (illegal and legal) and what aspects could instead generate real change. It is imperative to assess the precise identity of the dividing line between the legitimate and the illegitimate and between the legal and the moral, and to address both the exact relationship of the protagonists in public life to formal law and its production and their perceived legitimacy in the broader society. Empirical evidence suggests that the production of the law must take into account the moralities which inform the definition of legitimacy at the grassroots, for legislation that enjoys such legitimacy is authoritative — therefore effective — legislation, and thus is governance that benefits from and abides by such legislation.

Key words: Corruption, abuse of office, legitimacy, legitimation.

In this chapter I draw on historical and contemporary evidence from Great Britain and Italy to study illegal behaviours, particularly corruption. I examine actions at various levels of the social spectrum that fall under official definitions of corruption and actions that are not illegal but are widely regarded as morally corrupt. My analysis heeds the contentions that not always the strictly legal is received as moral and legitimate in the wider society, that there illegal behaviour may enjoy legitimacy and that the Law cannot afford to obey the moral orientations of an élite. As a social anthropologist, I argue that while avoiding the straightjacket of legal pluralism (Tamanaha 1993), the production of the law must take into account the moralities and ethical principles which inform the definition of legitimacy at the grassroots, for legislation that enjoys such legitimacy is authoritative, therefore effective, legislation.

A methodological note is due. The empirical study of corruption is made difficult by the complexity and elusive nature of this phenomenon; however, anthropologists have proved to be well equipped to address the shadowy fields of activity involving illegal, legal and ‘borderline’ forms of corruption. My own and other, regrettably few, ethnographically-based studies demonstrate that the disciplinary commitment to the in-depth investigation of the micro-level can be met. Useful information is often a contested by-product of anthropological research; the ethnographer ‘happens’ to collect first-hand material on corrupt behaviours while carrying out fieldwork on other issues. As, of course, corrupt deals are often marked by degrees of secrecy, it takes time for their ramifications and implications to become clear. It may be difficult to reach sufficient insider status to meet fully the demands of the method of participation and direct observation may not always be possible. However, background, consequential and connected events can be recorded, officials’ reports, memoirs and

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1 This essay was originally published in 2013 in Human Affairs (Vol. 23, No 2: 124–147).
2 I am most grateful to Rosemary Harris and Giuliana B. Prato for their criticism and comments on an earlier version of this article.
autobiographies are good sources and it is highly productive to focus on the ways in which people talk about the corruption of others and, in some instances, their own role in corrupt deals.

**What is Corrupt?**

As argued in detail elsewhere (Pardo ed. 2000c), what is legal is not always broadly regarded in society as moral and legitimate and what is illegal as immoral and illegitimate. There are modes of action which people widely regard as corrupt but are not so regarded by the law, while others that are legally corrupt may be recognized as (morally) legitimate, or necessary, in the wider society, begging the key question whether in state societies legal concepts and institutions do necessarily structure social interaction.

The sections that follow will bring out the weakness of legal definitions of corruption. Here, I note that such a weakness also undermines a large body of literature that deals with illegal forms of corruption that are defined as illegal (see, for example, Della Porta and Meny eds 1997, Levi and Nelken eds 1993, Rose-Ackerman 1999). Contributions to Part IV of the handbook edited by Heidenheimer, Johnston and LeVine provide a good example both of the breadth and limitations of mainstream analyses (1989; see especially pp. 728-825). We shall see that corrupt actions and abuses of power may be ignored by the law because an understanding of what goes on in certain sections of society is missing. Alternatively, they may be known to law-makers but it may be difficult to draft adequate legislation. There are, however, other, more problematic possibilities.

Governments and law-making bodies do not stand above the fray. By definition, legislation tends to be informed by the interests and moral attitudes of decision-makers. This certainly applies to the laws on corruption which, as a consequence, may fail to enjoy broad social recognition. Such arbitrariness both stresses the partiality of the law, and its inherently contentious character (Weber 1978: Ch. 8), and raises questions on what morality should be significant to the making of the law.

There are complex ways in which differences between concepts of corruption in society and in the law inform ambiguities and confusion. Alongside questionable (morally corrupt) behaviours that do not take place outside the law, an intriguing line of analysis is stimulated by actions which fall or are made to fall in the boundaries of the law by vested interests but are nonetheless received and talked about as illegitimate and (morally) corrupt in the broader society. In brief, in line with the principle of ‘heterogeneity of morality’ (Lukes 1991: Ch. 1), the culture of corruption and abuses of power, and the representation of their practice, may be subjected to nuanced, and changing, moral evaluations (see, for example, Pardo 2004 and Rigi 2004). They may be expressions of an expedient rhetoric of power, affecting both the relationships between differently placed groups in society and the legitimacy of the social, economic and political system. Moreover, they strengthen a belief in the prevalence of corruption, which as Parry (2000) suggests, is corrupting in its own right; it may well be that

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For example people who have been convicted for this offence or people who believe that what they do, or have done, does not really fall into the category of corruption.
corruption thrives on secrecy, he adds, but ‘it does pretty well on publicity too’ (Parry 2000: 37). Cross-cultural evidence, points to a negative relationship between the reality of corruption, the inflated rhetoric superimposed on such a reality by the political and legal establishment and the publicity accorded by the media both to actual cases of corruption and to such an inflated rhetoric.

Categorical assumptions are the scourge of the abstract approach. On the contrary, the ethnographer’s task is to account for the variety and complexity of this phenomenon across official and non-official normative systems. In order to understand the causes, effects and ramifications of corruption we must address two critical aspects, taking into account the gradations of individual positions between the ‘ideal’ extremes — sociological and moral — of right and wrong, legal and illegal, in the messiness of everyday life. First, we must investigate the empirically diversified motivations of those who undertake such actions at both ends of the exchanges; that is, those who perform those actions and those who require them to do so, whether on their own initiative or because they feel, or are made to feel, that they have no alternative (Pardo 2004). Second, we must account for how corruption is talked about among the corrupt — whether they act inside or outside the law — and among the rest of the population.

Abuse of Power and Corruption: Bedfellows in ‘Clean’ vs ‘Dirty’ States

It is commonly believed that weak states facilitate corrupt practices, while advanced ‘liberal’ democracies are basically immune from them. For example, Britain, where laws on corruption mainly focus on the private sector, is usually described as an ‘advanced, liberal democracy’, whose political élite’s integrity would be implicit and unquestioned. On the other hand, Italy, where laws on corruption focus mostly on the public sector, is generally portrayed as an example of ‘weak state’ dirtied by the corruption of the political system. From such a viewpoint, and failing to acknowledge that the public and private, like ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, are not easily separable, the mainstream literature on corruption has addressed what are regarded as ‘weak states’, where governments, politicians and economic powers have been seen to be embroiled in visible and invisible webs of power, the aim of which both is to exploit — lictily or illicitly — the weaknesses or instability of the system.

It kind of follows that, as Prato has aptly noted, drawing mainly on statistics, the World Bank (See, for example, 2000) should distinguish ‘between administrative corruption (involving both public officials across the board and private interests and individuals) and so-called “state capture”, whereby the state is captured by private interests and the distinction between public and private becomes blurred’ (Prato 2004: 74). Such an approach, challenged by anthropological analyses, has revived a controversy on the superimposition of external models and values and the consequent failure to understand what processes favour corruption in any given society.

Almost invariably germane to corruption, abuse of power, particularly in public office, is chief among such processes; its pernicious nature undermining at once the office, the social contract and, in most cases, healthy competition. Perhaps inseparable from the modern state
and from a Weberian rational-legal bureaucratic authority, abuses of power mar systems marked by sharp asymmetries of power, playing a less obvious but equally disruptive, if more insidious, role where such asymmetries are, let us say, more subtle. Friedrich (1989: 19) has described this key aspect of corruption as a ‘political pathology’; its most basic form consisting in the sale of the functions of the office and of actions, or the failure to take actions, that favour selected individuals or networked groups in exchange for money or other returns, such as the expectation of a job, a favour, a contract for public work or political support. This scenario especially characterizes modern societies where politics and bureaucracy intermingle as a distinctive form of corruption of the democratic system (Weber 1974, Prato 2000).

It must be pointed out, however, that the nature, dynamics and ramifications of abuses of power extend far beyond such a basic definition. The (more or less wilful) mismanagement of responsibility in the exercise of bureaucratic, economic and political power involves moral choices that are often part of wider frameworks and modes of exchange. That the problematic of moral choice extends both to the corrupt actions of ordinary people and to the legislative process only strengthens the point that these complexities need to be understood empirically.

While bribery, extortion, tax evasion and illicit exchanges of favours would seem to recur across different societies, there is considerable historical (Scott 1989) and ethnographic variation in the occurrence, dynamics and extension of corruption, in the perceptions of corruptness and in the interpretations of the legitimacy of corrupt acts. Steering well clear of cultural relativism, corruption needs to be examined contextually and diachronically (Alatas 1968, Klaveren 1989, Lowenstein 1989), for ideas of what constitutes corrupt behaviour, deceptions of language by which corruption becomes routinized and the ways in which corruption and bribery are legally defined change in place and time. In particular, attention needs to be drawn on a growing ambiguity to the official definition of what constitutes (morally and legally, I stress) illegitimate behaviour in public life. This ambiguity about the role of public institutions and the people who staff them feeds on a blurring of the dividing line between legitimate and illegitimate behaviour, and that between the legal and the moral.

The Law is a Ass

Western Law is informed by three fundamental principles. They are: *nulム crimen sine lege* (without law there is no crime); *nulla poena sine lege* (without law there is no punishment) and *nulla poena sine iudicio* (without judgement there is no punishment). Taken together, these principles underlie judicial systems based on the certainty of the Law and of the Judgement. The difficulty in defining corruption legally — and analytically — and therefore in producing unambiguous legislation, and the consequent difficulties in the application and enforcement of the law are reflected across Criminal Codes. Even within Western Europe the legal definitions of corruption fail to be harmonized, and in some European countries the word ‘corruption’ is not used, their legislation addressing, instead, offences such as bribery, purchase of votes, and the exercise of undue influence (Prato 2004: 79; see also Nilsson 1994).
As Prato (2004) reminds us, such difficulties marred the preparatory document of the 19th Conference of the European Ministers of Justice, organized in 1993 by the Council of Europe on the fight against corruption, and has continued to do so in subsequent efforts to deal legally with this problem. That seminal document stated, ‘The notion of corruption is to be understood in its widest sense, extending to all fields of activities, both private and public, and to all persons invested with private or public functions who acquire an undue advantage linked to the exercise of such functions’ (Prato 2004: 79). The obvious, so far largely unanswered, questions arise over how we define ‘undue’ advantage and to what extent is an advantage ‘undue’.

Where the Law does address corruption, only basic corrupt acts and abuses of power involving money changing hands are addressed. Such inadequacy (Lowenstein 1989) makes it difficult for law-enforcing agencies to identify, investigate, prevent and punish both corruption and the very varied criminal actions that it engenders (Miller 2004). The definition of culpability of those who take payment (in whatever form) and of those who offer or are forced to give it often defies the categorical certainties of right and wrong, legal and illegal, moral and amoral. This breeds further confusion, particularly considering that the phenomenon of corruption has evolved from one in which the predominant role was played by the, often coercive, bribe-taker to one in which the bribe-giver has acquired increasing power and increasingly plays the corrupting role of ‘offerer’. At various levels of corrupt deals these two roles have become interchangeable. Moreover, the law struggles to cope both with the reality that certain corrupt acts are regarded as convenient by the parties involved, which further testifies to the empirical fact that the certainty of the Law is an elusive ideal; that, to paraphrase Saltman (1985), the Law is a Ass.

**British Casuistries**

In the British context, corruption as a criminal offence has the specific legal meaning of ‘bribery’ (in the sense of soliciting or receiving rewards) in respect to local government politicians, not MPs, and to public officials for actions that favour the donors or their organizations. However, still today, there is no clear definition of what is the ‘public sector’ or of what is a ‘public body’. The situation is complicated by the fact that, given continuous privatisations, it often happens that ‘private’ services fulfil public duties, while ‘public bodies’ are the major shareholders of that service.

There are eleven different Acts that deal with corruption. The most important are The Public Bodies Corrupt Practices of 1889; The Prevention of Corruption Act of 1906 and The Prevention of Corruption Act of 1916. They owe their existence, in whole or in part, to cases of bribery in local government planning, and contract and procurement corruption in the armed forces (Doig 1996: 40). The 1889 Act defines the crime of corruption in relation to transactions of a public body. Both the donors and the receiver are considered guilty of the crime. It defines as corrupt a person who solicits, receives or agrees to receive for himself or on other people’s behalf a gift, a loan, a rewards or an advantage in order to fail to act or to act in a transaction that involve a public body. Moreover, it states that it is a criminal offence
to promise or give a gift, loan, etc., as an inducement or reward in order to fail to act or to act in a transaction which involves a public body. The 1906 Act extends corruption also to the private sector and applies the same principles to the transactions (payments) between individuals and between individual actors and businesses. Moreover, it also tries to define the criminal responsibility of the public official and it considers corrupt to disinform or mislead third parties. The 1916 Act appears to be the most controversial because it also establishes an exception to the principle of presumed innocence until proved guilty. In fact the corruption in the public sector in the form of payment or rewards for obtaining a contract is considered accomplished even without tangible proofs. The only exceptions are those of the town and county councillors for granting building permissions because a building permission is not by definition a contract. This Act is in conflict with the European Convention on Human Rights (Art. 6, section 2) on the presumption of innocence. In order to overcome this conflict, the British Courts tend to focus on accusations of conspiracy or attempted corruption, which are regulated by different Acts.

Not only, in this scenario, corruption is difficult to prosecute but, most significant, these Acts on corruption do not apply to MPs. The scandals involving British parliamentarians who accept money in exchange for parliamentary actions have led to the end of some political careers (following party disciplinary proceedings), not in most cases to their legal prosecution for corruption. Doig (1996) has pointed out that much of the British approach to standards of conduct in public life has its basis in Victorian values and public and political expectations of propriety. Doig goes on to remind us that the political élite was expected to behave, at least in public, in a ‘middle-class way’, which seemed to relate essentially to sexual propriety. Of course this did not necessarily induce sexual moderation; rather, it ensured ‘discretion against discovery’, or ‘cautionary advice by concerned colleagues’, and a complicit tolerance from leading newspaper proprietors who ‘protected the public reputations of politicians’ against ‘the moral indignation of the lower middle classes’ (Doig 1996: 37). In such a line, similar moves were made to dissuade politicians, especially ministers, from involvement in dubious private financial activities. In particular, it was expected that the public office would not be used as a means of acquiring wealth. The opposite seemed to be, in fact, true, as perspective MPs were expected to bear personally the costs of the electoral process and seek the necessary funding. Thus, as many MPs were still unpaid in the nineteenth century, several opportunities arose for conflict of interests. Most MPs were representatives of, or had to lobby for, the interests of their constituencies, which in itself did not constitute misconduct. The problem was how to separate effectively private interests from public responsibilities. The suggestion was that Ministers should observe ‘rules of prudence’ rather than of obligation. The ‘rules’ of obligation required Ministers not to undertake transactions where private interests conflicted with public duty, not to speculate and not to use official information for private profit or to accept favour from those seeking government contracts. Still today ‘rules of prudence’ essentially require Ministers to avoid all transactions that might lead to the belief that they are doing anything which the rules of obligation forbid (Doig 1996: 39).
Over the years, several Tribunals and Committees of Inquiry have been appointed to review the standards of conduct in public life or deal with allegations that range from insider share dealing to contract bribery, from sale of Honours for party funds to ex-ministers taking posts in the private sector, to influence-peddling. In the latter case, graphically exemplified by the Belcher affair,\(^4\) the inquiries have attempted, and generally failed, to establish a clear distinction between lobbying and bribery, so little has changed in terms of legislation. The Committees have based their approach on the faith in personal behaviour and regarded it as the solution to concern in decline in standards of conducts. For example, the Nolan Committee, established in 1994 (first report published in 1995), eventually reported that public anxiety was based more on perceptions and beliefs than on facts and that the great majority in public life were honest, hardworking, and observe high ethical standards.\(^5\) The problems addressed by the Committee were not new and, as we know today, they were to recur; see, for instance, the concern over quango appointments mirrored the 1970s rows on the so-called ‘patronage state’, whereby extended debate on MPs financial interests eventually led to recommendations (though not legislation) on the registration and declaration of MPs’ financial interests and on advocacy (that is, representing an outside interest in Westminster or Whitehall) for payment. The problems surrounding Peerages and party funding go back to the 1920s, civil servants moving to well-paid jobs in the City was first subject to regulation in the 1920s and again in the 1980s.

These affairs and the ensuing inquiries suggest that cases of possible misconduct tend to be treated as isolated examples or as the results of teething troubles of some reform. Most significantly, such a system, based, I repeat, on the traditional assumption of a consensual approach to standards of conduct and a reliance on prudence, common sense and honour, leaves room for individual interpretations of the ‘rules’ and of what constitutes a breach of such rules. What MPs see as a conflict of interest, corruption and bribery, or an acceptable way of representing an interest varies substantially. For example, is the Labour Party’s perfectly legal acceptance of one million pounds from the League against Cruel Sports, a ‘donation’ that led to the Foster Bill and to the ban of Hunting with Hounds, truly legitimate? Could it be seen as corrupt, \textit{de facto}?\(^6\) Under some EU countries legal systems, it would

\(^4\) The Belcher affair was one of the biggest cases of political corruption in twentieth-century Britain. The allegations of widespread corruption in the Labour government were serious and elements of the Conservative Party willingly used them for political gain. The government appointed a judicial inquiry to investigate the allegations, which, as Mark Roodhouse (2002) has argued, had the unintended effect of scotching public debate. The allegations became \textit{sub judice}, hindering the activities of the scandalmongers. Tedium press coverage of the tribunal hearings, Roodhouse reminds us, bored many voters, who interpreted the scandal in line with their existing beliefs effectively emptying the scandal’s potential electoral impact.

\(^5\) Interestingly, the Committee’s \textit{First Report on Standards in Public Life} stated, ‘we cannot say conclusively that standards of behaviour in public life have declined’ (See \url{www.public-standards.gov.uk}).

\(^6\) For an analysis of the complex issues raised by the attending debate and the legal ban, see Pardo and Prato (2005).
probably be. On a more secure footing, it can be argued that the British public’s general dissatisfaction with politics and politicians, as public figures are seen to indulge in bed-hopping, self-enrichment, influence-peddling and rule-bending, parallels a growing uncertainty about what is right and wrong in public life.

Following the expenses scandal that has recently tainted the British Parliament (see Winnet and Rayner 2009), public outrage is, again, in full swing, while official language insists on shying at using the word ‘corruption’; the euphemism ‘sleaze’ is instead used and, occasionally, the expression ‘abuse of power’ crops up in politicians’ statements and in the media. The scandal, fuelled by a media frenzy, has dramatically brought to a head the tension between the morally and the legally legitimate, particularly as law-makers’ corruption, or alleged corruption, is seen to be set against the background of mis-governance in the economic and financial fields, of the effects of such mis-governance on people’s lives and of the extraordinary privileges granted to a few. There are some careful considerations to be made because, while there was evidence of corruption in a number of cases, the situation was much more complex than the newspapers suggested.

What was clearly corrupt in the whole affair was the action of a few MPs who with deliberate falsity claimed expenses on non-existent flats they said they paid for as second homes because their constituencies were sufficiently distant as to make it unreasonable to expect them to commute daily to Parliament. Here, corruption varied from the non-existence of such flats to those that were acquired by the MP but rented out to clients, but in which the MP stayed only rarely, or a flat in which the MP installed a relative rent free.

All this was clearly corrupt and against the rules, and so illegal. More generally and more intriguing were those cases where the M.P. claimed for expenses that only up to a point were legitimate but where, it was argued, claims were made for work actually done; the problem was that such claims were on an extravagant scale. The extreme example was the man who actually lives in an ancient moated house, and claimed a large sum of money to have the moat cleaned out. This, with its implications of ancient family wealth, made a field day for the press. The great majority of claims were, however, much less extravagant but raised criticism because MPs did not have to get the agreement of any kind of supervisory body — they simply presented bills that were paid. The obvious objection, pointing to more ramified ‘weaknesses’ in the parliamentary system, is: why were they paid, no questions asked? The answer seems to have been that MP’s salaries had fallen a long way behind what they might legitimately have regarded as reasonable for the responsibilities of the work they did. In comparably responsible jobs in the private sector of the economy they might well have expected salaries of £20-30,000 (30-50,000 US dollars) more per annum. Party leaders, however, were nervous of the public's reaction if the MPs were paid the ‘going rate’ and so

7 A similar conundrum has marked the Murdoch-News of the World phone hacking scandal (Ruffo, 2011, has offered interesting comments from a journalist's perspective) and appears to surround the Libor (London Interbank Offered Rate) affair and the attendant manipulation of the inter-bank lending rates market (See, for example, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/9479052/Libor-scandal-US-regulators-summon-seven-banks.html).
had refused to put them up adequately for years. The MPs were therefore told by their whips that they should keep quiet about it but that it was legitimate to recoup themselves by claiming fully on every possible legitimate expense. In a sense, therefore, it was not so much that these MPs were corrupt in the strict sense, but that their leaders were collectively cowards in the face of a democratic system that they feared would punish them at the polls if they had pursued the stricter path of raising salaries and keeping a close eye on expenses.

There is a historic background to this, of course — as back in the nineteenth century MPs had no salaries, then corruption could take the form of candidates more or less bribing the (prior to 1832) few citizens with the right to vote. Once there was universal suffrage this was impossible — but largesse for the constituency could still come from wealthy candidates — and payment for all MPs was gradually introduced to enable the less affluent to become candidates (I simplify greatly). However, in this context, the extent to which MPs should be labelled corrupt becomes far more problematic, which raises interesting issues on the ‘democratic process’. It could be reasonably said that such a process lays itself open to corruption, since in the most open and liberal elections imaginable, the candidates compete to convince the electorate that individual candidate X will do better for the constituents than candidate Y. We might hope that the individual constituents are high minded and think only of the public good, but I would not bet on it. As we shall see in detail later, even the allegedly fairest system of voting, proportional representation for example, can descend into pork-barrel politics or engender the problems that I discuss later with reference to the Italian ethnography, while a nominally liberal system like that in Nigeria rapidly developed into a kleptocracy.

Eventually, one-hundred-thirty-three MPs did not stand at the last election (May 2010). Sir Thomas Legg’s Inquiry ordered 375 MPs (that is, more than half the total) to repay 1.12 million pounds. The inquest cost 1.16 million pounds. Criminal charges (mainly for false accounting) have been brought against three MPs and a Peer and an MP have been criminally convicted. Meanwhile, in the midst of the current economic depression, top bankers continue to be granted huge bonuses at the increasingly poor public’s expense. All major parties have expressed serious concerns about the British Public’s loss of trust in Parliament. Ordinary Britons appear to be as dismayed by and inactive about both affairs as increasingly convinced that there are double standards over, say, sexual or financial misconduct. Such conviction and the attendant loss of legitimacy of the political system have been fuelled by sections of the media that seem to have forfeited complicitous tolerance in protecting public figures from the moral indignation of a public increasingly convinced that public life is no longer about the common good; that individual and party advantage are prioritised.

These events and, almost equally important, the media-led inflated rhetoric of corruption, run counter to two non-negotiable principles of democracy, particularly ‘liberal democracy’. First, the power to rule needs authority for the relationship between citizenship and governance to work. Second, the establishment of authority depends on the achievement

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8 See, for example, the case of the Irish Republic (Bax 1976), of Italy (Prato 1993, 2004) and the aforementioned donations to the British Labour Party.
and recognition of legitimacy at the grassroots. This means, above all, that authority must be seen to be based on a fair, responsible and accountable exercise of power. Further to illustrate this conundrum empirically, let us now examine case-material from Naples and its Region.

**Fostering Corruption through the Misuse of Power: Italian Cases**

In line with T.H. Marshall’s (1950) classic definition of citizenship and of the attendant rights, I contend that a primary obligation of democratic governance is to guarantee public health. Exemplifying an abysmal failure in such a task, for a long time the Naples region has been swamped with enormous amounts of rubbish, the implications of which bring to a head both the points raised earlier and the empirical insight that not just anyone is allowed to participate in medium- to high-level corrupt practices or is accepted in the supporting networks; one must be ‘one of us’ in order to partake in such dealings.

Between 1993 and 2011, Naples was ruled by a powerfully networked élite. Their electoral success in 1993 was built on highly problematic anomalies. Spelling out the corruption of the democratic process, one such anomaly was that political competition had become inexistent because the tangentopoli (literally, bribesville; see Pardo 2000b) scandal had wiped out all the major parties, with the exception of the powerful Communist Party, subsequently renamed ‘Democratic’, and the insignificant neo-fascist Party. This anomaly was the direct product of another highly problematic form of corruption, consisting in a blurring of the classic Montesquieuan (1989) division of power in legislative, executive and judiciary in the democratic state: politically (and unconstitutionally) committed sections of the judiciary had taken over a key aspect of the political process as they had emasculated political competition roughly and selectively carrying out a witch-hunt that later failed to deliver the convictions of many of those who had been investigated and, with the help of a huge media campaign, discredited and ‘found guilty’ before trial. What follows is an attempt to let the ethnography provide answers to this question.

Naples’ new Communist rulers promised moral order and prosperity. Having done field research when they seized power, ten years later I returned to find out what had become of their promises. I recorded intense feelings that were the negative mirror image of those that had animated the city in the early 1990s. Then, many informants felt that any change was perhaps better than no change and that the situation seemed to offer new opportunities. Now, stressing the point that conceptions of legitimacy are not easily forced on the social context, they say, as Mario, a local shopkeeper aptly put it, ‘we continue to live in run-down buildings

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9 This section and the next draw heavily on Pardo, 2011.
10 Articles 98 and 101 of the Italian Constitution specifically forbid the judiciary to join political parties or have political affiliation.
11 On such explicit and strategized commitment, see Pitch (1983).
12 These ‘anomalous’ actions made a mockery of the fundamental principle that the accused, let alone the prosecuted, is innocent until proved guilty. Notoriously, they continue today, in a disfigured Italian democracy where an unelected government appears to be there to stay.
13 Ever since, I have carried out periodical field trips.
and unkempt streets, have to endure more than our fair share of the difficulties that characterize urban life across the world and our health is persistently at risk’.

Their rulers have, however, long enjoyed hegemony (Gramsci 1971), benefiting from a growing ambiguity in the dominant definition of what constitutes (morally and legally) illegitimate behaviour in public life. Local experts have convincingly shown that this modern Prince’s successful construction of electoral support has been based on a combination of ideological stances and astute management of both the media and a tightly structured and managed system of favours (Demarco 2007, 2009; Della Corte 2007). Key elements of such a combination should be spelt out.

These politicians had long vilified Naples — and Southern Italy more generally — as an ungovernable mess rife with crime, corruption and cultural backwardness (Pardo 2001, Demarco 2009). Once in power they claimed that under their enlightened rule the situation was improving and all would be well. When criticised, they repeated this message, perhaps in the belief that if you say something often enough people will believe it is true. Such rhetoric has drawn on the purchased loyalty of networked élite groups, as opposed to the purchased loyalty of the masses. Prominent experts have enjoyed lucrative ‘consultancies’14 — in some cases inexistent and highly paid (see, for example, Demarco 2007: 210), more often just pointless (see, for example, Della Corte 2007: 39-53 and 143-147). Well-connected businessmen and women have enjoyed privileged access to public contracts (D’Avanzo 2008). Favoured by administrative blindness and changes in the law, bureaucrats have become de facto politicians, of low moral standing (Weber 1974: 95), while, quoting Prato, their peers ‘who maintain a moral standing of “impartiality” are in fact regarded as “irresponsible politicians”’ (2000: 79).

Pragmatically, such governance has nurtured some clienteles at lower levels too, as exemplified by the case, under judicial investigation, of 2,316 unemployed people (some are ex-convicts on rehabilitation programmes) hired during one of the rubbish crises to clear the accumulated waste. By their own admission, they have never actually worked and, although their contract was officially temporary, after a number of years they continue, as one of them said, ‘to be paid 1,000 US dollars per month to idle away the working day’ (see also Demarco 2007: 194-97).15

It is a well-known fact in political science that, soon or later, the ephemeral nature of image and spin unsupported by effective policy will tell and, more often than not, it will backfire. The Naples case brings out this point eminently, as it demonstrates the limited reach of such an approach and the unreliability of its contribution to rulers’ hold on citizenship. This situation is not confined to Naples and its Region, also ruled for the past ten years until very recently by the same networked élite. Similar dealings in major Italian cities, such as Florence, Rome, Genoa (Di Feo 2008) and Milan, point to a widespread ‘moral question’

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14 For example, the cost of consultancies relating to the waste affair amount to almost 12 million US dollars.
15 They cost approximately 55 million euros per year, so far amounting to a total of 145 million euros (Della Corte 2007: Ch. 4; Iovene and Lombardi 2008: 164-172).
underlying such a style of governance; however, in Naples and its Region it has taken a particularly dramatic turn in a dirty and insalubrious environment adorned by mounds of uncollected rubbish.

In Italy, regional governments are largely responsible for rubbish disposal and for the conversion of rubbish into energy. Over ten years ago, the Naples Region devised a Plan to rationalise the process. Lucrative contracts were granted to inefficient and under-qualified companies. Reminiscent of similarly dramatic events in Italy and beyond (Prato 1993 and Torsello 2012), the Plan was further crippled by delaying tactics combined with technical objections and not-in-my-backyard protests fuelled by a small but politically critical environmental party. This requires brief explanation.

The Italian political system is heavily affected by a weakening form of proportional representation. Small parties become part of governing coalitions and in the resulting balance of power they often play the key role of stabilizers, or de-stabilizers. In short, they hold considerable bargaining power and they use it. In the events under examination, the aforementioned environmental party played such a key role in the centre-left Regional and Central governments, where one of its MPs was Secretary for the Environment.

We need to know that Neapolitans deposit household waste in dumpsters located by the walk-side and emptied during the night. The council authorities must provide dumpsters in sufficient numbers and keep clean them and the sites where they are located. Residents are charged for this service on top of the very high council tax. The number of dumpsters is, however, generally insufficient and, as those available fill quickly, rubbish bags are deposited around them, to the mercy of the elements and of vermin. For several years such a situation has periodically reached crisis proportions caused by uncollected rubbish — regularly, during the summer months. Such past emergencies generally lasted several weeks; until, that is, residents and volunteers defied their rulers’ mismanagement of responsibility and power carting away (illegally and efficiently) the waste themselves. On occasions, the local authorities followed suit, belatedly ‘deciding to act’. In 2007, past ‘rubbish crises’ evolved in an ‘emergency’ that lasted a long time, jeopardizing public health and political stability and bringing ‘the system’ to the brink of total collapse, with effects that continue to be felt today.

During the second half of that very hot, overcast May, over 3,000 tonnes of uncollected rubbish piled up on city streets — including household waste, toxic waste (hospitals, manufacturers, and so on) and waste from institutional establishments and other

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16 Prato (1993, 2000) has offered detailed ethnographic discussions of the complexities and weaknesses both intrinsic to and engendered by such a system. In June 2009 a referendum was held in Italy with the purpose of streamlining the electoral system and raising the threshold to achieve parliamentary representation. The main political parties did not take a unified position either way, leaving electors to vote as they choose. The referendum failed because the low turnout did not reach the legal minimum.

17 Council regulations vary from town to town. Generally, they prescribe rubbish to be placed in the dumpsters outside working hours – before eight a.m. or after eight p.m.

18 Temperature was thirty-plus degree Celsius (eighty-six degree Fahrenheit) and would increase considerably over the following months.
facilities (schools, restaurants, hotels, bars, and so on). In less than a fortnight, mounds of rubbish grew to ten foot high, clogging every street — and they kept growing, everywhere. Public space was swamped with neatly tied-up black rubbish bags ripped open by stray dogs and cats and by an ever-growing number of sewer rats increasingly unafraid of human beings. Alleyways were completely blockaded and traffic on main roads was constricted into ever-narrowing bottlenecks, passing cars thus contributing to scattering the contents of rubbish bags all over the place. As pavements disappeared under the rubbish, pedestrians were forced to walk over festering heaps, doing their best to dodge the vermin but, of course, powerless against the revolting stench and the associated exhalations. Thus, public health became an urgent issue at a very elemental level.

As this situation was caused by serious problems with both collection and disposal, it was clearly not merely a magnification of previous crises. As the headlines and judicial proceedings of the past few years testify, it was there to stay. Those rulers, like today’s, argued that there was nowhere to dump the rubbish; they blamed contracting firms, also pointing the finger to the ‘usual suspects’, organised crime and their hold on the removal, transportation and disposal of urban waste. The amount of uncollected rubbish kept growing.

I have witnessed how ordinary peoples’ dismay and anger combined with embarrassment, as the unflattering image generated by their ruling politicians’ misgovernance is broadcast across the world. The regional economy is badly affected. Here, the locally important tourist industry and exports, particularly food exports, have contracted significantly. Street-markets (a key feature across Italy) have almost completely disappeared. Small shops have lost custom, as people feel safer shopping in supermarkets. The considerably adverse consequences on employment statistics are particularly painful in a setting known for its low level of formal employment.

As rubbish accumulates, people turn to burning it where it lays – sometimes in unorganised, scattered protest, to vent anger; most times simply as a necessity. Local hospitals report peaks in cases of burning eyes, nausea and pulmonary diseases, adding to the increase in cancer and infectious diseases (Giordano and Tarro 2012). Schools are repeatedly forced to close.

In 2007, and again in 2011, things turned ugly still as the local papers published photographs of the fashionable neighbourhoods where many rulers live: as the city lay critically in the grip the ‘rubbish problem’, they were outstandingly orderly and clean. Thus, previously scattered protests coalesced into large, angry demonstrations converging to those neighbourhoods. There, people transported and burned mounds of rubbish from across the city. There, riot police turned out in force, ‘to protect the privileged few’, say my (very angry) informants. Violent clashes ensued and arrests were made.

Judicial inquiries and on-going trials are providing some answers to the questions, why the emergencies have recurred over for such a long time and why rubbish is not collected.
**Abusive Governance Crushes Citizens’ Rights, in Partial Defiance of the Law**

In Italian criminal law the distinction between crimes of extortion and corruption in public life (respectively, Art. 317 and Art. 319) is insufficiently clear. In the case of extortion, an officer wrongfully uses his power to extract money, documents or services from a person through force or bullying. Liability lies with the extortionist (Art. 317), punishable with between four and twelve years imprisonment plus permanent interdiction from public office. Less straightforwardly, in the case of corrupt practices, abuses of influence may mean that ‘gifts’ or services are solicited — also indirectly through mutual unspoken understanding — as rewards for a favour, often consisting in speeding up or delaying proceedings, or in the omission of an act. In the classical definition, the distinction between a corrupt and an illegal practice depends not on the characteristics of the offence but on its consequences. Above all, my informants in the judiciary note, while extortion is easily proved, corruption is not always easy to prove in the absence of ‘confessions’.

Around two billion US dollars have been ‘invested’ in the failed Regional Plan (Chiarriello 2008). The contractors were to be paid 700,000,000 US dollars by the regional government, 19 and 400,000,000 US dollars by the local councils with jurisdiction over the areas where the waste dumping, transformation and conversion facilities were (to be) built. Following indictments for criminal conduct, the judicial authorities have sized the sites where the bales of converted waste are stored and have impounded the regional funds.

The findings of the main judicial inquiry, started in 2001 and completed in July 2007, match those of a Parliamentary inquiry. Twenty-eight highly placed people have been indicted (Bufi 2007). The offences are corruption, bribery, embezzlement of public funds, fraud in public contracts, the abuse of office and omission of administrative control. The accused who claim innocence, include the President of the Region, his two deputies, the directors of the firm that contracted the disposal of waste and those of the consortium that contracted the construction of the facilities to turn waste into fuel and energy. A key charge is fraud at the expense of the State. The regional government was responsible for allocating contracts and supervising the work. The contract was granted to a technically weaker bid promising lower costs for the processing and disposal of waste. The prosecution contends that neither was met and that the regional authorities allegedly failed to perform their administrative control. The waste management contract involved the transportation of rubbish to existing dumping sites; the conversion of waste into non-toxic fuel20 and the incineration of converted waste at the new facilities. Rubbish was not collected. The conversion of what had been collected in the past produced bales that failed to meet very precise technical specifications;21 illegal, useless and dangerous (if burned they would release **

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19 This money was part of State funding.

20 The contractors would have to transform rubbish into ecologically compatible, burnable bales. A key point is that, when burned, such bales must not produce toxic fumes.

21 This is, of course, a complex matter. To simplify, the bales are not sufficiently ‘dry’. Interestingly, inquiring judges have produced documents in which, on the one hand, the regional authority allowed a lowering of the qualitative criteria which it had previously established for the conversion of rubbish
highly polluting and poisonous fumes), they have been stocked and the contractors have been allowed to defray to the regional authority the cost of disposing of it (Demarco 2007: 197). The prosecution contends that lack of controls over the contractors’ performance throughout the process, complicity and active cover up of the contractors’ failure to fulfil the terms of the contract amount to fraud and intent to commit fraud. The underlying problems caused by such corruption remain, while the criminal trial proceeds haltingly; large teams of defence lawyers are at work and, as technical objections are continuously raised, postponements are recurrently granted.

Meanwhile, a civil court has sentenced the Ministry for the Environment, the Region and a local council to pay 1,000 US dollars to a man for damages caused by the rubbish emergency to the image of his provincial town and to his quality of life and personal dignity. Five-hundred-fifty similar cases were subsequently brought by citizens in the periphery and 1,000 by people who live in Naples. Consumer associations report that such civil suits are multiplying in the order of hundreds of thousands.

A second criminal trial is in progress, involving 20 people. They are politicians and administrators, including — again — the previous Governor of the Region and Naples’ mayor. They are on trial for having caused an epidemic through abuse of office.

Clearly, in this case as in others there is a complexity to corrupt practices that defies a legal definition. What makes corruption in public life a particularly complex issue is that corrupt practices tend to happen in a favourable ‘general climate’ marked by corruzione ambientale (literally, environmental corruption). Informants across society have described how, in such a climate, they have ‘long felt forced to offer bribes of all kinds in order to obtain goals and benefits’, regardless of whether these should be theirs by right. Much political and career profit has been extracted from the empirically weak (Pardo 1996, 2012) view that ordinary people involvement in not strictly legal dealings is evidence that in Italy criminality is socially pervasive and corruption widely tolerated. Of course, it remains to be seen what role the continuing investigations will play in respect to the traditionally justified belief that taking the initiative in offering money, services or support to a bureaucrat and especially to a politician or his friends may be illegal — or only immoral and unfair — but it is also the most efficient way of pursuing goals. Italian law (Law No 197, 1991) both makes it difficult for money to be laundered and facilitates the investigation of suspect bank accounts into fuel and, on the other hand, assured the central government that the converted rubbish met the minimum criteria.

22 The immense quantity of such bales is also highly polluting as they stand unburned and festering in open-air sites.

23 Allegedly, administrators turned a blind eye over false certifications on the stages of the process under contract.

24 The case brought by a housewife who lives in central Naples exemplifies such cases. She has sued for economic, moral and livelihood damages (400,000 US dollars) the National Government, the Campania Region, the Naples Provincial Council and the Naples City Council (Il Denaro 2008: 27).
and financial dealings.\textsuperscript{25} However, as the prescribed relations of reciprocal control between politicians and bureaucrats have lost their strength, highly varied modes of exchange have become the norm but, perhaps inevitably, continue to be addressed only in part by the law. Not only can payment be made in intangible ways; but, where it applies, it can be delayed in the context of generalised relations of exchange and international deals. The corruption of public bureaucrats often intervenes in the process, reducing risks for politicians through complex transactions that critically limit efficacy of controls. In the more sophisticated cases, payment takes the form of an assurance that a new alliance has been forged, adding to the moral and practical ambiguity of the exchange and of the ensuing socio-economic relations. Money, if at all, is seldom taken by the political boss, for it is usually intermediaries who take care of this part of the deal. The boss usually pleads unawareness or, when faced with hard evidence, claims to having been an unwitting instrument, which flies in the face of the empirical fact that these practices find support in a web of relationships based on shared interests and complicity.

We have seen how a ruling élite’s commitment to establish and maintain power regardless of the quality of their governance has fundamentally weakened crucial sources of Weberian (1947) legitimacy — especially (rational and emotional) belief in and acceptance of the legality and value of the existing order. As testified by this case study and by examples across the democratic world, control over resources, spin and rhetoric may well be a condition to a certain kind of management of power. Such control, however, absolutely needs to be ‘legitimated’ by results observable at the grassroots. Later, I will return to this point; for now, let me simply point out that the experience of corruption, moral or criminal, may be a corollary of the reach of the state. However, as it inevitably conflates the opposites of rational legal authority and impersonal rules and of the realm of selective interests, its corrosive power in the relationship between citizenship and governance may well become a key element in the latter’s demise. Corruption, moral or criminal, draws on an interaction between power (and its asymmetries) and its dishonest, self-serving or incompetent exercise, whereby the misuse of power breeds corruption and feeds on it. As in this case, the most obvious casualties of betrayal of fundamental principles of citizenship are: trust in governance, political responsibility and citizens’ rights. The problematic of legal authority is, however, much more complex, which now needs expansion.

**Comparative Reflections**

The Italian and British cases exemplify the point that not all corrupt actions are violations of rules and procedures. Socially constructed ideas of what is legitimate and what is not legitimate may play an important role in the extent to which such rules and procedures are established and received in any given society and, therefore, in the impact and ramifications of such violations and in the degree of tolerance which they enjoy. When such rules and

\textsuperscript{25} See, in particular, Law No 646, 1982 with particular reference to sub-contracts (Law No 663, 1986 and its modifications, as in Law No 55, 1990) and the laws against administrative crimes (No 86, 1990) and money-laundering (No 356, 1992).
procedures are devised according to some superior morality, their violation becomes less of an issue for the people involved. Endorsing the argument made by Gledhill with reference to Latin America (2004), Prato’s analysis of the Albanian case (2004), Sedlenieks’ of Latvia (2004) and Harrison’s of the distortions of aid in Africa (2004) illustrate the weakness of external categorizations of specific acts and persons as ‘corrupt’ — focusing on finding solutions to what is corruption in the terms of outside agents, rather than on an understanding of what actually goes on at local level, which compounds the problem.

The empirical analysis offered here, suggests that the amount of violations of rules and procedures is determined in part by their abstract or ideological nature and in part by their inadequacy. The transactions between private contractors and public bodies offered good examples. It has been repeatedly found that they are too restrictive, limited or ambiguous. As a consequence, not only do they tend to breed corruption among those who are appointed to apply them and among those who are expected to operate under them (see, for example, Rose-Ackerman 1989, Mazzoni 2000, Feld de la 2000, Paravia 2000); they also form the ground for moral legitimation of not strictly legal actions and practical justifications of corrupt actions (Pardo 2000b).

To put it bluntly, an approach relying on a hard-core legalistic definition of corruption would be unhelpfully restricted by the underlying assumption that corrupt acts are explained by material interest and dubious moralities. Of course, this may well be the case in many instances; however, it would be inexcusably naïve to believe that either or both these aspects explain implicitly about corruption. Most certainly, they do not always dictate the dynamics of corrupt action and they do not necessarily play a significant role.

The British and Italian cases point to kinds of corruption that often happen at various social, political or economic levels, and to the different motivations that may explain the exchanges that take place at each level. Even when monetary gain accounts for an important part of the exchanges, as in the cases of parliamentary expenses or of contracts for public works, a determinant role may well be played by complex dynamics of power (its achievement, maintenance and enhancement), by political ideology or by networked loyalties. There are, however, further considerations to be made.

Friedrich’s (1989; also King 1989) graphical illustration of key events in British history, whereby nineteenth-century Great Britain managed to pull itself out of the morass of a highly corrupt system and develop, in the process, an admirable civil service and sound political institutions reminds us of the practical consequences of Montesquieu’s and Bentham’s arguments that the sale of office under absolutist regimes acted as a check on corruption ‘because it benefited the public weal, instead of some personal favourites of the King’ (Friedrich 1989: p. 21); an aspect that is brought out by the dynamics of access to corruption as a resource in social systems that have undergone a transition from absolutism to democracy, such as Russia and Mongolia (Humphrey and Sneath 2004), Kazakhstan (Rigi 2004) Latvia (Sedlenieks 2004) and Albania (Prato 2004).

Sedlenieks analysis of ‘rotten talk’ in contemporary Latvia (2004), for instance, links interestingly to the Naples material on the influence of the media, as there the media not only
seldom bother with complexities, since they make bad headlines; but, more worryingly for the democratic process, they may opt for the ethically corrupt role of playing up to the interests of political or economic masters. Thus, reminding us of Parry’s point, they contribute substantially to strengthen a corrupting rhetoric of ‘widespread’, ‘inevitable’ corruption or, at the very least, they contribute to undermine the fight against corruption which they, sometimes vociferously, advocate.26

Anthropologists have aptly addressed the disjunction between belief in, and empirical evidence of, the pervasiveness of corruption (See, for example, Gupta 1995, Parry 2000 and contributions in Pardo ed. 2004). They have looked at various forms of resistance to corruption, whereby people achieve their goals without recurring to corruption, and have examined the role played by the belief, where it exists, that corruption is everywhere, cannot be completely eradicated, cannot be avoided or is not worth avoiding, and only with great difficulty can be contained. From different angles (see, for example, Pardo ed. 2004), such analyses have shed light on the reproductive force of corruption and abuses of power, showing that, socially and politically contested rhetoric of power on ‘zero tolerance’ quite apart, not always are their reality and the recognition of their negative implications matched by appropriate state intervention in the form of legislation, prevention and punishment. Official attitudes often verge on more or less explicit expedient appeasement, or they overtly obey powerfully networked interests (Gledhill 2004; Pardo 2004; Sedlenieks 2004). Equally often, when legal measures are devised and put into place, they predictably (Scott 1972) fail to address the complex nature, causes and dynamics of corruption and abuses of power. As a consequence, legal intervention is often halting, incomplete and inadequate (see, for example, Miller 2000). The events in nineteenth-century Great Britain did after all engender a culture in which, even as late as the 1940s, people did not expect public officials to abuse their power — so much so that, even in the light of current events, they continue to regard corruption as not inevitable. Indeed, although the inevitability of corruption and abuses of power remains debatable, we must wonder whether it is reasonable to believe that they can be totally eradicated, as opposed to temporarily kept under some form of control. As suggested by recent events (e.g., the Murdoch and Libor affairs), it may well be true that the ‘pathology’ of corruption is not unavoidable or unassailable but it remains to be seen, case by case, whether a lasting recovery is at all possible.

Concluding Remarks
The foregoing has highlighted how the corrupt acts of officials who abuse their power and the law seriously jeopardize the relationship between legitimacy and authority (Weber 1978: Chapter 10). More strongly, we have seen, such a critical relationship is undermined by questionable behaviours in public life that do not strictly fall outside the law and by the legalization of previously illegal acts. Under such circumstances, the Western jurisprudential principles of the rationality and objectivity of the Law and of law as imposed law (Weber 26 See, for example, Caferra (1992: 91-6) and Ruffo (2000a and 2000b). For a journalist’s view of the corrupting power of the media, see Ruffo (2011).
1978: 753-84; Burman and Harrel-Bond 1979; Lloyd-Bostock 1979) are visibly weakened, undermining both the relationship between ordinary people and key representatives and institutions of the state and the way in which the state is perceived in the public culture (Gupta 1995). Moreover, as the link between authority and the exercise of power (Pardo 2000a) is weakened, the credibility of government (local and central), and ultimately of the state, becomes an issue. As anthropologists have made abundantly clear (Gledhill 2004, Pardo 2004, Prato 2004, Rigi 2004, Sedlenieks 2004 and Torsello 2012), especially destructive forms of resentment and distrust are fostered among ordinary citizens, contributing to a view of the state and of its institutions as illegitimate, morally dubious entities (Pardo 2000a).

Today, as in the past, these limitations mar public life in many leading Western countries, as discussed for example by Blankenburg, Staudhammer and Steinert (1989) with reference to Germany, Block (1996) and Lowenstein (1989) with reference to the U.S.A. (see also the contributions to the section titled The United States: How Special a Case? in Heidenheimer, Johnston and Le Vine, 1989), Doig (1996) with reference to the United Kingdom (see also King 1989) and Ruggiero (1996) with reference to France. Recognizing such limitations and their role in the impact and far-reaching ramifications of corruption and abuses of power is, however, an important but insufficient step. Of course, our analysis must acknowledge that such actions undermine fundamental principles of trust (Alatas 1968: 14 ff.) and, particularly when they extend to the public domain, of duty and responsibility. Yet, there are other important implications to consider.

Corruption at once draws and thrives on injustice, exploitation of inequality, distortions of power and betrayal of fundamental principles of citizenship, for those who do not have access to, or refuse to engage in corruption are at a disadvantage; but we also cannot fail to recognize that corruption may help to maintain social bonds and to engender new ones. To treat corruption simply as an aberration would be inexcusably simplistic, betraying ignorance of an empirical reality that spans illegal, as well as not strictly illegal actions. To put it more clearly, although the form and the nature of corruption, particularly in public life, may change in different political systems (for example, democratic, totalitarian), it must be identified for what it is; a highly problematic aspect of social and economic exchange.

Clearly, corruption may well be a pathology but, broadly in agreement with Gupta (1995: 376), it is unhelpful to treat it as a dysfunctional aspect of state organization. For the purpose of precise analysis, it should be identified as their product, not some sort of bug that is alien to them. Degrees of corruption may be encouraged by a shortage of resources and may themselves become useful resources. For instance, as Prato (2004) and Humphrey and Sneath (2004) have suggested (but see also Torsello 2012), corruption in the Post-socialist world is explained by current economic circumstances and by the degree of reform of the bureaucracy, rather than by a simple dichotomy between a ‘clean’ West and a ‘corrupt’ East. Rather than reflecting some ‘Eastern’ cultural disposition, the specific forms of corruption which they examine are the result of predatory responses by officials to the shrinking of resources available to them. Such shrinking of resources followed the breakdown of the system (see also Rigi 2004, Sedlenieks 2004 and Kramer 1989, on political corruption in the
USSR), in a political ambiance where state service jobs are still very prestigious, where those charged with enforcing state regulations still consider themselves an élite and where the ethical valuation of their work among those in state service remains high.

In other words, corruption and its causes must be understood in the context of the inherently difficult relationship between politics, bureaucracy, law and civil society which, in distinctly different ways, mark both Western and non-Western states. Corrupt relations draw on an interaction between power and its expedient or incompetent exercise, whereby the misuse of power breeds corruption and feeds on it. Linking to the analysis that I have offered here, ethnographically wide-ranging studies (see, for example, Harrison 2004, Pardo 2004, Prato 2004, Rigi 2004 and Sedlenieks 2004) have suggested that it is by studying such a relationship empirically that we can begin to fathom the nature and relative weight of corruption, not by seeking the roots of corruption in some ‘cultural disposition’.

Conflicting conceptions of legitimacy arise most strongly in situations marked by a duality between official and unofficial procedures and practices, whereby official buck-passing, abuse of power and of office, sluggishness and general malpractice contrast with unofficial exchanges which guarantee the achievement of goals, licit or illicit. Here, we have addressed the strong link between abuse of office and corruption and the significant role played in this contrast by insufficient internal audits and controls (see also, for example, Cordova and D’Amato 2000, Fiume Mariniello 2000), as well as by the ways in which bureaucratic norms are internalized not only by officials but also at various levels in the social spectrum. Significantly destructive problems are caused by rights becoming privileges, or transactionable assets, à la Bailey (1969); under such conditions of betrayal of duty and responsibility, corruption, especially extortive corruption, and bribery have far-reaching implications in the dynamics of associated life. Perhaps equally destructive are cause by ‘irresponsible’ media, proving that inflating corruption is corrupting.

It may indeed well be that, as Gledhill puts it (2004), corruption works primarily to the advantage of the élite in power, who exert greater control over it and over the legislative process, and that the rest of the population lose more than they gain from pragmatic individual behaviour. However, in agreement with a point made by Parry (2000), our analysis should address the recurrent complex empirical facts that corruption is not always condemned outright, that those who condemn corruption do not always stay away from it and that individual resistance to corruption tend to go alongside a readiness to participate in it, opposing morality to need, or convenience.

The corresponding notion of an ‘acceptable level’ of corruption does not necessarily imply that condoning corrupt actions. However, it does raise problematic, and intriguing, issues of moral legitimation or condemnation and a number of critical questions. According to what (necessarily arbitrary) criteria — political, moral and legal — is such a level defined? What kind of corruption is addressed? Even assuming that such a definition of ‘acceptable level of corruption’ can be achieved, is it possible to devise legislative means to guarantee that corruption does not increase above such a level?
In brief, when dealing with the complexity of corruption and abuses of power, we need to identify what aspects of the system encourage or generate illicit practices (illegal and non-illegal), what aspects could instead generate real changes and how people experience and speak about these changes. It is imperative to assess the precise identity of the dividing line between the legitimate and the illegitimate and of that between the legal and the moral. The next critical step lies in addressing the exact relationship of the protagonists in public life to formal law and its production and to their perceived legitimacy in the broader society.
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Corruption between Public and Private Moralities: The Albanian Case in a Comparative Perspective

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This essay draws on comparative ethnographic material from Albania and Italy. It addresses different forms of corruption, arguing that in order to understand the way in which phenomena such as corruption occur and are experienced in any given society, we should contextualize them in the historical and cultural traditions of that specific society. In doing so, however, we should be alert in avoiding falling into the trap of either moral relativism or cultural determinism. The essay suggests that an anthropological analysis of corruption should distinguish between legal rules and social norms. In particular, the empirical study of such norms helps to understand the meanings — both individual and inter-subjective — that actors give to the social and political situation in which they operate.

Keywords: Albania, Italy, party rule, regime change, social norms, informal networks.

In this essay I draw mainly on ethnographic material from post-communist Albania, where I began doing fieldwork in 1999. My main aim was to study regime change and legal reforms, and their implication for democratic governance. At that time, continuous allegations — and proved cases — of corruption and illegality were among the major concerns of foreign observers. I have addressed these issues in previous work (2000b, 2004, 2011); in particular, I looked at the way in which allegations of corruption are used in political competition and how they affect people’s trust in their representatives and the representatives of the institutions of the state. In the Albanian case, the relationship between citizens and their new rulers has also been affected by external influences in a context marked by the country’s aspiration to become a full member of the European Union and of other Western organizations, such as NATO. Over the years, I have addressed two principal research goals. On the one hand, I have examined how, in order to fulfil international demands of democratization, administrative responsibilities have been distributed at different levels of government and among different actors in the system. The initial question was to ascertain whether these actors were provided with the required authority and means (financial, human and technical, including legislative) to perform their duties. I looked at intergovernmental agreements to examine the consistency of the relationship among responsibility, authority and accountability, taking into account the social and cultural consequences of the reforms and of the attendant economic, financial and political processes. On the other hand, I have studied how people at different social levels respond to change and how they ‘negotiate’ the ‘new parameters of action’ demanded by the democratic process (and by the international community). I have looked both at ‘ordinary’ citizens and at the above mentioned ‘governmental actors’, and the ways in which they manage the resources at their disposal. My aim was to understand what generates the gap between formal legal rules and people’s actual behaviour, often based on informal social norms.

Here, in addressing the issue of corruption and its ‘forms, opportunities and social outcomes’, I shall also briefly draw on the findings from previous research on political change,

1 This essay was originally published in 2013 in Human Affairs (Vol. 23, No 2: 196-211).
which I carried out in Italy in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The timeframe of my Italian fieldwork is in itself significant because, while in the late 1980s most European Communist countries were experiencing more or less vociferous movements that demanded democratization, in Western European democracies like Italy the majority of the population was clearly dissatisfied with what they regarded as a ‘corrupt’ democratic system. It is worth emphasizing that Italy was one of the founding members of what is now the EU, and that EU representatives have acted as ‘advisors’ to the Albanian government regarding legal reforms and democratization. Before looking at the ethnography, let me address some general analytical points.

It has been simplistically argued that developing countries and countries in ‘transition’ are often the most corrupt. I use the term ‘transition’ in inverted commas. In my previously published work (2004, 2011), I have extensively criticized the concept of transition (see also Saltmarshe 2001), arguing that, instead of assessing the ‘success’ of post-communist regime change in terms of a linear movement towards an idealistic democratic model, an informed analysis should go beyond rigidly set abstract indicators and address the empirical situation. In particular, an in-depth analysis should take into account the gradual adjustments, adaptations, negotiations and redefinitions of social identities (see also Burawoy and Verdery 1999) that are inevitable and necessary in implementing democratic institutions based on the rule of law.

Drawing mainly on statistical data on developing and ‘transition’ countries, the World Bank has distinguished between administrative corruption (which involves public officials at all levels of government and affects a cross section of private interests and individuals) and so-called state capture, whereby the state is captured by private interests and the distinction between public and private is consequently blurred. From such a viewpoint, the mainstream literature has focused on corruption in the public sphere, such as abuses of office as well as agreements among governments, politicians and economic powers, the nature of which is not always legal. It has been argued that the aim of such ‘agreements’ is to exploit the weaknesses or instability of the political and economic systems to gain private, personal advantage. Such an approach has revived a controversy on the superimposition of external models and values. Anthropological analyses fundamentally challenge such an approach, raising doubts, for instance, on the widely accepted view that a (politically) weak state facilitates corrupt practices (see, for example, Gledhill 1999, Pardo 2004).

I have suggested (2004, 2011) that, in order to understand the way in which phenomena such as corruption occur and are experienced in any given society, we should contextualize them in the historical and cultural traditions of that specific society. In doing so, however, we should be alert in avoiding falling into the trap of either moral relativism or cultural determinism. Furthermore, in looking at such phenomena as corruption, we should consider the discrepancy between, on the one hand, codes of behaviour and people’s perception of actions which are legally defined as crimes and, on the other hand, the legal system which should punish such crimes. In particular, we should consider that while actions are seldom sanctioned or sanctionable per se, they are so in the context of given relations, of the ethical vision of such relations and of what is considered to be proper behaviour. As Pardo (2000a) argues, people do not automatically accept legal rules and behaviours as legitimate, similarly, they do not
necessarily regard actions that, by definition, fall outside the strict boundaries of the law as morally illegitimate.

An anthropological analysis of corruption should ask whether this phenomenon should be looked at only in relation to a set of legal rules or whether it should also be contextualized in a given normative system. As Greenhouse (1982) has observed, (legal) rules and (social) norms are different in type, not in degree. Referring to Fuller’s work (1969), she states that rules are products of legislation; they are intelligible, consistent and stable. They are written in relation to a given administrative system and therefore are predictable and public. Rules require a legitimate legislator, who guarantees reliability and predictability, even when they are violated; and yet, although rules imply accountability, they do not necessarily imply obedience (Greenhouse 1982: 60). In contrast, norms belong to the private domain; they are not unanimously known (in the sense that they are based on shared knowledge and not on the promulgation of an institutionally sanctioned authority); they do not necessarily imply reliability, although they are shared on the expectation of trust and accountability; they can be contradictory and are often applied in a selective way. Finally, the individual’s knowledge of them is always incomplete (Greenhouse 1982: 61). Greenhouse suggests that norms imply a system of ideas regarding social relations and the social structure; ideas which lead individual actors to compare their own actions, and the justifications for such actions, with the actions and justifications provided by others. It is, thus, a system of inclusion and exclusion; a process of classification and reclassification of oneself in relation to the wider society.

The Albanian Case: The Background

Using historical and contemporary ethnographic material, in my previous work I have analysed how the concept of ‘corruption’ as it is defined in Western jurisprudence is not contemplated by the Albanian traditional juridical system, an oral tradition that was codified only at the beginning of the 20th Century and is commonly known as Kanun.2 For the purpose of this essay, it is relevant to point out that this Canon of Customary Law regulated the social, economic and political relations of a segmentary tribal society based on a system of obligations and loyalty among the male members at brotherhood and clan level. This segmentary social organization relied on a system of exchange based on reciprocal obligations that bound the individual to the group; belonging provided not only a sense of identity, but also protection against the infringement of social norms. Because these were unwritten norms, trust and expectations of trust, credibility and accountability were fundamental and were constantly assessed through personal relations. Margaret Hasluck (1954) described this system as a true democracy because it was a government of the people, for the people, by the people.3 In such a system it was expected that a person would act in the interest of the primary group to which he belonged; to do otherwise would be dishonourable. At the same time, a person would not pursue personal

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2 Bardhoshi (2011) points out that there are several regional variations of the Kanun; therefore, social norms may vary significantly from one region to another.

3 I describe in detail the traditional segmentary organization of Albania in previous work (see, Prato 2004, 2009 and 2011).
interests that would be detrimental to his group. Therefore, in such a system, there would be no incompatibility between ‘administrative’, or rather, ‘public duties’ and obligations towards one’s group (be it the brotherhood, the clan, or the tribe);\(^4\) being a ‘good brother’ also meant fulfilling the social responsibilities deriving from public office. Indeed, for a long time the word closest to the Western concept of corruption used by Albanians was the Turkish word *ryshfet*, which can be translated as the ‘offer of a gift’ (in the pursuit of an interest).\(^5\) This concept was usually applied to the attempts of the Ottoman administration to ‘buy’ the loyalty of clan leaders — which would often be regarded as a betrayal of the loyalty and obligations among the clan’s members — or to benefits and privileges that were granted to Albanians who converted to Islam but were denied to the rest of the population. Older Albanians have sometimes pointed out the word *prish* to me, which I also found in an Albanian dictionary of 1936. In English, this word translates as ‘to ruin’, ‘to destroy’, or to squander money, to spend lavishly, to thwart (plans), to break. The 1936 Albanian dictionary provides three definitions of *prish*: 1) chemical-physical processes of deterioration; 2) moral deterioration, which however does not imply a self-conscious, voluntary act (the example used is, ‘a boy led astray by friends’); 3) to squander money, or to put up an obstacle.

In the 1980s, two new words were introduced in the Albanian dictionary (which are transliterations from Western European languages): *korruptim* (noun) and *korruption* (verb). The meaning of *korruptim* is given as ‘the act and condition defined by the verb’. The definition of the verb *korruption* uses both *prish* and *ryshfet*, and gives great emphasis to the meaning deriving from *prish*. Thus, corruption is defined mainly as ‘moral’ corruption, typical of the capitalist system (a system that ‘corrupts people, especially the young’). Further explanation also provides the meaning of ‘bribe’, using the word *ryshfet*. Many Albanians argue that the latter meaning became widespread during the last decade of the Communist regime. However, it must be noted that, in totalitarian regimes, corruption is a phenomenon involving the élite, the power-holders and, therefore, is not exposed to public sanction. In Communist Albania, as in many other totalitarian regimes, nepotism, associated with a proved loyalty to the party, was a stronghold of the regime’s power. It should also be stressed that under Communism, the Party was the Law; in fact, the profession of lawyer did not exist.

Nepotism, however, was not the only form of corruption under Communism. In 1976–86, following Albania’s economic autarky, corruption became widespread at all levels of the State’s institutions. While embezzlement of funds and other forms of theft among State officials multiplied, the party’s hierarchy began to publicize various political scandals some of which significantly involved a Minister of Interior and officials of the secret police. On the one hand, such public disclosure was aimed at fostering popular support for the Party in a situation of deep economic crisis. On the other hand, moralizing campaigns became the means of political

\(^4\) The primary group of reference would change according to the specific circumstances; for example, whether there were conflicts to be solved between brotherhoods or between clans (in the latter case, different brotherhoods belonging to the same clan would ally against the opposing clan); or obligations to be fulfilled by a brotherhood towards another brotherhood, or by one clan towards another clan (in which case all brotherhoods of the same clan would be expected to fulfil such obligations).

\(^5\) In English it is commonly translated as bribe or graft.
competition among party cadres in preparation for the succession to Enver Hoxha — who died, after a prolonged illness, in 1985.

So, under Communism, _ryshfet_ and the abuse of office (in their diversified forms of nepotism, theft and embezzlement of funds) appeared to involve mainly higher levels of society and to be associated, among ordinary people, with the corrupting power exerted by a central government in order to subjugate the Albanian people (and break down their tribal identity). In contrast to such a centralized and centralistic approach, in democratic systems, potentially everybody has access to resources, including those arising from socially acceptable exchanges of favours or from illegal dealings. Later, I shall address the system of exchange that operates among ordinary people. For now, let us look at corruption among the contemporary Albanian élite.

Since December 1990, Albania has experienced deep social, economic and political change. This process began with the introduction of political pluralism, which paved the way to institutional and legal reforms that would eventually stimulate the development of a market economy.

The introduction of political pluralism has exacerbated the instrumental use of corruption and of the moralizing campaigns against it in political competition; a phenomenon that, as we have seen, was already present, though in different ways, during the late Communist period. This, however, is not an Albanian idiosyncrasy. Pareto (1964) and Mosca (1923) have pointed out how, also in Western Liberal democracies, the use of moralizing campaigns has been instrumental to the circulation of the élite. In post-communist Albania, proved cases of corruption and (often unsubstantiated) accusations of corruption have become the means for political opponents to exclude each other from power. Perversely, however, the alleged ‘corruption’ of one party also becomes the _raison d’être_ of the other party. As the recent events of January 2011 show, still today the Socialist and the Democratic Parties appear to pursue their political agendas by staging demonstrations against each other. For example, the Socialist Party is still challenging the result of the 2009 elections.6

In post-communist Albania, cases of corruption have involved representatives of the institutions of the state (including former prime ministers, and former presidents of the Republic) and high-level bureaucrats, who in some cases have been accused of embezzling international financial aid and of administrative fraud. Some of the accused have justified their corrupt actions in the name of the ‘public interest’; in particular by claiming that their dealings were helping economic development and, thus, facilitating the process of democratization. Perversely, however, these justifications have facilitated the illicit accumulation of private wealth to the detriment of local enterprise and of the interests of the wider citizenry; that is, the interest of the general public on whose behalf they claimed to act.

The contemporary situation raises critical questions. To what extent is Albania different from established Western democracies? Is it a qualitative or quantitative difference? In the next section, I shall briefly describe the Italian context of the late 1980s. This makes a significant

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6 In a later section, I shall address articles of the Albanian Criminal Code that specifically deal with ‘attempts of corruption’ in the procedures of the ‘democratic electoral process’.
comparative case because, as I have mentioned, the EU — of which Italy is a key member — is one of the Western international organizations that are monitoring the ‘democratic’ process in Albania, and its representatives (from different EU countries, including Italy) have acted as ‘advisors’ to Albanian state officials.

Parliamentary Democracy vs Party-rule: The Italian Case

In my analysis of the changes that occurred in Italy in the late 1980s and early 1990s, I have addressed the degeneration of the Italian political system from a parliamentary democracy into a system of party rule (represented by the so-called partitocrazia, partyocracy, and sottogoverno, sub-government, or hidden government). I have argued (Prato 1993, 2000) that in order to understand the legitimacy granted to such a system beyond formal law, it is necessary to look at the ‘ethics of responsibility’ that guide the actions of individuals and ask, following Weber (1974), what ‘cause’ the politicians of sottogoverno claim or aim to serve (see also Prato 2012). If we agree with Weber that the politician’s action is characterized by partisan spirit, we ought also to agree that responsibility towards a particularistic cause would be the ultimate goal of such action. Furthermore, I have suggested that, apart from the acquisition of personal power, in a partyocratic system — which developed in response to the original weakness of the parties — the cause to be served is the acquisition of power (electoral and political) for one’s own party. In Italy, as the work of the executive body (that is, the government) is constitutionally subordinated to the trust granted by the parliament (whose members are in fact party representatives), the observable outcome of such an approach to politics has been that the informal rules of sub-government have become dominant. In this situation, the ‘cause’ to be served feeds on an internal ethic of responsibility towards one’s party (or party faction) and its allies in sub-government. Once this duty has been fulfilled, responsibility might extend to one’s electorate and, maybe, ultimately, to the broader society.

It should also be noted that, critically, partyocracy has extended the control of the political parties over public offices through a system of distribution of spoils known as ‘allotment’. In this situation the bureaucratic and administrative structures seem to have failed to become separated from the process of political competition; thus, the ‘ethics of responsibility’ of sub-government extend to those areas too. This is crucial because, contrary to what is prescribed by the Italian Constitution, in this partyocratic civil servants, especially in ministerial offices, cease to be at the ‘exclusive service of the nation’ (Italian Constitution: Art. 98). As they are appointed by the parties in accord with the allotment procedure — which also involves ‘trustworthy’ opposition parties — they are restricted in guaranteeing ‘the good performance and impartiality of the administration’ (Italian Constitution: Art. 97). For them, the ministerial office increasingly becomes an important step into a high-level political career; thus, ‘bureaucratic, administrative responsibility’ becomes an empty concept and the office holder becomes responsible in the party-o-cratic sense described above.

The intricate, cross-party network of sottogoverno relationships is, thus, based on a system of inclusion and exclusion, whereby politicians, and bureaucrats, who claim responsibility towards the common good and to an impartial administration are regarded, and treated, as untrustable and unaccountable partners, ‘irresponsible’ politicians of ‘low moral
standing’ (Weber 1974: 95). In such a situation, the ‘trustworthy’ opposition parties — who are officially outside government, but have their share of power in sotto governo — end up strengthening the ‘negative power’ of the parties, that is the power of blocking action. When, in the late 1980s, popular movements, and individual actors within the system, began to challenge this ‘normative’ framework (see Prato 2012), new rules were introduced (well before the tangentopoli scandals). As I have argued elsewhere (Prato 2000), paradoxically, these new rules brought about the ‘institutionalization’ of sub-government, whereby pre- and post-electoral negotiations and compromises ceased to be the outcome of a ‘shared conduct’ (among the politicians of sub-government) and became officially legalized. There appears, thus, to be a sociologically significant truth in the fact that a shared conduct becomes institutionalized, and therefore ‘legally’ binding, when such a conduct starts losing consensus (Weber 1978; Bohannan 1965). Bohannan’s hypothesis of the double institutionalization of norms may help to unpack the new Italian situation. For Bohannan, as for Weber, the diffusion of a conduct among a plurality of individuals will inevitably lead to a consensual understanding. For Weber, however, such a consensus is not by itself law. From the Weberian perspective, the necessity of introducing new rules of law is mainly explained by the emergence of new lines of conduct that challenge the established consensus. In such a situation there may be individuals who would favour change either to protect their interests, thus altering the external conditions in which they operate, or to promote them more effectively under existing conditions. The Italian changes seem to be the outcome of the first possibility envisioned by Weber. More interesting, however, Bohannan has argued that a shared conduct becomes institutionalised, and therefore, ‘legally’ binding, when such a conduct starts losing consensus. Taking Bohannan’s analysis further, we could say that, although sub-government was certainly not losing consensus among political parties, the moral opposition to it expressed in the broader society seriously threatened its survival. Thus, while political parties started preaching ‘revolutionary changes’, the rules of sub-government were eventually enforced by law, thus becoming institutionalised.

As Pardo (2000b, 2004) has pointed out, in the post-tangentopoli situation, appropriate changes in the law have decriminalized actions that had been previously instrumental in bringing down most of the old political parties (see also Pardo’s chapter in this volume), but not, I reiterate, the old party-system.

The Albanian and the Italian cases lead to the questions: what in fact is corruption; how do we define it?

Interpreting Corruption: Contested Empirical Reflections
It has been effectively argued that the definition of corruption depends mostly on the definition of illegality, and on the classification of certain kinds of transactions, as they are provided by different legislative systems and by the international community (Gledhill 1999, Pardo 2004, Prato 2004).

7 In the early 1990s, magistracy enquiries led to the exposition of corrupt practices in the Italian political system. The enquiries became known as tangentopoli (literally, bribesville), or kick-back city. Pardo (2000b, 2001) describes in details the reasons and outcome of these enquires.
As Nilsson points out, definitions of corruption are not harmonized in Europe (1994: 90); indeed, different European criminal codes provide different definitions of corruption. In some cases, the word corruption is not used. Sometimes, there is a definition of different offences, such as bribery, purchase of votes, and the exercise of undue influence. To overcome these difficulties, in the summer of 1993, the Council of Europe convened the 19th Conference of the European Ministers of Justice on the topic, ‘Administrative, Civil and Penal Aspects of the Fight against Corruption’. The preparatory documents stated that, ‘The notion of corruption is to be understood in its widest sense, extending to all fields of activities, both private and public, and to all persons invested with private or public functions who acquire an undue advantage linked to the exercise of such functions’ (quoted in Nilsson 1994: 90).

These different legal traditions and the attendant different schools of thought have influenced in different ways the legal reforms in Albania, often leading to discrepancies and inaccuracy in Albanian Law.

In the new Albanian Criminal Code (which was approved in 1995) corruption is a crime. Nevertheless, until the mid-2000s, corruption was rarely investigated; it would be simplistic to explain this omission as a lack of political will. One of the initial and frequent explanations given to me was that the Albanian judiciary were not trained to deal with this kind of crime, and that the necessary judicial structure was not fully developed. According to foreign observers, political influence in the appointment of magistrates has been a major obstacle in the fight against corruption. One major explanation, however, appears to be found in the weakness and inefficacy of the legal system. In the Albanian Criminal Code, there is only one article listed under the heading ‘crime of corruption’; this is Article 312, which addresses the instigation to commit perjury. The crime of corruption, as it is envisaged in other European criminal codes, can be deduced from other articles relating to ‘criminal actions against public offices’ and ‘criminal actions against justice’ (Arts 259 and 260, relating to the request and acceptance of bribes); or others which refer to perjury, deceitful expert’s reports, deceitful misinterpretation of official acts and deceitful translation (Arts 306, 308, 309, 321). Still others address the acceptance of bribes by judges and public prosecutors (Art. 319) and interdiction from public office (Art. 35). Articles 244 and 245 refer specifically to Public Administration and establish penalties for officials who accept bribes, gifts or other profits to undertake a specific action in the exercise of their public duties, or for dereliction of such duties. Article 328 refers to ‘attempts of corruption’ in the ‘procedures of the democratic electoral system’; it states that it is considered an attempt at corruption to try to obtain the signatures necessary to present a political candidate, or to influence the vote either in favour of or against a candidate. Furthermore, there are several contradictions between different articles, which often lead to their inapplicability in practice.

The above articles show that Albanian Law is often evasive, imprecise and full of gaps. Alternative punishments are almost always prescribed: the penalty can be either a fine or imprisonment. This principle of an ‘alternative penalty’ is supposed to be evidence of an advanced judicial system. In the Albanian situation, however, it becomes an ambiguity that often leaves room for the judge’s own (many say, arbitrary) interpretation of the law. Over time, such ambiguity has encouraged corruption through limiting the deterring element of the penalty.
Passing new laws would probably not work. As is shown by some Western cases (including, for instance, Italy), the proliferation of laws (sometimes contradicting each other) is also evidence of a weak and ineffectual system. At both ends room is left for arbitrary judgement, which leads people to challenge both the impartiality of the Law and, as a consequence, its legitimacy.

The need for Albania to gain international credibility has spurred anti-corruption investigations. Successive Albanian governments have implemented various policies in fulfilment of their pledge to fight corruption. Apart from the approval of the new Criminal Code in 1995 — which, as we have seen, includes within limits the crime of corruption — other significant initiatives are worth mentioning. In 1998, the government approved the first ‘Plan of Action against Corruption’; in 1999 it began to implement the first ‘Strategy against Corruption’ in consultation with international partners. In February 2000, Albania signed the ‘Anti-Corruption Initiative of the Stability Pact for South-East Europe’ (SPAI). In signing the SPAI, Albania, other Southeast European countries and their international partners agreed that they would fight corruption at all levels: national, international, organized crime, money laundering, and so on. Nevertheless, cases of corruption continue to occur, and to be reported, in many spheres of public and private life.

Paterna (2000) reports malpractice and bribery in several public sectors that would be regarded as corruption in many Western criminal codes. Drawing on international ‘indicators’, he reports that a most common form of corruption appears to consist in payment to obtain jobs as custom officers (more than 50 percent of whom are said to have obtained their job in this way), tax inspectors, magistrates, public attorneys, directors of public institutions, as well as in the police. Moreover, so-called ‘corruption costs’ are regarded as the biggest expenses for small and medium enterprises. Forty-five percent of such enterprises must pay bribes for services such as import-export operations, building permits, telecommunications, avoidance of tax inspections and civil and penal sanctions. Of those who have to deal with the judiciary, one in three has paid bribes to officials. The most corrupt legal professions appear to be bailiff, notary, public attorney, judge and prison officer; and the most corrupt public institutions appear to be the magistracy, customs, institutions appointed to supervise the privatization of state assets and the restitution of property, and public hospitals. My ethnography suggests that the empirical situation is rather complex. Elsewhere (Prato 2004), I have examined cases of entrepreneurs who have exploited loopholes in the law and have ‘successfully’ avoided fiscal controls and the payment of business taxes and of workers’ benefits. On the other hand, I have also collected empirical evidence on cases of budding entrepreneurs who refused to pay corrupt officials. The case of Tani and his partners is a telling example. Tani was a schoolteacher when he migrated to Italy. There, he married an Italian girl whose family owns a food-processing factory. Tani and his brother-in-law decided to develop an import-export business with Albanian partners. Tani describes his experience with the customs officers as traumatic and unbelievable. Every time he disembarked in Albania, and on embarkation for his return journey to Italy, he was asked for money by two custom officers. As he refused to pay, the officers threatened him, saying that his business would be short-lived. He gave up his share in the business after his Albanian associate was assaulted and robbed (see, Prato 2004: 77-78). In spite of this negative
experience, years later Tani established a new business of a different nature. For this new business, he relies mainly on internet communication and online trade. So far, he says, in Albania the kind of ‘internet crime’ that might affect his business is limited; this, he adds, makes him confident that he can continue to operate within the law and without having to compromise too much. Occasionally, he travels to Albania to meet his associates there. On those occasions, he takes ‘small gifts’ to bureaucrats who have helped him in dealing with the intricacies of the often ambiguous business legislation. Similar to Tani’s initial experience, the case material (Prato 2004) that I collected on a magistrate supervising the restitution of property confiscated by the Communists shows that magistrates who do not comply with the unspoken but widespread practice of accepting bribes are forced to transfer to other departments in order to avoid retaliation (and, in some cases, physical assault).

Nowadays, foreign observers seem to take a positive view of what appears to be a decrease in corruption in many of the above-mentioned sectors. On his visit to Albania in 2009, Bill Hughes, the Director General of the UK Serious Organized Crime Agency, praised the achievements of the Albanian government, particularly regarding the successful steps taken in the fight against crime and corruption and the progress made in terms of judicial reforms and in strengthening the rule of law. However, international observers believe that there are still key issues that Albania needs to address more efficiently, such as reinforcing the government’s anti-corruption action plan and increasing the independence and transparency of the judiciary. The achievements mentioned by Mr Hughes clearly have brought about institutional credibility and legitimacy demanded by supranational organizations; however, in my experience, they have not led to citizen recognition of legitimacy.

We should ask, therefore, how is this situation affecting ordinary people’s relations with, and perception of the new political élite and of the state institutions?

**Legal Rules and Social Norms: Insights from the Grassroots**

The Preamble of the Albanian Constitution (approved in 1998) states the aim of building a social and democratic state based on the rule of law and of guaranteeing human rights and equality of opportunity in the framework of a market economy. While on paper the new Albanian Constitution appears to guarantee such rights, the empirical situation is complex and diversified.8

Empirical evidence suggests that many Albanians find the contemporary situation disorienting on three accounts. First, they realize that the existence of democratic institutions alone does not guarantee the protection of citizens’ rights. Second, they associate this failed protection with the fact that very often institutional representatives do not appear to have the necessary authority and the means to perform properly their duties; poor public services and ambiguous legislation are two aspects of this situation. Third, malpractice, allegations of corruption and abuses of office continue to make the headlines and to be experienced at the grassroots. This has led to a widespread view of the political élite as people who are mainly concerned with signing international agreements and setting up procedures and performing acts

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8 For a detailed analysis of ethnographic material, see Prato 2011.
aimed at gaining personal power, while ostensibly ignoring citizens’ needs. In particular, as the partially accomplished economic reforms have fostered people’s discontent, opposition parties have turned what had the making of a serious breakdown of the ‘social contract’ into an opportunity to gather electoral support, while continuing to be observably unable, or unwilling, to manage the economic crisis. In 1999, when I began my research, Albania was still dealing with the chaos caused by the 1997 collapse of the ‘pyramid schemes’. Over the following five years, under the Socialist Party, there were four changes in government, due to party infighting which, as Raxhimi reports (2002), has substantially contributed to delaying the negotiations for Albania’s accession to the EU (the Accession Protocol was eventually signed in 2009). Above all, in this situation ordinary Albanians are de facto denied access to the most fundamental rights.

To put it briefly, the Albanian State appears to be failing to ‘pool’ resources and ‘redistribute’ them on the basis of equality of opportunities and citizens’ rights. In the face of people’s new economic and social aspirations, this failure has generated a situation whereby people have developed multiple strategies to gain access to resources or, simply, to cope with the uncertainties of life.

After the collapse of Communism, images of a ‘good’ Western life-style were widely broadcast in the media. Ordinary people no longer wanted to be excluded from such a life-style. Some wanted quick access to it and would use whatever means to achieve this goal. Others, while feeling disoriented, were more discerning about how to gain access to the new available resources (and the new acquired rights). Ethnographic material shows that in both cases mobilization of traditional networks and the ability to appeal to the attendant value-system have proved to be key assets in gaining access to services and in partaking, with different degrees of success, in the good life that democracy claims to bring. I have constructed representative case studies to illustrate how people, faced with life crisis situations or with ambiguous or weak legislation, endeavour to gain access to resources and to what should be available to them by right through informal networks and relations of reciprocal help (Prato 2011). Mobilization of social networks proves essential, for example, in gaining access to proper health care, or in the restitution of properties that were ‘collectivized’ under Communism (this is especially the case of Albanians who have refused, or did not have the means, to bribe the relevant magistrate; see Prato 2011). Thus, in the postcommunist situation, characterized, on the one hand, by the emergence of ‘economic individualism’ and, on the other hand, by the failure of the State to protect the rights of citizens, networks of individuals or groups become important elements of the aforementioned multiple strategies. A summary description of the case of Enida, Bledar and Faton, which I have examined at length in a previous essay (Prato 2011) may help to illustrate this point.

Having failed to regain their family property through the new Law on the Restitution of Property of 1993, Enida and Bledar eventually decided to use their informal network. They were not indiscriminate in their approach, though. Contrary to the widespread assumption (especially among foreign observers) that in postcommunist Albania people try to achieve their goals by appealing to the ‘old clan mentality’ and the attendant values, after careful consideration Enida and Bledar excluded close family members from their strategy. They found
instead a trustworthy interlocutor in Faton, a non-blood relative of Enida’s, who is locally regarded as a skilful entrepreneur who manages his activities within the limits of ‘relative’ legality that mark the current situation. Faton’s help turned out to be crucial in solving the problem. Drawing on his local reputation, he involved entrepreneurs from the building sector with whom he had done business in the past. Eventually, Bledar and Enida regained their land and, lacking money, allowed Faton to build a block of flats on it. In exchange, they received a large apartment of their choice, which Faton fully furnished at his expense.

In trying to make sense of the social significance of what might appear as an imbalanced exchange — for Faton’s material gain was considerably higher — I found it analytically useful to look at some aspects of the Albanian traditional system of exchange and the attendant values. In this system, exchange does not occur as an occasional transaction between single individuals but is, instead, part of a chain of reciprocal help based on kinship and regional networks, whereby transactions tend to occur among families. Such networks are usually mobilized in cases of emergency, but also in mundane situations. This set up could be described as a system of socially-based generalized reciprocity (à la Sahlins 1965) where value is attached not to the ‘quantity’ or to the material value of the help provided, but to the family’s effective readiness to respond to the call. Failure to respond leads to social ostracism. Providing help, and when possible protection, enhances the self-image and social status of the giver. However, although this appears to engender a hierarchy of obligations, reciprocal help may be expressed in different ways, depending on individual circumstances and on the wider social conditions and historical contingency. In the process, old links are strengthened and new relations of trust are created. This is important for, as I have argued, trust plays a central role in the whole system.

In contrast to cultural deterministic approaches, I have suggested that what might appear to a superficial observer as a resurrection of a traditional system of reciprocity should instead be understood as a new system of ‘exchange of favours’ of the kind described by Pardo (1996) in his Naples ethnography, where selfworth and its social recognition are central in the dynamics of social relations.

In the ethnographic case described above, the exchange with Faton was more than satisfactory for Enida and Bledar, who regained the family property, could finally leave the run-down building in which they had been forced to spend all their life and strengthened their relationship with an influential individual like Faton.

Far from representing the restoration of an ‘old mentality’, their strategies exemplify new applications of people’s appeal to reciprocal help and family obligations, bringing out the ideological construct of their approach. As Faton observed in commenting on his transaction with Enida, Bledar and other local entrepreneurs, he, like many others, has often had to apply the ‘logic of the market’, ‘shopping around’ for the best deals and the more trustworthy partners. In such a logic, kin networks cannot always be a priority. Nevertheless, Faton is widely regarded as a ‘generous’ and ‘disinterested’ person, which has enabled him to

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9 Following Polanyi (1944), the personalization of social exchange appears to be a way of building trustworthy relations.
establish social relations of trust and, in the contemporary social and economic situation marked by new forms of social stratification, a sense of self-worth and social standing.

**Concluding Reflections**

It has been argued that in many societies that experience rapid social change social behaviour does not always conform to legal rules (Kregar 1994); instead, legal rules are often seen as obstacles to be by-passed. In this essay, I have briefly referred to the Italian ethnography to highlight forms of ‘corruption’ (in the sense of the degeneration of an established parliamentary democracy), which are usually overlooked when analysing corruption in developing or ‘transition’ countries. A comparative look at the two ethnographies discussed here suggests that both in the Italian and Albanian cases the initial weakness of the political parties may dangerously lead to a situation in which a ‘shared conduct’, based on informal norms, prevails over the rule of law. This may lead, in turn, to a new form of dictatorship — that is, a system of party-rule — which guarantees its self-legitimation but alienates people’s trust and undermines the legitimacy of the new legal rules.

We have seen that in the fluidity that marks the Albanian process of democratization, unhelpfully labelled ‘transition’, access to resources continues to occur in a selective way and that ordinary people are often denied access to most basic rights. In this situation, the new rules are either received as ambiguous or seen to be too complex to be applied. It follows that personal re-interpretation and exemptions become the (informal) rule.

In the past, classificatory approaches that label states as ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ have put a spin on what a strong state should be. The contested concept of transition that underlies the approach of the international community appears to be reproducing this kind of misleading analysis, portraying Albania as a ‘weak’ state. The descriptive analysis of the situation has suggested a far more complex view. It has suggested that citizens grant legitimacy by comparing their motivations and actions with the motivations and actions of their rulers. It has suggested that, ultimately, the credibility of rulers builds on relations of reciprocal trust. When the formal institutions are not trusted, we have seen, informal social institutions, such as personal networks, become the guarantors of stability and security.

People’s mobilization of traditional networks and their appeal to the attendant value system should not be seen, however, as a cultural legacy or the restoration of an old mentality, but as a new development of familiar patterns that take on new meanings and are used to new ends, including as resources in overcoming legal or illegal bureaucratic obstacles. New, but often weak, laws are seen as obstacles to be by-passed. In many cases, such obstacles take the form of illegal practices and abuse of office. If we consider the dynamic dimension of society and culture, we realize that informal networks, and the new relations they engender, have become part of a system of exchange of favours which is based on broadly defined social and moral norms. Such norms imply a system of ideas regarding social relations and the social structure, leading to a process of classification and re-classification of the self in relation to the wider society. To put it briefly, the empirical study of such norms helps us to understand the meanings — both individual and inter-subjective — that actors give to the social and political situation in which they operate.
One would be tempted to ask, what will be the future of Albania? Will the current situation lead to the institutionalization of ‘shared conducts’ which, though regarded as legitimate by the actors involved, are de facto illegal, as has happened in Italy? Perhaps a tentative answer will have to take into account two factors.

First, as I have argued, the dynamics of phenomena like corruption must be contextualized historically and culturally. However, beyond cultural specificity, it is also necessary to contextualize national processes within broader international interests. It could be argued that the logic of inclusion and exclusion — which I have discussed in relation to the Italian sub-government and the Albanian system of exchange — might serve both Albanian and international interests. On the one hand, Albania needs to be recognized as a true democracy accountable to other Western democracies. On the other hand, there is a strategic international interest in including Albania in the ‘Western world’.

Second, the Albanian case seems to corroborate the view that corruption cannot be explained by a simple cause/effect model. Most importantly, we should recognize that corruption is not an isolated phenomenon circumscribed to specific countries. Although all Western criminal codes address corruption in one form or another, there appears to be an unwillingness, or a powerlessness, in punishing it. The judicial systems of the countries discussed here appear to be weak and inefficient against this crime. In the Italian case, the weakness and inefficiency is manifested in the proliferation of laws (which often contradict each other). In the Albanian case, there are few laws and those that exist are vague. What appears to be beyond question is that both systems leave ample room for arbitrariness, leading to the very problematic consequence of fostering doubt at the grassroots on the credibility and legitimacy of legislation and, more worryingly, on the credibility of the Law.
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Uncanny and Dystopian City: An Analysis of Siva

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With rapid urbanisation and people’s migration from rural to urban areas in search of work, education and other opportunities, urban conglomerations in India are rapidly growing. A city is marked by diversity, modernity, high-rise buildings, modern infrastructure and consumerism. Popular culture is one of the many resources for understanding the cityscape. The city is not just about physical and material spaces but also includes the lived experiences, interactions, contestations, exclusions and power relationships. Many urban geographers opine that cinema reflects and represents these issues as well as the discourses about the city. There is little or no research on the Cinematic City of Hyderabad. This article analyses the movie Siva, which captured the essence of the city of Hyderabad. The discussion maps out its urban spaces by using semiotic and discourse analysis, and addresses the different themes that the discourse reveals. In sum, Siva captures the anxiety, violence and evolution of a dystopian city and provides insights to the potential fate of similar urban conglomerations.

Keywords: Hyderabad, cinema, Cinematic City, cinema and geography, film studies, urban studies, city.

Introduction
Films are set in space, imaginative or real, and then re-presented to the audience in what Stephen Heath terms in his seminal essay, ‘narrative space’ (Heath 1993). Cinema can also be an archive of the city (Mazumdar 2007), ‘a tool to read the cityscape’ (Unni 2011), and for cinematic discourse (ALSayyad 2006). To understand the city of Hyderabad, the movie Siva, which was released in 1989 and directed by Ram Gopal Varma, is analysed. Siva is one of the first Telugu movies that used the city (of Hyderabad) as a character of the story and represented the uncanny city (Mazumdar 2007); one of the characteristics of a city and its modernity which is discussed in later sections.

The focus of the Telugu movie industry (which is called ‘Tollywood’) from its beginning was on rural people and their culture. Movies about urban spaces and residents were very rare and the city location was always Chennai. The city of Hyderabad was virtually non-existent in the cinematic imaginations of the Tollywood industry. It was only after the formation of Andhra Pradesh in 1956 and with government encouragement and subsidies that the Telugu movie industry moved from Chennai to Hyderabad, as did its narratives (Srinivas 2013). It was the movie Siva which first captured the city of Hyderabad like no other film had ever done, with on location shoots, without the use of sets (except in songs), and with the use of the spatiality2 of urbanscapes.

1 I would like to thank the anonymous readers for Urbanities for their suggestions and criticism, and especially Prof. Jerome Krase for his editorial assistance.

2 Anthony Giddens (1984) used the word spatiality and later many scholars defined and redefined the term. Spatiality is defined as how the spaces are structured by architecture in public spaces and private spaces, informal and formal use and segregation of spaces, and so on. It informs the power relations of different people and discourses set in that space.
Siva became a hit beyond the imaginations of its director and producer. The movie set a precedent for future Telugu movies with the use of a steady cam, and sound design which had never been used before as effectively. Since then, the importance of using a place as a backdrop to a narrative structure has changed; that is, the narrative has spatial aspects linking the stories to the locale. Many directors after Ram Gopal Varma say their movies were influenced by his movies and especially Siva. Directors Puri Jagannath, TriVrikram and Krishna Vamsi are some of the directors who made movies that follow the trends set by Varma. This movie brought Hyderabad’s contestations into focus in order to understand and analyse the negotiations and lived experiences of the city. The markers of the city do not just rest on its physical reality, but also in its stories, everyday discourse, art, symbols and imagery (Unni 2011) as well as being constructed by images and representations (Lapsley 1997: 187; Fitzmaurice 2001). To understand the city to its fullest, the representations of the city offer to unravel the hidden secrets, and notion of the uncanny of the city (Mazumdar 2007: 40). S.V. Srinivas, on the depiction of Hyderabad in movies and especially Siva, says:

The city’s geography and Telangana region’s dialect became a noticeable presence in Telugu cinema as recently as the late 1980s with Siva (Ramgopal Varma 1989). In this film, for the first time in popular Telugu cinema, the local specificity of the city was foregrounded, the action being set in narrow by lanes of city’s bastis and Irani tea shops, against the backdrop of the odd historical monument (2013).

Ram Gopal Varma introduced new filmmaking and narrating techniques in his debut movie, Siva. Ram Gopal Varma said in an interview that he will never make a family movie or movies like those that Karan Johar directs (Vasudevan 2000). His movies are a departure from earlier movies that were produced in the Telugu film industry. The narratives of homes and family have moved out into the streets of the city. The narratives are now in the public sphere but at the same time remain individualistic and personal. This is a clear departure from social movies and ‘message oriented’ movies.

Figure 1. Title Card of Siva — Source: YouTube

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3 Surendra Yarlagadda and Annapurna Studios are the producers of the movie.
4 Contestations are the negotiations, struggles and compromises for power, access to space, production of meanings of space, everyday living, and so on. Hyderabad’s contestations were cultural, political and economic assertions and claims to the city — between the local and immigrants, the Telangana and Andhra people, and the Hindu, Muslim and other minorities.
Siva is the story of a college student who is new to the city. He witnesses the violence and exploitation of some students by fellow students who are active in college politics. The students who win the elections with the backing of local goons and politician do as they please,— disturb classes, harass women, and bully other students, canteen workers and teachers. In return for this support, these students help the goons in their rioting and other illegal activities. The student President is JD, who has the support of local gangster Bhavani (played by Raghuvasan) in collaboration with the politician Machiraju (played by Kota Srinivas Rao). Siva stands up to the intrusions of these outside rowdy people in student politics and runs for the post of president in the student elections. But when one of his close friends is killed and other friends are hurt in an attack by the local goons, he realises that the system that produces such criminals has to be rooted out, as the law is also in the hands of the politician. He says that ‘if one JD or Bhavani goes, some other comes in their place’. He quits college, leaves his family as they come under jeopardy, and dedicates himself to wiping out the forces producing such people. In the process, his friends become his supporters and they instruct the local shop owners, merchants and union workers of various factories to stop paying ‘mamool’ (an illegal fine or tax) to Bhavani and his associates. Bhavani’s empire starts to crumble apart as Siva hits his main income sources, and takes down important persons in the gang one by one, and eventually MLA Machiraju deserts him. For Siva, the enmity with Bhavani becomes personal when Bhavani kills his niece and the movie ends with Bhavani falling down an elevator shaft to his death.

The Cinematic City of Hyderabad
The name of the place/town/ city was never mentioned throughout the movie. In the movie, it is mentioned that it is a Nizam area. The language used by the locals, the canteen worker, and one of the villains is the Telangana dialect. It is interesting to note that the characters are either from the lower classes, or play villains and speak in the Telangana dialect. The lead, and his group of friends, enjoy the college canteen worker’s quirky narration of Ramayana — the classic Hindu mythological text always recited in ‘pure’ Telugu by the upper caste and the learned — in the local Telangana dialect. When narrated in Telangana dialect, it evokes laughter, in stark contrast to the hushed reverence the traditional telling of the story elicits. This kind of marginalisation of a region and its people in the filmic representation, and stereotyping Telangana speaking people as uncouth, illiterate working class, or criminal caused a rise in discontent among Telanganas.

The recognisable locales and specific places suggest that it is the city of Hyderabad. The chase scene of the hero and his niece on a cycle by the villains in a car is shot on Raj Bhavan road, Erragadda bridge, and in the old city basti (slum) is easily recognized as Hyderabad. Many locales and specific places suggest that it is the city of Hyderabad. The chase scene of the hero and his niece on a cycle by the villains in a car is shot on Raj Bhavan road, Erragadda bridge, and in the old city basti (slum) is easily recognized as Hyderabad. Many

5 The notion of pure Telugu is either classical Telugu or the Telugu spoken by coastal Andhra, now Andhra Pradesh. Most of the literature, art, films and conversation in formal settings use the Telugu spoken by natives of coastal region. There were many instances where erstwhile Telugu film makers opined that Telangana dialect is lesser Telugu (Srinivas 2013).
people recognise the theatre in the movie as the Ganga theatre, and the final scene is shot in the Swapna Lok complex. The college campus scenes are shot in Keyes High School, Secunderabad. The School is famous and sits right beside a bus-station hub. Almost all the city buses connect to Secunderabad, and it is the main node connecting different parts of the city. The railway station is within walking distance of the School. The School is surrounded by Irani cafes, bakeries, movie theatres and other leisure places. The ‘Hotel Hilight’, where Siva and his friends have lunch on a regular basis, is still operating in the Kukatapally area.

Even when the narration tries to generalise the setting and make it appear as though the events can happen in any city or town, the recognisable locations become part of the narration and cannot be separated from it (Nowell-Smith 2001). In support of this argument, Barbara Mennel (2008) in *Cinema and Cities* talks about the city depicted in *In Things to Come* (1936) which looks like London and it is considered as London for her analysis. The setting in *Alpha-Ville* (1961) is Paris in her analysis, but the Paris in that movie displays *no typical signifiers of Paris* (Mennel 2008: 134). She goes on to say that it is seeing a familiar city in unfamiliar ways through a narrative that is projected onto the cityscape. In the movie *Siva* also, the typical signifiers of city, the past of the city, and the people of city are not shown and talked about. The movie and the characters look toward the future. The distortion of the futuristic vision of the young and how it becomes dystopic is delineated in the later sections.

**The Migrant/Stranger in the City**

It is stressed many times in the movie, that the protagonist Siva, played by Nagarjuna, is an outsider. He migrates to the city because his brother was transferred there for his job. It is the migrant who takes the role of a stranger. It is the stranger in the city that defines the city. His separation and slow integration creates interesting perceptions on the city (Clarke 1997, Mazumdar 2007).

![Figure 2. Entry of Siva — Source: YouTube](image)

The relationship of the stranger to the city is highlighted by David Clarke (1997) in his editorial introduction to *Cinematic City*. The stranger, Clarke says, is symbolic of the ordering of the city which is sometimes ‘annihilated’ or ‘displaced’. He cites David Harvey (1980), who calls the stranger’s experience in the city as *the transitory, the fleeting and the contingent* (Clarke 1997: 4). The stranger — Siva — who arrives in the city and is new to the college, is appalled by the apathy of everyone towards the atrocities and disturbances caused by some students and forces outside the college. Siva moves in a detached way, observing the incidents of ‘bad students’ disrupting the classes, harassing women and mistreating the canteen worker.
As Bourdieu says, the city’s modernity is overwhelming, and the sounds, the sights and the sensory simulation of the city desensitise the citizen; George Simmel terms this the blasé attitude (Mazumdar 2007, Mennel 2008) and David Harvey (1980) calls it blasé indifference (see also, Baeten 2002).

As the stranger becomes familiar with the surroundings, he learns to navigate the urban spaces. The stranger is ‘proximate’ yet ‘distant’ (Clarke 1997, Mazumdar 2007, known and unknown, and charming and horrific (Mazumdar 2007: 37). In his prior life, he never experienced the desensitization and violence that is an everyday part of the life of city folks. He retaliates and responds violently by ripping out a cycle chain to beat up the miscreants. This incident becomes an iconic scene. To analyse the journey of Siva in the city which is shaped by random events, I use Ranjani Mazumdar’s tropes to define the stranger and his rage in the city. Those tropes are ‘angry young man’ and the ‘psychotic’ and the how Siva — the stranger and Flaneur — becomes a gangster and turns from an angry young man and almost becomes psychotic.

Uncanny Urban and its Youth
Freud used the term ‘Uncanny,’ or rather unheimlich which translates as ‘unhomely’ (McQuire 2008). The familiar becomes unfamiliar and strange, as the domestic is disrupted. This concept of unheimlich has larger social and cultural implications (Eckhard 2011). In Siva, homes are virtually non-existent. Except for Siva and Asha, none of his friends are ever seen at home, or in home, or even talk about home. The interior scenes of Siva’s home are always uncordial as Siva’s sister-in-law resents him and his brother is helpless in relation to her taunts. Siva’s sister-in-law is harassed when she goes out to buy groceries. She comes and complains to her husband and asks why they could not live in a good locality. Her husband explains that rents are high in good localities and hence, they cannot afford to live there because he has to save for Siva’s education. This increases her resentment towards Siva and she openly scolds him for being a burden. The bad and unsafe versus good and safe neighbourhoods are spatially related to the economic status of residents. The blame for the harassment is not put on the perpetrators but on something as abstract and uncontrollable as space. The visibility and attention to the risk of harassment and sexual violence might be less in elite spaces, but it exists in posh localities as well.6

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http://m.indiatoday.in/story/women-unsafe-in-posh-delhi-online-poll/1/153315.html
m.timesofindia.com/city/mumbai/Mumbais-wild-west-Bandra-Kurla-Virle-Parle-citys-most-unsafe-areas/articleshow/17484597.cms
Although he feels unwanted and a burden at his home, Siva is warmly received and loved by his niece Keerthi with whom he has a strong bond. Asha is seen at home with her brother, only thrice in the entire film. Talking about home, McQuire (2008) says home is not just a physical structure but a place which instils a sense of cultural belonging and existential shelter (McQuire 2008: 7). Home is absent for the young adults in the movie. Literal homes are hostile, non-existent, or in villages. The college, streets and the leisure places are also hostile places, as the danger of violence is always beneath the surface. The cityscape is ‘unhomely’, ‘derelict’, ‘dehumanised’ and uncanny (Christodoulou 2011: 44).

Uncanny and Urban go together in creating and writing cities in both academic and popular literature (Wolfreys 2008, Baeten 2002). Uncanny is seeing from the place of other (McQuire 2008: 9). Uncanny in the urban is characterized by disorientation and spatial estrangement (Eckhard 2011: 13) and embodies one’s desires (Christodoulou 2011). With each act of violence and disruption of order and normative rules in urban space, the uncanny emerges.

The movie starts in a classroom, the lecture ends and the students walk out of the classroom. The audience sees dangerous-looking men outside the college. A student points them out to another student who is talking to his friends. The men drag him, beat him and leave him on the street unconscious while everyone looks on. Siva’s classmates tell him that as long they remain invisible, ignore and ‘unsee’ the harassment happening to them and others in the college, they can be peaceful and happy. And, they would remain happy if it was not for his outbursts. This is the one of the stanzas song they sing:

*Botany paatam undi, matinee aata undi*
*Deniko votu chepparaa*
*History lecture undi, Mystery picture undi*
*Sodara ede bestu ra*
*Botany class antey boru boru*
*History rustu kantey restu melu*
*Paatalu, fightlu unna film chudu*
*Break lu, disco lu chuputaaru*

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7 This translates, ‘There is botany lecture and there is matinee picture / To which one we shall vote / There is history lecture, there is Mystery picture / Brother, tell me which is the best / Botany class is
The youths’ problems are as simple as watching a movie or attending a lecture, passing exams or topping them, and deciding whether to love or not. For the friends of Siva, the first act of violence by a restrained, inward looking, well-mannered and shy Siva — the characteristics of angry young men as defined by Ranjani Mazumdar (2007) — is the first uncanny urban experience on the college campus. The stranger Siva directs his distracted flâneur gaze towards taking control of the urban space like a gangster. The uncanny urban space, and its violence, are hidden under its ordered and rational spaces, which is abruptly uncovered by Siva’s act of violence (Christodoulou 2011: 45). Once-safe streets, the college campus and leisure places become nodes of violence, and the underbelly of the city marked by violence, corruption and criminality is exposed. Meetings take place in dark rooms and in the cheap sleazy bars of the city. The youth come into close contact with them and realise that these urban spaces and their crowds are sites of violence (Mazumdar 2007: 30).

The youth work in the hope of achieving a utopian city. They hope the violence inflicted upon them and the deaths of their close friends are sacrifices made toward achieving ideal urban spaces. This hope can be termed a Utopian Impulse, as conceptualised by Jameson (cited in Mazumdar 2007: 40). The fatal violence inflicted upon Naresh, the death of Mallik and Chinna, each meticulously violent and horrible, slowly turn the uncanny urban space into dystopian space. Jameson says that the utopian impulse fails to abolish death and that it robs the death of its sting. Here we see the undying hope of youth that the sting, and the value attached to the death of their dear ones should not go in vain. And, as Jameson noted, the utopian impulse remains unrealised, while the hope of the youths quickly turns into an urban nightmare (cited in Mazumdar 2007).

City — For the Youth, by the Youth and to the Youth?
In the movie, the young of the city are represented as makers of the city. The movie is marked by the absence of older people. The oldest urban person is around forty. The only elderly

boring / Resting is better than history class / Watch a film with songs and fights / They show discos and break dancing.’
characters in the movie are the grandmother of Siva’s friend who comes from the village to the city to claim the body of her dead grandson. The grandson is the opponent of the politician Machiraju who briefly appears a few times and who also gets killed in the end. The city is no place for older persons, and even if they do live in the city, they are in danger.

The agency of any change rests in young people who are below thirty. Older persons like Asha’s brother — a police officer, and Siva’s brother — a government employee — are shown to be helpless. As discussed earlier, the absence of the family is omnipresent in the movies. None of the young peoples’ parents are present, or even talked about. Siva lives with his older brother and so does Asha. The presence of family and elder family members denotes stability, and the absence of family signifies the unstable, lonely and distressed lives of the young in the city (Harvey 1980). The city is oppressive, and the lack of stability for the city’s inhabitants is characteristic of a dystopian city (McArthur 1997).

In the movie, the city is predominantly a space of the youth. The future of the ‘city in ruins’ rests in students like JD (a ‘bad’ student) and his gang who get involved with the local rowdy group. The brighter future for the city rest with students like Siva (‘good’ student) and his friends. They are sincere in their studies, feel responsible towards the society and their family, but occasionally bunk classes for some fun and movies.

The urban spaces are conducive for the young forming social bonds beyond their families. The stability not found in their families is compensated for by forming strong social bonds outside the family. These urban spaces are at the same time threatening, as violence lurks around almost every street corner. However, spaces such as the college canteen, the hotels, ice-cream parlours and tea stalls become places for establishing long lasting friendships, loyalties through camaraderie, as well as the discussion of politics.

The youth are represented as accepting everyone with no discrimination on the basis of gender, class or religion, which seems like a utopia existing only in fictional narratives. This raises the question whether the ownership of the city resides only in the youthful, while older groups are relegated to the fringes as mere spectators or victims/subjects of the changes that take place. Why is a certain age group privileged over the other? Is this changing relationship of the city and its culture reflected in the movie of that point of time? (Gandy 2006)

**Asha — Modern Woman of the City**

Asha (played by Amala) is introduced to Siva by his friend and described as the ‘most active girl in the college’. She is a college student, a liberal young girl of the city, and for a while this is celebrated. She enjoys the freedom and access to the city equally as her male friends and sometimes speaks in Hindi. She visits ice-cream parlours alone and goes to the evening show at the theatre with male friends. She waits confidently at bus stops and seems comfortable at a gym which is considered as the male domain (where only men are seen working out).

Her upper-middle-class status is reflected in her education, makeup and dress, which allow her access to these typically male-dominated urban spaces. Her nonchalant and irreverent attitudes do not limit her, even if the city ever tries to do so. The city provides anonymity,
endless opportunities and entertainment, as it helps this aspiring and free-spirited woman to explore the city (Phadke et al. 2011).

Her modernity is reflected in the ease by which she dons western wear and also slips into traditional wear with no fuss. The modernity of the city girl and her freedom is clear when she replies to Siva’s concern that people might gossip if they rode a bicycle together, ‘Do you think it is the 1940s or did you come from Srikakulam forests?’ She is friendly with men and women, and she can also go on dates with a boyfriend to a restaurant. This is a deviation in the depiction of women in Telugu movies. Even in the movies that came after Siva, the women meet their lovers in secret, and are scared and guilt ridden. She has a casual relationship with her brother who is modern and liberal just like her. The gender of Asha is never stressed and she is an equal to the men and the representation of Asha in the movie is empowering and positive. This freedom, and access, ends when she is threatened by the villains. In the beginning of Siva’s and Asha’s friendship, Asha tells Siva that she does not want to get married as she hates cooking, household chores and other wifely duties. She gets married to Siva, and under his protection stays at home, restricted to wearing sarees and being the perfect housewife and hostess, while doing the same things she said that she hated about marriage. The freedom to loiter is also not for married woman. If a woman’s safety is threatened, the only solution is marriage and remaining at home.

The City as Site of Conflict: Making of a Dystopian City

The city during the day is shown by washed out colours and excessive sunlight. The heat is oppressive and blinding. The streets are mostly empty, but the crowds gather and watch the spectacle when violence erupts in the urban space. The streets and other public places are sites of conflict. Here the sites of spectacle, like the college campuses, streets, Irani cafes, restaurants and the shopping mall in the final scene, become sites of violence thereby unleashing the uncanny shock of urban (Mazumdar 2007). The violence that they hate and restrain within themselves, in turn, becomes their only means of fighting it. Siva becomes like the anti-protagonists except for being on the moral side.

The college dropouts Siva and his friends acquire a legion of cars, guns and other weapons, and seem to live comfortably. The narrative does not show the source of the money for acquiring the weapons and material comforts. It is tacitly understood that they get their money and resources through the same means as do the villain and goons, but without the use of force and exploitation. They happen to be on the right side of the moral binary and, hence,
the means used for the steady flow of money and resources are forgiven and overlooked. The irony in the statement of Siva, ‘if we kill one JD or Bhavani, another Bhavani and JD will take his place’ is evident when Siva kills Bhavani and might eventually replace him. The protagonist Siva, like Ranjani Mazumdar’s (2007) angry young man, fights for the good of other people and to reduce the frustration of the young with failed promises of development, and visions of a better future.

There are only handful scenes of the city at night, when gruesome murders or violence are committed. The horror is palpable and the tension runs through every frame. During the first night of the city depicted in the cinema, the brutal violence committed on Naresh and the scene of his face being smashed on a boulder shocks the audience. This kind of violence, and the eerie silence intermittent with equally horrific background music, breaks with the conventional film violence shown in earlier movies.

The movie gets even darker as it progresses, and in the second night scene a politician is killed. The days are still hot and sunny, washed out but the night scenes and interior scenes get darker. The cinema uses low-keyed lighting and shadows to convey the narrative’s progression towards darker tones. The night scenes display the darkest side of the city spaces as an urban concrete jungle with ominously dark shadows lurking within the light (Mennel 2008). For example, larger than life shadows of Chinna (friend and associate of Siva) are displayed while he is being chased by goons of Bhavani (anti-protagonist). Their projection onto the high walls of the apartment captures the proximity of violence to the citizens of the city. Only the high concrete walls separate the safe spaces from the violent spaces of the city streets (Krutnik 1997). The city sleeps through the violence when the first act happens in a residential area, and it seems distant from and unaware of the violence unfolding on the streets.
The city is haunted by death (Mazumdar 2007: 151). For Mazundar, death in the city has the ability ‘to do each other the greatest injury, without any one of them being actually wrong (Mazumdar 2007: 26). The villain Bhavani is not seen until an hour into the movie, Bhavani is, like Siva, restrained and marked with brevity. We witness Siva becoming as cruel as Bhavani and the movie ends on ambiguous note on whether Siva becomes Bhavani or not. With each death, Siva gets closer to becoming a gangster and the city becoming a dystopian city.

Hyderabad is wary of immigrants and, although outwardly welcoming, the anxiety of what strangers bring to the city underlies the fear. Many academic writings concern this anxiety (Luther 2006) and some argue that immigrants who do not understand the culture of Hyderabad are responsible for diluting it (Pandey 2015). For example, the communal riots that happened in 1978 and in 1990 (due to the repercussions of the Babri masjid demolition) were blamed on politicians and the unaccommodating immigrants (Vittal 2002, Engineer 1991). The communal riots have become an annual event since the 1990s and communal riots broke out in 2000s, as well as more recent years (Kruizinga 2008). This communal tension is hinted at when Siva’s family is visited by some men donning Tilak (Red powder put on forehead — indicating religious identity) asking for donations to build Lord Ganesh’s temple (alluding to building the
Ram temple at ‘Ayodhya’). The assertions of identity and marking the differences has become aggressive with the increasing entry of migrants from different backgrounds (religious, cultural, linguistic, economic and ethnic), which is an ugly side of the cosmopolitan city. This anxiety and suspicion in the cinema is represented by illiterate and uncouth locals who speak in Telangana. The earlier migrants, and some new ones, are middle class, educated and work in government sectors. This cultural stereotyping and the suspicions fostered the Telangana movement since the Andhra Pradesh state was formed in 1956. The grievances of local Telangana were left unaddressed and fuelled agitations in the 1970s, early 1980s and late 1990s until the formations of a separate Telangana state in 2014.

Sanjay Baru (2007) notes that Hyderabad was undergoing interesting changes around the time the movie Siva was released in the 1980s. In earlier times agricultural profits from the coastal areas were invested in Madras, Vijayawada and Vishakhapatnam in the Andhra region. From the 1980s, it was invested in Hyderabad. Industrialisation was spurred by private investment and facilitated by state subsidies. There were also distressed sales of land in Hyderabad for many decades after the 1956 police action, as rich Muslims emigrated to the Middle East and other foreign countries, and middle class and poor Muslims to other parts of India where the Muslim population is large (Luther 2006). This situation was taken advantage of by land grabbers, rowdies and politician (Engineer 1991). The chief ministers and other major ministers of Andhra Pradesh were from coastal Andhra. As a consequence, the businesses and industries in city were set up by first-generation immigrants and upper castes from the coastal Andhra peasant class (Baru 2007).

In Siva, the noble wish of the immigrant/stranger and his friends who speak the Andhra dialect to cleanse the city of its Telangana-speaking criminals indicates the underlying prejudices and the politics of the times. At the time, the city and the nation were going through a period of rapid industrialisation and were ready to usher in globalisation and its by-product of consumerism. Hyderabad did not industrialise as early as Bombay, Calcutta and Madras, but from 1980s the cityscape changed along with the changing economic, social and political processes (Baru 2007). The final two scenes of the film are important for understanding the global city that Hyderabad has become and its transition towards a dystopian city.

Siva’s bond with his niece and love for her is symbolic of the innocence and hope that still exists in him. This hope is evident in that although he has no qualms about hurting enemies, he will never kill despite his close friends’ death. Siva arranges for his brother to get transferred to another town, distancing him from his family. His house with his wife Asha is always teeming with his ‘followers’ who were once simply his friends. The house keeps receiving people with complaints and grievances, which Siva helps to solve. Asha is always anxious for her and her husband’s safety. The moral lines between Siva and Bhavani, good and bad, moral

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8 The main issue about Ayodhya is that Hindus believe that the site of Babri Mosque is the birthplace of Ram and a temple was destroyed to build a mosque. Some sections of Hindus demand the temple be built on that location. This dispute became a cause for communal rife amongst Hindus and Muslims, and a cause for numerous communal riots. The politicians keep bringing up this issue for political mileage.
and evil, are blurred with death of Siva’s niece Keerthi. If the depictions of deaths in the movie are unconventional in the Telugu narrative pastiche, the murder of a child was almost non-existent before, and unthinkable and devastating in reality as well. When Bhavani loses everyone’s support, he kidnaps Siva’s niece Keerthi. At the same time, an arrest warrant is issued for Bhavani. Upon learning that he has lost everything and will be jailed, he kills Keerthi not with rage, but in a chillingly calm way.

The fuzzy boundaries of the moral divisions between the legal and non-legal and the legitimate and criminal, in the city are attributed to industrialisation by Ranjani Mazumdar and is a reflection on dystopian forms in urban life (Mazumdar 2007: 27). With industrialisation and globalisation, the city has become complex and dangerous, and with the death of a child — dystopian. The image of the city is now marred by violence (Mazumdar 2007: 28) and the complexities are captured in cinema. With the arrest warrant issued for Bhavani, Siva had won; the angry young man had won. But with the murder of his niece, he turns psychotic and his rage is internally directed toward revenge.

The fight between Siva and Bhavani does not use a background musical score. The fight on the top of the Swapna Lok Complex (a shopping complex) uses the diegetic sound of the traffic below. The shopping complex, traffic sounds (honking of cars, revving noise of bikes and cars), surrounded by tall buildings and an under-construction elevator (where Bhavani falls to his death) are some of the main visual markers of the city. These markers are used in the climax fight scene which symbolises that violence and conflict have become part of the city and is inseparable from its imagination and representations (Mazumdar 2007).

Barabara Mennel (2008) talking about deaths in city in the movie Metropolis says that after the fall of a villain from the top, the hero on top is now the head of the metropolis. In Siva,
it is the migrant standing atop of a mall that controls the city now. The violence in a mall and the everyday life proceeding as normal is the ‘Co-existing of Events’ (Narkunas 2001: 156). The malls are signs of urbanism and growing consumerism that is transformed into the site of a final struggle for dominance. As Mennel says, ‘The contemporary urban development of malls is subversively portrayed with iconic horror as a site of danger’ (Mennel 2008: 145).

**Conclusion**

The city has been represented as unliveable and oppressive (Krutnik 1997, McArthur 1997). The chase scene of Siva and his niece on his bicycle on wide roads, then running in the slums, and finally catching the bus to get away from the attackers, traverses the city and represents the claustrophobic spaces where one seems to be trapped (Tolentino 2001). But, at the same time they provide opportunities to escape into safe spaces. Tea stalls, hotels, college canteen, the streets and a shopping complex (in the final scene) become the spaces where the showdown happens and either one of the parties (villain and hero) will establish, maintain or destabilise the existing power relations. There is no privacy in a dystopian city, or in a gangster film. Anthony Vilder says that private experiences become public in the modern metropolis, and the streets are the prime sites of narrative action in gangster films (cited in Mazumdar 2007: 152) The uncanny city reveals the ambiguities and insecurities of city dwellers when the violence, hidden under the order of urban surface, bursts its seams. In the uncanny and dystopian city of *Siva* everyone is a stranger, and is as scared and insecure as everyone else (Tolentino 2001). Women are unsafe as masculinity controls all its spaces. This masculinity finally subdues Asha who reluctantly moves away from masculine spaces into domesticity. The dystopian city offers only violence as a solution to the problems of crime and violence. Since *Siva*, the tropes of dystopian gangster cities have been depicted in many movies such as *Gaayam* (1993, directed by Ram Gopal Varma), *Antham* (1992, directed by Ram Gopal Varma) *Gulabi* (1996, directed by Krishna Vamsi), *Pokiri* (2006, directed by Puri Jaganath) and *Jalsa* (2008, directed by TriVikram Srinivas). It must be noted that many of the Ram Gopal Varma’s movies themselves after *Siva*, and his movement to Bollywood, have been ‘Gangster ‘movies like *Company, Satya*, and *Sarkar* which deal with even more of the complexities of city that can now be explored.
References


BOOK REVIEWS


Untamed Urbanisms is an eclectic book in the issues it addresses, the variety of fields of expertise of the contributors and the geographical locations of the case studies discussed. Still, this is a book about cities and how they work. Despite this multiplicity, the whole is anchored by an inspiring introduction and a well-structured final chapter that somehow knit together the myriad of seemingly disparate chapters bound solely by the general theme of the book. The introduction — Why untamed urbanisms? — provides a relevant review of the bibliography on how to study and comprehend cities and, above all, how they are in constant change through negotiations, involving formal and informal means, in which social actors participate using their own ways of exercising power, even if through ‘arts of resistance’ (Scott 1990), to assert their stances. The connections between the chapters are probably not evident, or even relevant, since the central theme is so broad that there are several ways of addressing various issues in diverse contexts through the lenses of scientists with different backgrounds and approaches. Each city has its own dynamics and none is a monolithic entity. What could be a weakness becomes an achievement and constitutes one of the most interesting aspects of the book making of it a wholesome experience of dialogue between disciplines.

The book is divided in four parts, each with a short introductory presentation. The first section — Trajectories of change in the urban Anthropocene — includes five chapters with the common concern over sustainability and how pressure on cities have consequences in their liveability. Swilling questions the emphasis on infrastructure projects rather than systems (p. 24) and asserts that ‘collectively the smart city agenda does amount to a hegemonic project in the making’ (p. 26). Mukherjee looks at Kolkata (India) highlighting the importance of the urban-rural continuum, looking at the role of the wetlands for ‘the proper functioning of sustainable flows between the city and its periphery’ (p. 46). Hajer analyses the smart city discourses and presents a short history of the evolution of the modern city. He asserts that planning should rely on networks and not a ‘top-down techno-fix but rather a project of projects’ (p. 61), arguing that the governance of the cities needs to include those who live in it, a stance maintained throughout the book. Reusser, Winz and Rybski are concerned with the implications of urban emissions and climate change and explain how GDP influences per capita emissions. Haysom’s chapter concerns food systems and food security and how city institutions should be involved in connecting the local and the global in the management and facilitation of access to food resources.

The ‘polarity between agency and structures’, ‘importing evolutionist assumptions about “adaptation” into the social sciences’ and ‘state-versus-market dualism’ in the city (p. 89) constitute the central issues of the second section — The untamed everyday — dealing with Latin America and Africa. Lampis’ text addresses the role of agency in the access to welfare...
and social protection in Bogotá (Colombia). Agency is also the main theme of Lawanson’s chapter dealing with the predicaments and the strategies in the poor neighbourhoods of Lagos, Nigeria. Dominguez Aguilarr and Pacheco Castro look at social justice and describe the endeavours of young breadwinners of Merida, México, in seeking means of subsistence and welfare provision. Mubaya, Mutopo and Ndebele-Murisa look at the implications of rapid urban growth in Africa through Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) and maintain that the poor are highly vulnerable to climate risks and are excluded from city planning benefits designed for the elites. Harris studies access to public toilets and sanitation in Accra (Ghana) and the corrupt politics surrounding the licensing and regulation of such infrastructures.

The chapters in third section — Disrupting hegemonic planning — address contentious problems of the city in the twenty first century and how ideas to improve the cities’ environment, sustainability and liveability are designed for the elites and are clearly detrimental of the rights to the city of the poor. Rosales discusses the practical and theoretical approaches to urban planning and sustainability in Mexico City. This theme is also central in Woldeamanuel and Palma’s chapter, particularly concerned with city revitalisation and how slum clearances and gentrification exclude low income groups. Obeng Odoom’s chapter concerns Henry George’s stance on common land use with equal rights of access, and questions the varied concepts of sustainability asking whether we should ‘look at cities in nature or nature in cities’ (p. 191). Lawton looks at how international organisations, especially the United Nations and the European Commission, produce global discourses on justice and human rights that would be central for urban governance but do not bring about inclusive cities, instead they represent mechanisms of dominance.

The fourth section — Liberating alternatives — is the more ethnographic part of the book; it presents defiance to the established hegemonic mainstream practices of urban living. These chapters depict some sort of ‘marginality’ or, rather, unconventional ways of being and living in the city. Gendered use of urban space by women in Harare (Zimbabwe) includes four portraits — a homeless girl, an informal trader, a nightclub worker and a sex worker — and an autoethnographic account of the author’s early life in a poor neighbourhood of the city. Age, class and gender are relevant factors in a male dominated context. Through these women’s stories Chisweshe provides insights on why they ‘are not mere victims of urban processes, but rather are creative agents’ (p. 229) that challenge colonial and postcolonial factors of exclusion. Silva reports on Rocinha one of the Brazilian favelas in Rio de Janeiro. He set out to look at ‘freedom’ and in a dentist chair he became aware of the dynamics of employment of the favela dwellers: they are not interested in keeping permanent full time employment. The favela has bandits and workers, those who do not work are likely to be labelled as bandits. Their unconventional, or at least unexpected, strategy reflects the expectations for cheap labour by the employers and the complementarity between the (asfalto) formal and the (favela) informal city. Low expectations of wealth and strong networks in the
neighbourhood allow for alternative ways of life that give them freedom to choose how much to work and whom to work for, enabling them to enjoy their spare time, an option reminiscent of the ‘The original affluent society’ discussed by Sahlins (1972). Sequera and Mateus look at Buenos Aires (Argentina) and the resistance against segregation brought about by the pressure to requalify the city. Puerto Madero, the public-private partnership on the shore of Rio de la Plata, built on public land, bordering an ecological reserve and Rodrigo Bueno slum — a poor area, contrasting with one of the most exclusive neighbourhoods of the city. Similar rearrangements of the urban space include the Isle of Dogs, the Docklands, in East London (Bird 1993) and the Expo98 Park in Lisbon. Betancourt looks at agency through ‘citizen-driven initiatives and practices’ (p. 257) in Cape Town (South Africa) concerning ‘inclusion and integration in public spaces’ (p. 261). Sotiropolou analyses private property as a concept associated to patriarchal capitalism and explores three case studies — a social kitchen, a free exchange bazaar, an artistic project and real estate development plan in a disadvantaged neighbourhood — in which the experience of sharing defies the neoliberal capitalist logics. Edwards discusses food security and sustainable food systems in urban Australia through three case studies — gleaning, growing and gifting — of alternative forms of production, circulation and consumption of edible goods conducive to autonomy in relation to corporate food suppliers and fostering social values and environmental protection.

A final chapter — Untamed urbanism: enacting productive disruptions — by Allen, Lampis and Swilling, wraps up the general concepts and ideas presented in the various chapters of the book and proposes further untamed reflexions on the ‘many urbanisms that produce cities’ (p. 296) and the right to the city for all.

This book consists of papers presented by social scientists in a conference held in Quito, Ecuador, in 2013 under the auspices of the International Social Science Council (p. 15). All chapters include a discussion of the concepts and theoretical frameworks providing extensive bibliographical references. The chapters are clearly written and are suitable for undergraduates, for academics and for anyone interested in urban issues.

References

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Walking has, for some time now, been subject to a growing attention within and across interdisciplinary urban studies. There are a number of interconnected
reasons for this: the sustained presence of walking — albeit sometimes implicit or unrecognised — in a number of seminal texts in the urban literature; the contemporary context of the intersection of the ‘new mobilities paradigm’ and associated mobile methodologies with a number of fields of study (see Buscher et al., 2016); and the ways in which walking captures, embodies and reflects something of the more contemporary reframing of understandings of ‘the city’ and ‘urban life’ found in the work of scholars such as Urry, Amin and Thrift, de Certeau, and Lefebvre. It seems hard to turn a corner without coming across another take on walking and its relation to the urban.\(^1\) That walking might be considered as having been ‘discovered’ as a means to get to know cities is, however, ironic. The appropriation of walking as a professional means of inquiry begs questions of analytic focus and the prioritisation of theoretical analysis over that of the routinely unmarked work of walking in cities. Nonetheless, urban walking lends itself well to the convergence of inter and multidisciplinary concerns with city life as fluid, dynamic, rhythmmed, networked; with walking often framed as both a means of operationalising these concerns and ‘immersing’ the researcher in urban life.

In *Walking in Cities*, the reader is guided through a range (a particular, and perhaps peculiar, one) of urban settings — regularly interesting in their own right — in which walking is mobilised as a means to explore the collection’s core themes. Walking is positioned, primarily, as a practice through which the organisation of city space might be experienced and elucidated. Each section gathers chapters — perhaps a little arbitrarily — that discuss walking in relation to established big questions in sociology and urban studies, whilst also opening up some new insights and lines inquiry. A section on ‘race’ includes discussions of the street-level contours of ethnic and racial relations as manifest and produced in the organisation of urban public spaces; a discussion of the quotidian rhythms of Beamish Street, Sydney, and the organisation of multiculturalism for its walkers (Williamson), a compelling account of pedestrian ethnographic field encounters as an opening of closeness and understanding with both the field site and informants in Chicago’s Chinatown (Lan), and a discussion of the ‘reality’ of the organisation and distribution of barrios and ethnic groups not available to the walker (Casteñeda et al.). The section on Gender includes two interesting chapters on women’s experiences of walking in two distinct contexts; the shopping malls of Tehran, where women go to experience a degree of emancipation (Bagheri), and walking with a critical eye to and in the ‘donut hole’ of Dayton, Ohio (Durr). In sections on Social Class and Politics and Power, chapters include discussions of the everyday production of community in street encounters in Northcote, Melbourne (Hall), the different modalities of walking as a means of analysing the gentrification of Greenpoint, New York (Williams) and critical discussions of walkability in New science more generally; a bold but inaccurate claim.

\(^1\) Williamson (p. 27) notes that little methodological attention has been paid to walking in ethnographic research and social
Orleans (Wiley) and the potentiality of walking as protest and collective activism in chapters by Brown, Watts, and Knudsen et al.

Each chapter in its own right provides a contribution to the urban literature dealing with well-known themes whilst offering new cases and applications of existing theory. The chapters also succeed in asking a series of pressing questions of contemporary public spaces whilst also grounding these questions and the sources of trouble in the quotidian experience of everyday life. At the same time, the collection frustrates. In different ways across each chapter walking itself — the actual bodily, everyday pedestrian business of moving on foot through the city — wanders in and out of analytic focus.

Erving Goffman (1972: 13-14) once complained that interaction in public space was treated as a rhetorical convenience for those discussing cities and public spaces, rather than an object of serious analysis. And in some ways walking suffers the fate in contemporary literatures. This collection is not alone, but too often walking provides a short cut to arrive at a ‘bigger’ point that the authors wish to address, whilst the journey taken to arrive there is often not considered. Indeed, walking often provides a pre-amble in some chapters; beginning with small steps on firm ground before quickly taking leaps in to conceptual or theoretical spaces that — whilst of theoretical worth in their own right — often bear little relation to quotidian pedestrian movements. Walking is also often handled with a methodological vagueness, and asked to carry an analytic weight that it is not clear it can manage. How walking, as opposed to other practices, might enable critical observation or immersion into the relationality of place makes for an important and interesting discussion. One that requires a connection with discussions of perception and mobility that the collection, as a whole, does not quite achieve. And this is not a narrowly methodological point.

The key issue is the loss of the sense in which walking and mobility practices more generally might not only be a way to ‘experience’ urban space but might be constitutive element of the urban (and all its striations) itself. And this is a great shame because a number of chapters offer glimpses of further questions to be asked and paths to follow in relation to the spaces they introduce and analyse (the everyday walking practices and experiences of women outside of the malls of Tehran, and outside of interviews, for example). The organisational details of walking are obscured and the specific settings and experiences described in the chapters are considered through the head, rather than the feet, to paraphrase Ingold (2011: 33), whose work is notably absent at points. We do not learn much of surfaces, of the actual organisation of ‘pace’ (for example) or of the rhythms of the body itself, of practical navigational troubles, and so on. So, as I noted above, walking is treated ironically. Ironic in the sense that it is not a central concern of the collection, but also in the sense that such a ubiquitous practice is taken up to reveal, allude or enable access to things that may or may not be of relevance to urban walkers themselves and the ways in which walking makes urban space. Not to mention the various walkers whose very job it is to walk in cities in ways that produce the ‘urban order’; cops,
cleaners, security guards, repair people of various stripe, and so on.

That *Walking in Cities* makes a contribution to the body of interdisciplinary urban literature concerned with the often unevenly experienced organisation of urban public spaces is not in doubt. The collection demonstrates that urban space *is* often uneven and striated and unjust. Indeed, the strongest insights produced are the auto-ethnographic reports of the author’s direct experiences of, and encounters in public space where differences are revealed (Lan’s and Durr’s, perhaps in particular). There are other, more affirming, moments that capture some of the joys available on city streets and the possibilities of fleeting connections and being together in public space. Of course, the role of walking and bodily presence in public space discussed in the latter chapters resonates with a number of key political moments and movements both at present and across the previous decade. Indeed, in the current socio-political context, the sober reporting of the different ways in which being in public space is experienced is an important contribution, and deserves and needs to find a wide audience. The interdisciplinary nature of this book being a boost to this aim. It will certainly be of value to students on various urban programmes and modules, introducing the idea and demonstrating that the analysis of quotidian street-level experiences *is* a powerful means to shed light on ‘grand scale’ inequalities. The collection also serves as an antidote to the macho overtones of writing about walking in cities. The vulnerability of walking in public spaces, for some people, at some times, in some places is made visible here in sensitive accounts, throwing, at the same time, a light on the privileges associated with never experiencing walking through urban space as discomforting and fraught with risk (consider, for example, how much is bundled up, categorially, in the account ‘white people walk can around here at night now’ as a positive assessment of urban change and gentrification). Walking is not, however, at the centre of the contribution that this book makes. And in many ways, that is ok; there are other things going on here that make an important contribution to research and teaching on contemporary cities. In other ways, however, this matters a great deal in terms of a missed opportunity for a fuller step-by-step, pavement level consideration of the experience and production of public space, from the ground up.

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Cities and urban spheres are not merely places or spaces of living. They inhabit within our visual culture and ways of seeing too. Owing to that notion, Jordan and
Lindner have brought together an edited volume on how urban spaces are interrupted through various visual modes of expressions. Eleven chapters are placed within three larger themes to define interruptions as ‘cooperative rather than subversive’ (p. 6).

The introduction explains interruption in form of changes that are not explosive but ‘quieter pockets’ (p. 3) of resistance. The first part links the urban visual culture to interruptions that emerge from ruins of bygone eras and states’ grand development plans that impact lives of ordinary citizens not for better. Williams follows ‘the cult of decay’ (p. 9) to reset the meaning of interruption and explains how academia needs to ‘redefine… definitions’ (p. 20) because current notions fail to describe the cities. He focuses on food trucks that are nostalgic reminders of the 1960s to show how the culture of interruption is ineffective and unclear in its approach toward the ‘actual state of cities’ (p. 20). Williams insists that food trucks are a nostalgia produced by the flow of capital and are turned into a familiar aesthetic that the new urban economy tolerates because its surface and flow are not challenging, despite that the trucks may appear as interruptions. However, de Kloet is more amiable toward interruptions in the second chapter by focusing on distinct tactics that unsettle the ‘ubiquity of shiny white scale models in China’ (p. 33). He explores cultural expressions such as the artwork of those who indirectly write about the state through urban spaces or documentary-making that simply shows state agenda through urban narratives of development that challenge the rush toward a global future. He stresses that these interruptions disturb ‘the representation of a sanitized history’ (p. 33) by calling for different realities to reflect upon. Lindner takes the notions of ruin and interruption in their full extent by concentrating on a park that is built over an abandoned elevated railway track in New York City. He does not fall away from the first chapter that addresses interruptions through workings of memory such as nostalgia and seeking bygones. Lindner interrupts the park’s green lush appearance via its metaphoric qualities that interrupt the global city. He explains how the elevated space of leisure recalls mobility that is slow and designed around ‘detour and delay’ (p. 49) within the accelerated city. Meanwhile, he does not lose sight of the visual interruption of the park that ‘disrupts familiar, [and] everyday urban experiences’ (p. 49) without stating that these interruptions are merely episodic and ‘superficial, and ultimately reinforcing urban velocity’ (p. 64). Pinder takes a different approach to ruins and concentrates on the campaign against M11 LINKED road in the fifth chapter. He looks at the ambivalence toward memories and is interested to move on to new struggles in order to write about the interruption from the perspective of future.

The second theme, which includes four chapters, focuses on resistance through creative modes of expression such as street arts, digital visualizations and pop-up shops. Jein pursues what he calls ‘the endotic subject’ (p. 96) to find out how street arts interrupt the rehabilitated suburbs of Paris. He suggests the street arts appear as de Certeauian tactics that interrupt the suburbs through their inseparability from public spaces as well as their tactile accessibility. However, he does not find the
street arts interruptive enough because at
their best interrupt the governmental
discursivity and the smoothness of public
architectures. Chapter seven, co-authored
by Rose, Degen and Melhuish, demystifies
the pictures and digital visualizations of
buildings under construction. They find
‘sensorily seductive, atmospheric visions of
urban life’ (p. 107) within advertisements of
high-rises and large scale constructions
which sell a global city filled with affective
glamour. They stress that the urban future
sold within the frames can be interrupted by
exposing the other side of these glamourous
pictures and looking at the digital
visualization as ‘objects crafted by people
labouring to get a job done’ (p. 118).
Verstraete looks at the transportation
networks of Amsterdam’s north-south
metro line along the media campaign which
tried to smoothen this controversial metro
line in people’s perception. He traces the
visual interventions in public spaces that
challenged communications and
representations offered by the metro line’s
media campaign. Ferreri presents a detailed
fascinating chapter on pop-up shops in
London. These shops for her embody ‘a
progressive critique’ (p. 141) that brings
about self-representations and performative
dimensions across inner London. She traces
the imaginative reconstruction of the city
through pop-up shops’ interruptions that are
nothing beyond the ephemeral filler of
urban vacancy.

The last part of the book is formed
around three eloquent chapters that note
photographic frames of urban spaces both
literally and figuratively. Campbell traces
the photographic oeuvre of Morell and
Struth to explain ‘the rediscovery of the
spatio-temporal [via] capacity of the
camera’ and how that capacity is
interruptive. Campbell celebrates these
interruptions as they ‘blossom into
significant life’ (p. 160) while disturbing
the continuous flow of urban visual
horizons. In chapter eleven, Marshall looks
at the parkour movement and building to
explain the ‘interruptive modes of placing
human bodies’ (p. 176) in urban spaces. He
looks at how different frames and
perspectives are configured and achieved
while moving differently and arriving at
different heights. Jordan takes the lens-
based arts as her subjects to end the edited
volume with an eloquent lucid prose that
speak of street photography. She wonders
amongst the frames of Wolf and Streuili to
see interruptions of photographers who
‘fold images from the street back into the
street and display there… looping them
back to their place of origin’ (p. 194).
Jordan reconfirms Campbell who sought
continuity and interruptions to analyse
‘global consciousness’ (p. 195) that are
framed within photographs of urban spaces.

Cities Interrupted interrogates the
other side of interruption that is not pursued
much by social scientists. The authors speak
of discrete conformity that deceives
passers-by with its appearance that only
looks subversive but it remains an empty
shell within the flow of capital and nostalgia
in cities. The book is innovative, however,
its theoretical foundation remains
disputable as the concept of interruption
remains unclear. Neither the editors nor
authors make explicit whether interruptions
are subject-centric or object-oriented; if
they are a matter of design; are they able to
impact the lives of people; are interruptions
inherent to the photographs and their
framing; do interruptions evolve from the act of photographing?

Most chapters speak of the continuity of urban life as a given fact without mentioning how that continuity became tangible for them. Despite my questions, the book is a welcoming step toward seeing cities differently and thinking about urban visual culture from another perspective. Anyone who dwells in urban studies, cultural anthropology and political geography should ponder on this book and follow the curiosities that the authors provoke.

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This book is about Brooklyn, one of the most famous up-and-coming places to visit in the United States. But it is not just one more book on Brooklyn. Jerome Krase and Judith N. DeSena have lived there for decades; they observe sur la longue durée the deep transformation that has taken place, the downturn during the 1960s and the 1970s when New York City suffered a hard economic crisis and the effects of the urban regeneration policies that followed. They are committed long term to several local associations, as activists, as inhabitants and as sociologists engaged in producing ethnography with their students. So Race, Class, and Gentrification in Brooklyn can be read in different ways: as an ethnography of an ideal-typed place for gentrification issues; as the journal of two insider ethnographers; as a methodological manual for young anthropologists that combines visual sociology, qualitative interviews, digital ethnography, close-up and wide-angle views to describe what is going on and to offer a detailed description of the terrain.

The authors do not propose a new dramatic theory on gentrification. They defend a pragmatic position, following some of the post Marxist theoretical models that see cities as places primarily for real estate promoters and economic actors. They also recognize their debt to the Chicago School of Sociology in observing the spatial consequences of social mobility and the role of neighbourhood communities in social activities. They document the complex and asymmetric relationships between gentrified people and the promoters of gentrification and compare the present with the situation thirty years ago. They pay particular attention to the formal and informal organizational strategies that local actors used to resist certain changes and promote others in the composition of their residential communities. According to their long-term ethnography, gentrification dislocates local communities and lessens support for the poor such as public housing. As to residential displacement, they show how rent regulations are failing to protect inhabitants from the effects of gentrification.

Brooklyn was the most populous borough in New York City. Around 2.5 million people live there today; the size of Paris. It was very industrial and still has a very diverse population, most of whom dwell in different neighbourhoods, each with its own identity. The 1950s were the demographic and industrial peak. For many,
the bottoming out began in 1957 when the famous Brooklyn Dodgers left for Los Angeles. In spite of the urban blight inaccurately correlated with the inflow of minorities, especially African-Americans, and despite the ‘planned shrinkage’ practiced in New York, some neighbourhoods succeeded in preserving and protecting themselves. After the 1975 fiscal crisis, and in response to the race riots of 1964 that highlighted the racial injustice and growing civil unrest, mayors like Michael Bloomberg sought to reshape both the physical and the social landscape of NYC. Luxury housing development and loft conversions were accompanied by the introduction of new restaurants and retail establishments that favoured upscale expansion of some local areas. However, Jerome Krase and Judith DeSena remind us that, ‘income inequality separates people by residence, resulting in increased spatial distance between rich and poor’ (p. 90).

They describe two neighbourhoods. One is Greenpoint-Williamsburg, along the East River, facing Manhattan; a neighbourhood whose waterfront had become a ‘desolate post-industrial ghost town’ before being rezoned and where a new community of mostly luxury high-rise developments has risen. The other is Crown Heights/Prospect-Lefferts Gardens, in the middle of Brooklyn, where a predominantly White neighbourhood changed into one that is predominantly Black. In Greenpoint-Williamsburg and Prospect-Lefferts Gardens marginality exists in different ways. In Crown Heights and Prospect-Lefferts Gardens race was the key factor. It will be useful to mention some ethnographic details that give the real input of the book for gentrification understanding.

Greenpoint and Williamsburg are now among the most expensive neighbourhoods in Brooklyn. This is the result of a long and dramatic process. Williamsburg was viewed as a stigmatised place because of its density, public housing and non-White residents, while Greenpoint was perceived to be better. The racial composition changed during the 1960s and 1970s, causing panic among some long-term white residents. Some real estate agents sold to Blacks and Puerto Ricans, thus ‘increasing racial tension and encouraging panic selling’ (p. 29). Several neighbourhoods experienced White people’s flight. Yet, segmentation can also be seen as a tactic to maintain the White communities and resist to the growth of Blacks and Puerto Ricans. Whites used a number of strategies to protect and preserve their ethnic enclaves and the larger neighbourhoods by advertising available apartments and houses by ‘word of mouth’ and ‘sponsorship’ of home seekers. They also defended their neighbourhoods using informal surveillance and civilian observation patrols. In 1980 Whites were 49 percent of the population, and Hispanics were 42 percent. Thirty years later Whites and Hispanics are respectively 61 percent and 27 percent. High-rise luxury towers have been built, high end retail establishments have opened and people can now walk along parts of the improved waterfront.

In contrast to the past, homeowners now sell to the highest bidder. The focus in the local culture has shifted from maintaining a homogenous racial group through strategies of neighbourhood
defence, to welcoming the highest payer regardless of social characteristics. So, parallel cultures coexist. Sometimes mobilization against gentrification succeeds. Resident activists have been successful in having a publicly funded esplanade included in the water front plan. They also negotiated an agreement from the city that 20 to 25 percent of new residential units should be affordable to ordinary New Yorkers.

Crown Heights and Prospect-Lefferts Gardens are among the oldest urbanized place in Brooklyn; especially Lefferts Manor where local elites have lived since the seventeenth century. At the end of the nineteenth century, landlords sold off their large tracts for commercial, industrial and residential development. The residential development began during the first half of the twentieth century and hosted numerous communities such as Irish Catholics and Italians, Loubavitcher Hassidims, upper middle class Blacks, Blacks who live in the nearby low-income housing projects, and Caribbeans. Historically, both Crown Heights/Prospect and Lefferts Gardens experienced ethnic segmentation. This was accomplished by formal and informal strategies to resist the increase in residents of colour. Both neighbourhoods illustrate well the complex relationship that has taken place since the 1990s between gentrification; racial segregation and increase of non-White communities. This process was not homogeneous. As the élite White groups abandoned Crown Heights, the neighbourhood benefited from the influx of secular middle-class and working-class Jews as well as Orthodox Jews. Crown Heights experienced the gradual deterioration of rental housing and the growth in numbers of poor Blacks but also a large population of successful Black homeowners. Then conflict between Blacks and Jews occurred, the violence reflecting the alienation of African and Caribbean Americans who believed that the Hassidims were given preferential treatment.

The Lefferts Manor is a very well documented situation. The community maintained its homogeneous class outlook but gradually accepted non-WASP members. In 1969 people described it as ‘White’. Then it became ‘integrated’ and by the 1990s it became increasingly defined as ‘Black.’ Today, for the inhabitants ‘class matters most’ (more than race). Ironically, ‘a few Black pioneers who moved into the Manor in the 1960s resented the fact that the neighbourhood became predominantly Black’ (p. 44). An explanation for this — unexpected — feeling is that their past experience taught them that Black neighbourhoods suffer declines in the quality of city services, protection from landlord abuses and abusive real estate practices.

Activism has been important in the defence of the neighbourhoods. Goals and outcomes have been diverse and sometimes contradictory, seeking social justice as well as preserving ethnic and class privileges, defending the neighbourhood from real and sometimes imaginary negative forces.

The fight against gentrification is today conducted by community organizations and individual activists. It takes many forms: assistance to the aggrieved; demonstrations, protests and petitions; going to court; campaigns via Twitter, Facebook, conferences and lectures.
Although gentrification may have different causes, it always has visible effects on the urban landscape. For ethnographers, all are signs of the social transformation of the city. During this process, visual signs or markers of gentrification become stronger, retail shops are replaced by higher-end establishments, hardware stores for do-it-yourself and tradesmen disappear. Gentrified and working-class streetscapes can be contrasted as examples of luxury and necessity. These signs are meaningful for the sociologist. Gentrification is a physical displacement as well as a social displacement that involves real human challenges for the working class and the poor. For some groups, gentrification creates not only displacement, but also the dissolution of their ethnic community. In addition, policy makers, developers and newspapers editors tend to support the interests of the affluent.

Social facts are never unequivocal: while activists mobilise against gentrification, many residents welcome the up-scaling for the higher status residents and amenities that it attracts. It should also be said that conflict and competition over rezoning plans can have racial undertones as some associations describe problems of displacement and gentrification in Black-versus-White racial terms. This is not new, as noted by Suleiman Osman in 2011 in his study of gentrification ‘Race and racism have long been powerful factors’ (p. 128) in Brooklyn. Finally, gentrification can be seen as the process by which higher-status residents displace those of lower status, but it cannot be understood without also paying attention to the racial bias highlighted by the authors.

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Over the past few years, the socio-economic impact of heritage sites and their management policies have attracted growing interest among researchers. *Urban Heritage, Development and sustainability. International frameworks, national and local governance* is a collection of essays that tackle the dilemma between the conservation and management of urban heritage and sustainable development that has a positive economic and social impact on the local populations. This book is part of a long history of research about the destruction and conservation of urban heritage. While initially this issue was a national concern, international frameworks have emerged in the second part of the twentieth century that have influenced national and local histories, policies and governance. An example is given by the 2011 UNESCO Recommendations for Historic Urban Landscape (HUL), which enshrine the passage from the conservation of monuments to the management of urban heritage as an environment made of buildings but also people, values, qualities and practices.
The chapters in the first part of this book underline the disjunction between these international frameworks and their national implementation. The authors examine how international frameworks — and the institutions that enact them — tend to ignore local political processes as well as local populations and their way of life. For instance, the implementation of integrated heritage management and conservation projects at the national or local level and their sustainability often relies on political support and funding, which may drastically change after elections. People may resist changes induced by these projects because of their habits or because they lack information about the project. The articulation between imported normative frameworks and local practices, structures and knowledge, is a major concern, as Nardella and Cidre illustrate with reference to Tunis medina. Jessiman tackles the property issue in Canada and shows that the HUL Recommendations are unable to address problems ‘in areas where unresolved land claims and other impact of colonialism are still felt deeply’ (p. 90) in local communities. Buckley, Cooke and Fayad focus on the various actors involved in heritage and urban projects in the Australian city of Ballarat in order to question the relationships between academic theory and municipal practice in the HUL implementation.

The multiplicity of actors involved in the implementation of international frameworks at the local level is also at the core of Jopela’s chapter. Looking at projects of sustainable development in the Island of Mozambique, he argues that a focus on the responsibility of poor inhabitants in the decay of heritage underestimates power relations at national and town levels and the negative consequences of past neoliberal national development policies. Kearrin Sims and Tim are interested in what they call ‘invisible communities’; that is, those who live outside a World Heritage area but whose homes are threatened by (economic) development projects accompanying the development of tourism heritage. They focus on the forced displacement of people in order to extend the city airport of Luang Prabang (Laos). In their conclusion, they invite the developer to take into account people’s well-being in the World Heritage areas but also outside them.

The second part of the book present various notions and mechanisms taken from more or less successful examples of integrated heritage projects mixing conservation and socio-economic development. The chapters focus on the implementation of international frameworks in changing urban environments. Pickard is interested in management strategies and evaluates two integrated plans for heritage management in terms of methodologies, aims, involvement of various partners, implementation and management. In the same vein, Ho Yin and Di Stefano investigate the compromises between inhabitants and developers through a governmental policy of heritage management in Hong Kong that depends on political support but shows the importance of integrating the built heritage with development in fast-changing urban environments. On the other hand, Yanez points out the lack of efficiency of current international charters and recommendations concerning the introduction of new facilities in urban landscapes and presents
corporate social responsibility as a framework to reduce their visual impacts on urban heritages. Labadi explores another visual dimension of heritage sites, namely the images that heritage cities create and broadcast for their promotion. She questions the impact of culture and heritage-led development programmes in two former industrial cities (Liverpool and Lille) that want to change their image of derelict cities into one of attractive and creative cities. However, she points out the lack of inhabitants’ participation, the gentrification of several neighbourhoods and the resulting marginalisation of poorer populations and the fact that major investors attracted by the ‘new creative city’ also bring threats to heritage. She then concludes that the HUL Recommendations are not well fit to cities that are in a dynamic process of re-inventing themselves as places of innovation and creativity. Hill and Tanaka also present Old Havana as a place of innovation and creativity. Although the State controls everything in Cuba, the emergence of heritage tourism and the commodification of heritage have resulted in the creation of a new kind of heritage, ‘entrepreneurial heritage’. Defined as a form of heritage governance, entrepreneurial heritage allows the management of communities, buildings, individuals and their practices by a unique local heritage authority (to whom individuals have to pay taxes and apply for a licence) and the creation of new forms of heritage.

The chapters in the last part describe bottom-up approaches and alternative strategies. They underline the need to preserve and reinforce the social and cultural rights of populations whose heritage is subject to development projects. Logan analyses the various discourses and ideas of what heritage should be in Myanmar. He focuses on the conflicts between the international and national Authorized Heritage Discourse based on monuments, the various communities who ‘bear’ intangible heritage and heritage practices in different cities such as Yangon, where civil society promotes alternative ideas of heritage. He argues that the promotion of alternative heritage is mainly an élite-driven process. Pham Thi Thanh Huong investigates the municipal heritage policy of Hoi An, an important tourist destination in Vietnam, and shows that ‘the living heritage approach in combination with greater community participation contributed to heritage management and conservation’ (p. 276). However, only urban inhabitants participate, giving feedback. Finally, Narayanan proposes the concept of deep ecology as a framework to develop and manage heritage with respect to the local sense of place. She examines villages in Delhi to show the advantages of deep ecology in promoting the values of place and social justice, and in avoiding social exclusion and marginalisation.

Rojas investigates governance issues related to urban heritage by analysing the role of the different actors taking part in projects, the institutions and structures of authority that allocate resources and coordinate activities, and the institutional arrangements for implementing plans. Blake supports the idea that intangible cultural heritage empowers inhabitants and urban communities, particularly in a migration context. Migration and population movements and their impact on urban heritage management are at the core.
of several chapters. The authors argue that migrations, gentrification, spatial segregation between tourists and inhabitants, population displacements to develop the historical centre, result from and have an influence on the sustainable conservation of urban heritage, although the HUL Recommendations do not take them into account. Another criticism of the HUL Recommendations points to its Eurocentric definition and its difficult implementation in developing and post-colonial countries because of their weak democratic institutions or their focus on the economic aspect of development. In this view, the HUL Recommendations can be correctly implemented only in a few Western cities.

The main strength and interest of this book lies in bringing multiplicities together. It presents multiple institutional tools and provides several notions (entrepreneurial heritage, deep ecology, and so on) in order to look at the implementation of these tools in various environments. The book succeeds in bringing together authors from various backgrounds. They are academics as well as practitioners, who approach theoretical and practical questions from case studies in various countries (Tunisia, Canada, Laos, Mozambique, Australia, France, UK, China, Cuba, Myanmar, Vietnam, and India). This interdisciplinary lens may be of interest for a multiplicity of readers, be they heritage specialists, students, urban planners or academics from various fields. Last but not least, the case studies allow exemplifying and questioning broad notions such as (heritage) governance, empowerment, sustainability, heritage community, public participation, urbanisation, cultural rights and post-colonisation, which put the book at the core of current passionate debates about heritage, cities and development.

Offering interesting insights, the book also invites further investigation. As an anthropologist, I would only question the construction of both the investigations collected in the book and the compromise and conflicts that they describe. They give little information on how the authors carried out their research (fieldwork, literature review and analysis) and what was their position in the setting that they describe (researcher, practitioner). Little is said about how actors came to, or could not reach, a compromise, which would be most interesting to local practitioners. The chapters give little insight into how local inhabitants practice heritage and relate to international frameworks or institutional plans and on how international frameworks are actually discussed within national or local institutions. This book remains, however, a must read for anybody interested in the relationship between urban heritage and sustainable development.

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This edited volume emerged from workshops and seminars organized by Mollica on ‘Fundamentalism: Transnationalism and Religious Minorities and Methodological Problems of Anthropological Research in Conflict Zones’ and on ‘Ethical Issues in
Ethnography’, held respectively in 2014 and 2015 at Tbilisi State University, Georgia. The ethnographies give a particularly timely and insightful snapshot into critically altered environments, including areas connecting the Caucasus to the Eastern Mediterranean shores through the Anatolian peninsula to the northern Mesopotamia region.

Mollica discusses two intricate lenses in his introduction, language and contextualization, which aided this reviewer in finding common premises throughout the text. When Mollica introduces language, he refers to it as a ‘victim’, with reference to the Lebanonization of the conflicts in what were once Syria and Iraq. He further discusses how rhetoric (both local and international) can make defining conflict, minorities, majorities, perpetrators and victims difficult. The ‘semantic trap’, as Mollica refers to it, ‘can build upon religiously or politically motivated (forced) migration’ (p. 10). Mollica introduces the complicated lens of contextualization by giving examples relevant to the text. The ethnographies in the text focus on religious minorities with transnational loyalties with a history of living in conflicted regions.

In addition to Mollica’s multifaceted introduction and Giordano’s comprehensive ‘Epilogue: Illusions of universal modernity and delusions of global secularism’, this volume includes eight ethnographies. Hakobyan’s ‘From Aleppo to Yerevan: The war and migration from the window of the bus’ is an ethnography about the Armenians of Aleppo. Identity related to community rapidly changed in Aleppo after Daraa in 2011. When conflict broke out, Syrian Armenians identified themselves as Armenians. There was never a collective decision to migrate to Armenia; rather, a ‘community preservation’ approach emerged (p. 32). Between 2012 and 2015, more than 21,000 Syrian Armenians migrated to Armenia via flights from Aleppo or Beirut or bus rides from Aleppo to Yerevan, followed by transfers via individual cars. The Republic of Armenia allowed Syrian citizens of Armenian origin to obtain Armenian visas and exempted them from entrance fees in order to expedite the process for them. This chapter emphasizes the complex history and culture of the Armenians in Aleppo, their treacherous migration to Aleppo (in 1915 after the Armenian Genocide) as well as out of Syria, and the accelerated way Armenia attempted to aid ethnic Armenians.

In ‘Ezidi struggle for survival: From the last massacre in Sinjar to the new temple in Tbilisi’, Mollica focuses on two communities of Ezidi: a diasporic refugee community coming to Georgia from North Iraq and an already settled community of Ezidi living in Tbilisi. This particularly interesting chapter offers an in-depth treatment of the history, population, background of the religion, language and ethnicity, with relevant stories about migration, within the context of two Ezidi communities coming together to build and open a new temple, Sultan Ezid.

Khutishvili’s chapter, ‘Religious aspects of structuring the ethnocultural identity of the Assyrian community in Georgia’, examines the exploitation of religion in Georgia as a marker of ethnocultural heritage since Georgian independence in 1992. This ethnography details the history of Assyrians in Georgia and identifies markers of Assyrian identity,
such as language and religion. Most Assyrians are either Orthodox or Chaldean Catholic; the everyday language of most Orthodox Assyrians is Georgian and that of most Chaldean Catholics is Russian. Services for Orthodox Assyrians are usually held in Georgian whereas those for Catholics are held in Aramaic.

Khutsishvili’s chapter is an interesting read as it documents how a minority community such as the Assyrians can assimilate into the majority community while retaining their own characteristics and also simultaneously divide from their own community.

‘Molokans in Georgia: A changing culture and the search for new identities’, by Antadze, is an ethnographic study of the changing identity of Molokans, whom Antadze calls ‘Spiritual Christians’ (p. 77), in Georgia and the factors preserving and endangering their unity. Antadze describes the complex historical background, beliefs and organization of this ethno-minority, who migrated from Russia to the Caucasus in the nineteenth century. Molokans are portrayed as hard workers; the Bible plays a central role in their everyday lives and is kept on the kitchen table. Religious and secular authorities are rejected as the Molokans pursue peace as one of their main ideals. They are not allowed to eat pork, drink wine or smoke. Molokans live in small communities, but they are not a homogeneous group. The Molokan ethical beliefs of equality, brotherhood and diligence (p. 82) were united with the secular beliefs of communists, which is hypothesized to have contributed to the decline of Molokans’ religious identity and the rise in identity relating to nationality.

Gujejiani’s contribution, entitled ‘Ways to maintain ethnic identity: Folk festivals of Georgians in the Artivan Province (Republic of Turkey)’, examines Georgian identity in the Republic of Turkey through the lens of two folk festivals, Shuamtoba and Marioba. Millions of Georgians live in the Republic of Turkey; the majority of them are Sunni Muslims, and they have maintained elements of their Georgian culture, including folklore, festivals and rituals (p. 91). The researcher posits that folk festivals are a way for ethnic Georgians to maintain their identity, but describes how the festivals have been transformed over the years as Turkish administrative control has contributed official characteristics to these festivals and ethnic Georgians have migrated from rural areas to cities.

Delibas also writes about an ethnic minority in the Republic of Turkey and their difficulties in maintaining identity in ‘Negotiating and maintaining identity in the urban jungle: Alevi organizations and Alevi identity in Izmir’. Like Gujejiani’s study, Delibas cites migration to urban centres as one of the difficulties of maintaining cultural identity. Whereas Gujejiani focused on maintaining Georgians’ identity in the Republic of Turkey through the custom of festivals, Delibas researches how the Alevi in the Republic of Turkey have begun to build Cem Houses, formal Alevi organizations, in urban areas in an attempt to reconstruct their cultural identities in new urban spaces.

Identity as it relates to class and ethnicity is the focus in Atalay Gunes’s research in ‘Class and ethnicity in gender mainstreaming projects: A case study of women’s NGSs in Mardin, Turkey’. Mardin is a city located in southeast Turkey that borders Syria and is close to the border with
Iraq. The ethnic population is Arab, Kurd, Turk and Assyrian; the majority of the population is Muslim, and the Christian population is rapidly declining. The city’s birth-rate is higher than that in the rest of the country. Due to several factors, including the area’s unstable political context, there has been a stable socioeconomic decline in the area. The city has limited access to healthcare, few women are in the workforce, and there is a large percentage of child brides as well as marriages between family members. Atalay Gunes thoroughly presents how issues relating to intersectionality impact the work of the women’s non-governmental organizations in Mardin and how matters of intersectionality that relate to identity must be considered when applying practice and policy.

The final ethnography, Panchetti’s ‘Controversial conversions and intra-Christian marriages in pluri religious Lebanon’, describes the complicated intricacies of marriage and divorce in Lebanon, a country that officially recognizes 18 different religious sects. Panchetti’s fascinating chapter discusses how religious identity may be negotiated when civil marriages and divorces are not granted, as in the case of Lebanon. In Lebanon, only religious marriages and divorces — or, in the case of the Catholic Church, annulments — are recognized. Orthodox churches, through their bishops, grant ‘ecclesiastical divorces’ and allow members to celebrate second religious marriages whereas Catholic churches grant only limited annulments through ecclesiastical courts. These significant differences in doctrines in churches, combined with the lack of civil marriages and divorces in Lebanon, contribute to controversial Christian conversions in Lebanon.

Religions are a fundamental component of society and of community identities. Identity as it intersects with religion in communities is a theme throughout this text. These ethnographies are highly recommended for historians, educators and anthropologists looking to further their knowledge about minorities, discrimination and transnationalism.

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On Rich Immigrants


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Commonly held conceptions of immigrants, especially in modern times, conjure up those from a particular demographic, often fleeing from a set of insecure circumstances in the hope of finding a safe shelter or an economically improved one. This book invites readers to think of quite another type of immigrant; ‘rich immigrants’, who elect to emigrate and are not necessarily motivated by a plight, economic or otherwise. Rather, as this book so successfully demonstrates, motivations are enormously varied as are strategies and experiences of resettling. As such it represents a group who have always moved, but have been marginalised in the literature on migration which has focussed so
centrally on the experiences of disadvantaged migrants.

The book is organised around the three themes: places, or cities; mobilities, social as well as physical; and paths, in terms of motivations to migrate. These themes follow an introduction by the editors who set up the parameters of gender, ethnicity and class and argue that this work takes a different approach to most works on migration, particularly in that the migration, or migrant’s, experience is not the result of forced movement. As such its subjects are not the usual focus of books on migration: the manual labourer, the underprivileged fleeing migrant.

In the first section themed around ‘places’, the cities of Lisbon, Boston and Paris are the settings for the chapters. In the first, Cristiana Bastos recounts the creativity and (at least partial) success of two migrants, one from Cuba and one from Galicia, Spain, who in 1933 produced a guide to the nightlife of central Lisbon. This account is the centrepiece for a description of migration to the city from many centuries before, as well as after the event. In the next chapter Boston’s Brazilian community, especially its restaurants, is Viviane Kraieski de Assunção’s focus. The distinction between the Brazilian migrants and the US-born citizens who dine at them, as cosmopolitan and traditional respectively, was an unanticipated but effective comparison. Highlighting the high levels of social and economic capital of the Brazilians aligned with the book’s focus on the well-to-do. The last chapter in this set focusses on transnational entrepreneurs and small business owners of ‘ethnic’ businesses in a desirable district of Paris. The authors, Carmen Rial and Mariam Grossi, categorise the immigrants as one of three types: cultural, political and post-colonial migrants, drawing distinctions in terms of motivations. They also highlight the ‘kinship economy’ in operation here, where the family represents social and economic capitals in many of the studied ethnic businesses.

The next themed section, titled Mobilities, begins with Cláudia Voigt Espinola’s description of Muslim Arab migrants in Brazil, recording the information that forty percent of this population are employers who are active in the upper echelons of society. Espinola introduces the concept of spontaneous migration claiming that it applies to different generations, or waves, of migrants (those who arrived in the 1960s, and in the 1990s). Both groups send remittances, and have the means to travel home and do so, giving them the status of transnational migrants. Chapter five by Lirio Gutiérrez Rivera is closely aligned to the previous one with the focus being on Palestinian migrants in Honduras, although the Caribbean Coast-residents in this study are Christian. They are a socially and economically upwardly mobile group who arrived as peddlers but now own shops. Their trade networks are largely based on loose family structures, or ‘clan-ship’ structures, similar to that practiced by the elite in the Palestinian situation. Endogamous marriages which preserve economic capital to the clan are found in both geographical situations. The final chapter in this set is Caroline Zickgraf’s on Belgium’s middle- and upper-class Moroccan transnationals. The authors refer to the migrants and their families as ‘mobile families’, rather than migrants, and note the
classed aspect of the term. They report on the ways in which these families ‘do’ kin work, maintaining their close family bonds in three ways: through technology-mediated communication, by material exchanges and by visits. They tease out the ways in which the wealthier and less wealthy families practice and prioritise the three avenues.

The third set of chapters on ‘paths’, or motivations, begin with Katrin Sontag’s chapter on ‘global start-ups’, small to medium-sized international businesses founded as such by migrant and migrating entrepreneurs. Drawing on a set of interviews with 11 participants Sontag identifies orientation indicators ranging from multiple to transmigratory, to circular, to multilocial. While the ways in which each of these play out is multi-dependent it is clear that this is a significant, although small, group on the ‘rich migrant’ scene. The next chapter, from Karine Dalsin, asks the question, as indicated by the chapter title, ‘Why did you move to Ireland?’ of Dublin-resident Brazilian English Language students. Apart from the response of ‘to learn English’ this chapter highlights the book’s claim that the migrants focussed upon are neither forced to move, nor were they poor. In this case they were economically poorer and less comfortable after moving to Ireland, although fulfilling their multifactorial and varied objectives, such as seeing Europe, escaping situations at home, and/or having an adventure. This work added another category to the set of migrants covered in this book, that of international, or study abroad, students. The next chapter reinforced the variability and significance of typologies or migrant appellations. Giuliana Prato analyses comparatively Britons in the North of France and immigrants in the Albanian city of Tirana — these comprise both foreigners and rural Albanians. As well as commenting on the impact of migrants to the built environment she discusses the ways in which ethnicity significantly affected the way migrants were viewed. Those from Britain were ex-pats regardless of their capitals, urban Albanians on the other hand were immigrants.

In the concluding chapter Ruben Oliven asks, ‘Why do rich people migrate?’ and effectively summarises the contents and main arguments of the book as he addresses this question.

A theme that emerged from the collection, apart from the stated aims, was the variation in terminology used for those who comprise this sector of migrants, including: mobile families, transmigrants, transnationals, cosmopolitans, diaspora, expats, study abroad students, and foreign residents. This naming was highlighted later in the book by both Dalsin and Prato, as was the potential to stigmatise through some appellations, and socially elevate through the use of others.

Many of the chapters looked at unfamiliar streams of movement, with Brazil featuring in a third of the chapters as both sending and destination geographic location. By including migrations in both directions nuance and complexity was added to the migration story/s in this region. An area that I am more familiar with, the subcontinent of India and its neighbours, was noticeably absent, as were accounts from southern areas of the African continent. The work was not touted as being globally representative, but it does leave the reader with the question of whether there
are rich migrants from these densely populated areas too, and indicates room for a second in this series. A topic area not fully delivered on, which was indicated from the title onwards, was a stronger gendered focus on migration experience. Perhaps this valuable dimension could also make it into a second book?

The drawing together of such a well-organised and diverse set of ethnographic accounts offers a refreshing approach to permanent and temporary contemporary migration of a different demographic than is usually presented. The micro-analysis of migrants’ motives, experiences, impacts, at home and adopted home, made this a fascinating read for scholars interested in migration, and for a general readership. It is a welcome addition to the literature that opens up new ways of looking at an area of migration that, while not new, has thus far been overlooked.

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The book, Migration of Rich Immigrants, edited by Alex Vailati and Carmen Rial, is the final result of a panel, with the same title, organized in 2012, during a conference of the IAUES Commission on Urban Anthropology. In continuity with the topics addressed then, the main objective of this volume is to analyse the relation between migration, class, ethnicity and gender through case studies that go from Europe to South America. Within the existing literature, this book is part of a larger theoretical and methodological trend that has been complexifying and deconstructing hegemonic imaginaries about migration and transnationalism. As several authors have extensively shown, within anthropology (although not exclusively) international migration is frequently an option not to the poorest segments of society but on the contrary to those who can afford its costs. In this sense, it is an option to those who have some forms or access to social, economic, educational and/or political capital. This edited volume is a significant contribution to what the editors categorize as ‘rich immigrants’, namely entrepreneurs, adventurers, professionals, highly-skilled professionals, students and expatriates. As emphasized in the introduction: ‘analysis of the migrations of rich people, who usually do not gain media attention, can be at this moment, a powerful tool for rethinking and criticizing imaginaries and policies that are dysfunctional and devastating for both hosts and migrants’ (p. 2). This book, thus, unpacks and deconstructs some dominant images about immigration and reveals its complexities beyond the hegemonic images of ‘poor’ migrants. Furthermore, it allows us to show how migrations are contentious spaces where several processes of distinction are continuously produced. An example explored in some of these chapter is precisely the way categories such as ‘immigrants’ and ‘expatriates’ are mobilized as discourses of class, generational and gender differentiation in several contexts.

These larger arguments are developed throughout the three sections and the nine chapters of the edited volume. Cristiana Bastos (chapter 1) focuses on migration in mid-20th century Lisbon, a Cuban and a Galician, and their essential role in the transformation of the urban landscape through their entrepreneurial practices. In chapter 2, Viviane Kraieski de Assunção
reveals the making of Brazilianness in the context of restaurants owned by Brazilians in Boston and how they became caterers of ‘exotic’ foods in an ethnic market. As de Assunção, argues ‘cultural differences are essential to their insertion in the ethnic economic niche, but in dialogue with the local socio-cultural context’ (p. 41). At the end of this first section, entitled places, Rial and Grossi write about immigrant entrepreneurs in Place D’Italie in Paris. While studying two streets, the authors focus on entrepreneurs of migrant and non-migrant background, revealing the similarities and the differences between them.

In the second section — Mobilities — Claudia Voigt Espinola (chapter 4) focuses on migrants of Palestinian and Lebanese background in Florianópolis revealing the generational, gendered and kinship complexities, while simultaneously analysing the centrality of travel as a key constitutive element in this migration scenario. Chapter 5 by Lirio Rivera ethnographically explores the creation of social spaces between Honduras and Palestine and how her interlocutors became part of the local elite while, simultaneously, forging a transnational habitus (Vertovec 2009). In the last chapter of this second section, Caroline Zickgraf (chapter 6) takes us to Belgium in order to make a different portrait of Moroccan migration in Europe, through the analyses of the complexities of remitting among economically and educationally capitalized migrants.

The third section is entitled Paths and includes Katrin Sontag’s (chapter 7) work on brain drain and highly qualified workers and the way they build their ideas of success in relation to mobility and migration, and also the case of Brazilians in Dublin (chapter 8), written by Karine Dalsin about processes of downward social mobility through migration. The argument is that inherent to such mobility is the preliminary step of the acquisition of language skills and experiences. In chapter 9, Giuliana Prato compares migrations in Tirana and the North of France to show how categorizations are continuously produced. Finally, Ruben Oliven writes a closing comment that points to themes that cross all the case studies and contexts. One of his objectives is to emphasize the need to go beyond push and pull factors, and corresponding theories, to explain decisions to migrate and explore the subjective and experiential.

Within the larger anthropological literature on migrations this book is an important contribution because it highlights the connections between gender, ethnicity, class and transnational issues. Furthermore, by focusing on several urban contexts — Dublin, Lisbon, Paris, Florianópolis, Boston, Liége, among others — it opens numerous windows to explore and theorize processes of urban renewal, rescaling and the role of migrants in larger political and economic processes at the city level. Finally, if gender, ethnicity and transnationalism have been over-theorized topics of research in the past decades, Migration of Rich Immigrants highlights the need to go back to an underexplored topic such as class and socio-economic segmentation while thinking about migration contexts, discourses and imaginaries. At times, however, I was left with the impression that the editors could have further theorized class in connection to geographic mobility. It would have
increased the comparability and interpretative outreach of the whole volume. Having said this, overall, *Migration of Rich Immigrants* is a timely edited volume that raises important theoretical and methodological issues about the contemporary study of migrations and transnationality and is essential reading for scholars, students and policy makers alike.

**Reference**
FILM AND VIDEO REVIEWS


Set in Kinshasha, the capital of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Elephant’s Dream succeeds in many ways to communicate a sensitive portrait of the everyday reality in a conflict-ridden city. Belgian director Kristof Bilsen follows three civil workers and builds the film’s narrative through their stories — accompanied by a quite humane portrait of the city. The film follows Henriette (a post office clerk), Simon (a railway station employee) and ‘the Lieutenant’ (a fireman) through their daily struggles, frustrations, joys and, significantly, idleness.

The director’s choice to follow and narrate the stories of three civil servants, in a city in which public infrastructure and state institutions seem to be lying in ruins, does not aim to present merely yet another tragic portrait of state failure, corruption and destruction. The film does not fall for the narratives of violence and destruction that usually dominate filmic representations of the Congo, and chooses instead to look at the city’s complex lived reality — which might appear chaotic from the outset. The film is not detached from the largely ruined urban infrastructure of Kinshasha; yet, in attempting to document the inhabitants’ lives among those ‘ruins’, it offers a critical and substantial political commentary of the city’s post-colonial present.

The filmmaker has employed a quite longitudinal approach to his filming, as he has been following his characters over a period of three years. In so doing he has managed to document not only change in the characters’ lives (for example, Henriette) but also to capture and appreciate their daily idleness. He often assumes an observational approach in his filming, positioning the protagonists within the pace and the place of their environment. Shots of old letters amongst dust and cobwebs eternally waiting to be picked up, or of old men enjoying the peacefulness at a train station overgrown with long grass, communicate the sense of idleness in the working environments of the three civil servants he follows.

The Elephant’s Dream is cinematically haunting — with beautiful, dreamy and surreal shots; however, they often verge on romanticizing the places and situations they portray. While this in fact might be seen as a weakness of the film, over all it does anything but romanticize the lives of its protagonists and of the city. The filmic approach in fact functions as a counterweight to the vilifying lens of destruction that usually is employed by films on the Congo or Kinshasha. By contrast, the Elephant’s Dream offers a picture of the reality of living and working amongst what to an outsider might seem like simply ruins and chaos, and this is precisely its strength.

This film might be of great interest for scholars of conflict-ridden and post-colonial urban realities, as a carefully crafted study of how life goes on, and what it looks and feels like, in a largely destroyed city, but also as a reminder of the fact that it does go on. Far from exoticising the city, in employing an almost anthropological sensibility to its approach and through its keen interest in the people’s everyday lives, the film may be seen as another small but significant step towards de-colonizing ways
of looking at African cities.

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In the Greek port city of Patras, three adolescents attempt freight-hopping, not the old fashioned way on trains, but by jumping on trucks, hoping to catch a ferry to Italy. They are refugees in Greece, not permitted to remain nor allowed to leave. Unable to pay smugglers, they turn to Patras, a symbol of hope and repetitive failure, and for years have unsuccessfully attempted to leave Greece. The documentary is about the three friends, Reza, Kaka and Hossein, who move between Lesvos, Patras and Athens in an effort to leave Greece; but it is also about much more than that.

Leaving Greece is a metaphor for leaving a constant state of waiting. When the departure will be, if it will ever arrive, is unknown. Many of the shots could be from yesterday, a month ago or a year from now. It does not matter for the three friends who are stuck in a rut. When asked what he does with his friends, Kaka, the punky philosopher of the documentary remarks ‘We don’t experience anything new. So we don’t have anything to talk about’. Greece is for him and his friends a place where time stands still, not allowing for the creation of a past or a glimpse into the future. The dream is to move on, to have a dream.

Condemned to wait — even if on the beautiful beaches of Greece — takes its toll. The torture of waiting, sitting and senselessly waiting some more, nothing but waiting and repetition is terrifying. ‘We’ve wasted so many years already’ says Kaka. Hopeless, he even registers for voluntary deportation, but changes his mind at the last minute. Reza, Kaka and Hossein are suspended lives in a purgatorial state in the theatre of the absurd, senselessly waiting, waiting for something to happen, but not knowing whether anything will ever happen. Europe’s purgatory extends from Lesvos to Patras, testing the patience and courage of these youth, desperately hoping to exit Greece.

Leaving is not easy. It requires courage to leave. Scared, beaten, afraid of police and strangers, they rely upon friends to dissipate their fear. ‘You need guts’ Kaka reminds us, ‘once I’m on the road, I realize how scared I am’. He starts wondering whether ‘maybe the fear is the reason we cannot get out’. Some are able to overcome their fears again and again, and attempt a thousand failures, others remain on the island in hope of gathering the courage for one more attempt. Time only enters the documentary in the love story of Anna and Hossein, and the reunion between Kaka and Hossein.

This film provides a sensitive engagement with unaccompanied youth, by allowing them to speak. It is an indictment of border politics, but it is also a film of hope, strength and friendship. Caught in the world of their elders, Reza, Kaka, Hossein and Anna resist divisive political rhetoric, and rely again and again on trust, friendship and love, whether successful or not, they have not lost hope — yet.

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Le café de la nuit by Vincent Van Gogh (The Night Café, 1888) is one of the best known paintings from the period in which he lived in Arles. In several letters, Van Gogh describes to his brother Theo the emotions he wanted to express with the colors and choice of subject. Through these letters this image gained a three-dimensionality that has stimulated interpretations in other media: texts of art criticism, animated films, music and now a short film.

The film Night Café was directed by Ligia Dabul in 2011 and is part of the work of the Núcleo de Estudos Cidadania, Trabalho e Arte – NECTAR, a study group on citizenship, work and art, at the Fluminense Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFF). Named after Van Gogh’s work, the film is the result of an investigation of using filmic language as a research methodology in sociology and anthropology. The movie is an experience in which the research interests of the director and her students combine to produce a kind of ethnographic event. In this event, Van Gogh’s artistic production is the starting point for understanding the everyday reality of a bar and its patrons in the 21st century.

Instead of merely conducting a simple interpretation of the painting, the subjective intentions of the artist or a representation of a context of production and reception, the film, along with Van Gogh’s painting and texts, becomes a research device. The short film inspires reflections on the classifications that contradict reality and fiction in film, a subject as old as filmic production itself. Although these classifications are used in the academy mainly as a starting point for interpretations that mark disciplinary boundaries, they build social realities.

Using Van Gogh’s letters, as well as an art book with the reproduction of the painting, to elicit reactions from people in the bar, the film challenges disciplinary boundaries and raises interesting methodological issues. The strategies chosen to present this study are consistent with the dissatisfaction that this and other borders pose for an ethnographic film produced by a research group whose main subject of interest is art as social life. Framing, focus, composition and colour, which are important for the composition of the artist’s painting, are some of the elements that are also used to construct the film composition.

The rhythm of the painting comes largely from contrasts between red and green. In the film, the rhythm is produced by a contrast between the painter’s senses of the night and the bar and the ways these senses can be perceived in the reactions and responses of the people in the bar, as well as in details, which are also in red and green, on the walls, floor, desk, chairs and tables. Light and shadow alternate in the construction of a language that refers less to Van Gogh’s nineteenth century than to a twentieth century TV series.

Filming in the bar, near the University, thus becomes a social situation involving different forms of reception of art work — the director’s subject of interest — and a confrontation between subjectivity and otherness that is expressed through the
social uses of space and time. The use of Van Gogh’s writings presents the painter’s intentions about the painting and allow a direct dialogue between different times and spaces, making the people in the bar his informants and interpreters — of the work and of themselves as well.

In 9 minutes and 32 seconds, Night Café also confronts continuities and discontinuities in the meanings attributed to art, morality and aesthetics, which unfold at the bar tables, and in conversations and glances among the clients and between them and viewers, who are also part of this film production context.

The observer’s participation was established in modern art, such as Van Gogh’s, by a vertex outside paintings. In the film it is the people in the bar gazing out of the painting that completes the vertex of the triangle. Observers are both external to and part of the film composition. Included in the depiction, they are essential for the interpretation of and the very existence of the film, transforming the possible classifications of the final product. It is no longer merely an ethnographic film produced by researchers to present the reality experienced by their research subjects. It is a way to present film as a means to transform the everyday lives of the bar goers on any given night. The film thus dialogues, creatively and responsibly, with the sociology of art and culture, but also with filmic production to blur the boundaries that insist on separating producers, observers and research subjects.

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*Bruit qui apporte l’argent* (Noise that Brings Money) profiles a blacksmith and workshop owner in Maroua, Northern Cameroon. He and his workers, who include young apprentices as well as seasoned artisans much older than himself, produce pots, kitchen utensils, wheelbarrows, stoves and other items using ‘recycled’ scrap metal. The film is largely observational, but a partial narrative develops around the most elaborate of the workshop’s products: an ‘improved cook stove’. The improved cook stove uses an electric fan to deliver air to charcoal or wood burners to increase fuel efficiency. We follow the forgeron as he promotes this invention, a process that brings him into contact with various governmental and non-governmental entities.

The observer’s participation was established in modern art, such as Van Gogh’s, by a vertex outside paintings. In the film it is the people in the bar gazing out of the painting that completes the vertex of the triangle. Observers are both external to and part of the film composition. Included in the depiction, they are essential for the interpretation of and the very existence of the film, transforming the possible classifications of the final product. It is no longer merely an ethnographic film produced by researchers to present the reality experienced by their research subjects. It is a way to present film as a means to transform the everyday lives of the bar goers on any given night. The film thus dialogues, creatively and responsibly, with the sociology of art and culture, but also with filmic production to blur the boundaries that insist on separating producers, observers and research subjects.

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putting silent employees (and one customer) in their place, or discoursing on the nature of women (who he says ‘always want money’) in the presence of his wife, who manages a clever repartee. Meanwhile, when visiting an NGO and other offices, the artisan remains largely silent.

Although the film endeavours to give voice to the artisan and place him at the centre, this effort is handicapped by the reliance on French as a medium and the limited exploration of the processes of apprenticeship and innovation. The title, _Bruit qui apporte l’argent_, reflects this twofold shortcoming. First, although it is a phrase the master himself uses, it has an unsophisticated ‘pidgin’ ring to it. How different would the artisan sound expressing himself in Fulfulde? Second, in using the word ‘bruit’ he appears to be referring not to the undifferentiated din that emanates from the workshop, but to the differing pitch and timbre of pieces of metal when struck during the work. The dominance of medium- and wide-angle shots does little to distinguish different gestures, making it difficult to get beneath the noise to the subtleties of different sounds. It would have been interesting to learn more about the terms of apprenticeship and the processes of learning and innovation through which the artisan has forged his authority and success. Was he himself an apprentice? Did he benefit from a technical training programme that was part of a development project? Is he in any way connected by kinship to the blacksmithing profession, a sign of its persistence as a stigmatized professional specialization of certain lineages in northern Cameroon? Late in the film we see an improved cook stove being made, we do not learn where the idea came from or what prototypes or iterations it has gone through.

Thus, although the film focuses almost solely on the artisan’s perspective, the recounting of workshop life is somewhat superficial and the narratives the artisan provides are at times stylized and oversimplified.

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This documentary depicts how musical expression, as a central cultural habitus within social networks, can intersect with the establishment of hegemonies, hierarchies and revolts. This is the case of traditional singers and current revolutionary subjectivities. Even if the distinction between traditions from the past and modern practices seems obvious, the film shows that both can coexist in Senegal today, without contradicting each other. To understand how, we probably need to focus on the process of permanent ‘transformation’, as the subtitle of the film indicates.

The film juxtaposes Awadi, a pan-Africanist rapper and Facoly, an R&B singer, with three different old-style singers. Known as griots, these traditional singers transmit messages to their own society to declare their loyalty to the tribal or ethnic élites to whom they were and are still attached, and thus redefine hierarchies within the broader and highly complex social network. One of the three griots is a
woman, who is committed to singing and transmitting the glory and the morals of the Muslim religion, by expressing her devotion to a local Sufi saint. The three act as porte-parole personae who are in charge of redefining and maintaining the values, morals and principals on which people will base their path-dependent lives. In opposition to the griots the two other singers are self-reflexive about their role and status as singers within this society. The rapper Awadi sings to motivate and urge revolt among his compatriots by promoting a pan-African dream; while R&B singer Facoly shapes a strategy for personal life, free of restrictions and obligations imposed by highly conservative religious interpretations. Her music is targeted mostly at Senegal women in an effort to have them reconsider their obedience to traditional responsibilities and morals.

The juxtaposition of the narratives of these singers seems like a safe multivocal technique to follow given that the visual ethnography project faces a deeply complex environment traversed by multiple hegemonies, which are established as ‘traditions’. These include African empires, the European colonial past, conversion to Islam, submission to unequal Western modernity, the self-realization of the devastating effects of globalization, which has caused intense precariousness in suburban regions and a lack of security for migrants. The film manages to resonate the confusion and complexity under which people in Senegal and the surrounding African countries live. In addition, by portraying the local habitus of musical messages that invest in vocal and embodied expressions through singing and dancing, we sense the presence of joyful lives and happiness even amidst deep poverty. We are pleased to discover that contradictions can coexist without polarizing one category against the other. We see the R&B singer having an open discussion about her life with the female griot, who is defending conservative religious values, without risking a conflict. This exchange can be perceived as an excellent example of good practices of tolerance, within a deeply heterogeneous environment. For all these reasons, the film is a valuable source of ethnographic data, presenting comparisons and reflections about the impact of musical habitus on the management of differences and hierarchies within a deeply heterogeneous African environment.

The film manages to translate the local situation through the use of sound and dance accompanied by the lyrics and the powerful embodied experiences of the protagonists. The juxtaposition of the characters clearly expresses a visually pleasing ethnography project. However, the safeness of the juxtapositions at times becomes a trap that reproduces stereotypical distinctions between past and present, tradition and modernity, men and women. While these may only be triggered in audiences’ perceptions and are not necessarily intended by the ethnographer, she could have gone deeper into the souls of her characters to avoid this problem. Perhaps by showing contradictions within the narratives of the protagonists, the ethnographer and the audience can enjoy the charm of their ambiguity, reflect productively and re-inscribe their own lives. A device that could be helpful may be the use of fragmentary visible or vocal interventions from the filmmaker, and it is a pity we do not notice her in the film at all.
Such self-reflective devices are always useful, to avoid any exoticism. Moreover, to be engaged and exposed alongside our interlocutors and protagonists is not only a professional challenge; it can also provide a fruitful trans-individual experience of mutual empathy and understanding.

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ANNOUNCEMENTS

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

International Urban Symposium (IUS)
Commission on Urban Anthropology
University of the Peloponnese

The Informal and the Formal in Times of Crisis: Ethnographic Insights

Venue & Date: University of the Peloponnese, Corinth, Greece, Fri. 7th – Sun 9th July 2017

Convenors:
Giuliana B. Prato (University of Kent)
Italo Pardo (University of Kent)
Manos Spyridakis (University of the Peloponnese)

This Conference aims at understanding the roles and meanings of informal practices in the context of the current political and economic crisis. Using a notion of informality that encompasses the economic, the social and the political realms, this conference seeks to explore the importance of informal practices in cities and asks the key question Is the informal a panacea in times of crisis?

In today’s global scenario, urban settings are a dominant form of associated life that encapsulate the socio-economic impact of increasingly significant international regulations, and selective management of capital, knowledge and people. Over the last three decades, the crisis, and subsequent discredit, of polarized ideologies which had characterized international politics since the Second World War has apparently determined the supremacy of economics over politics, an acceleration of economic globalization and a progressive erosion of democracy. In many cases, however, politics in the form of authoritarian decision-making and superimposed adverse policies have jeopardized the democratic covenant and the attendant terrains of representation, responsibility and accountability in the exercise of the power to rule. This process has often brought about the loss of important parts of sovereignty, as wealthier nations and powerful supranational interest groups have been seen to bully weaker nations, often also resulting in ever-growing fiscal demands and withdrawal of credit throughout the social scale, which has often been paralleled by national and local governance riding roughshod over the broader society.

At the micro-level, this combination of events has engendered harsh living conditions for many ordinary people. Major casualties have been individuals’ access to basic rights and governments’ responsibility and accountability in the management of power. Mass migration from poorer countries to richer or relatively richer countries, or to countries that are perceived to be richer, has contributed to make this problem worse, often turning traditional cultures of tolerance into toleration and, sometimes, violent rejection of non-autochthonous people.

Anthropologists have addressed in-depth the significance of the informal in people’s managing existence:

- In the economic field they have addressed informal practices that develop beyond official employment and unemployment.
- In the social and political fields they have studied in depth cronyism, clientelism, obscure awards of public contracts and various forms of collusion that turn citizens’ rights into privileges.
- On the other hand, they have addressed informal exchanges of services, help, information, knowledge, and so on, that take place at the grassroots in response to ever-shrinking — sometimes factually inexistent — social welfare systems. Gradations of these grassroots informal activities
draw on access to community resources beyond official allocation.

In the above outlined scenario, informal activities and modes of exchange — economic and non-economic — have often grown and they may have contributed to people’s survival; in other cases, long-established informal economic activities have disappeared alongside informal exchanges, while secure formal employment has become a chimera for many and zero-hour contracts, unpaid ‘internships’ and similar, variously named cons, have multiplied. At the same time, new forms of informality are emerging — particularly but not only in the ‘on-line world’ — that appear to be acquiring the status of resource as they raise new challenges to the bullies and ‘roughshod riders’.

This Conference will bring together high-quality ethnographic studies of these processes with the three-pronged aim of:

1. Clarifying grassroots dynamics;
2. Contributing to a comparative analysis of the present situation;
3. Developing a theoretically viable discussion of potential way-outs.

The Conference welcomes contributions from anthropologists and scholars from other social sciences and the humanities, and encourages participation of research students.

A selection of revised papers that speak to each other will be brought together for publication in a Special Issue of Urbanities. Revised papers not included in this Special Issue will be considered individually for publication in Urbanities.

For further details and updates, see: http://www.internationalurbansymposium.com/events/events-2017/

WORKSHOP

International Urban Symposium

Erosions of Legitimacy and Urban Futures: Ethnographic Research Matters

Venue & Date: Gioiosa Marea, Sicily, Italy, Sun. 10th – Sat. 16th September 2017

Convenors: Italo Pardo and Giuliana B. Prato

This workshop will bring together a select number of high calibre scholars who will be engaged in an intense intellectual exercise aimed at developing robust and productive discussion on this topic. Participants will contribute to an ethnographically-based theorization of ‘legitimacy and urban governance’.

To ensure maximum scholarly interaction and exchange, the meeting is limited to the invited participants.

An edited collection of revised papers will be published in a Special open-access issue of the peer-reviewed journal Urbanities.

For further details and updates, see: http://www.internationalurbansymposium.com/events/events-2017/

IUAES Inter-congress 2017

Mo(u)vement

Venue & Date: Ottawa, Canada, 2-7 May 2017

For details on the Conference theme and programme, see: http://nomadit.co.uk/cascaiuaes2017
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HALF OF HUMANITY LIVES IN TOWNS AND CITIES AND THAT PROPORTION IS EXPECTED TO INCREASE IN THE COMING DECADES AS SOCIETY FAST BECOMES URBAN AND MEGA-URBAN. IN THE AWARENESS OF THE UNIQUE CONTRIBUTION THAT ETHNOGRAPHY OFFERS FOR A BETTER THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL GRASP OF OUR RAPIDLY CHANGING AND INCREASINGLY COMPLEX CITIES, WE HAVE ESTABLISHED PALGRAVE STUDIES IN URBAN ANTHROPOLOGY.

THE EDITORS ENCOURAGE SUBMISSION OF HIGH-QUALITY CONTRIBUTIONS FROM ANTHROPOLOGISTS AND OTHER SOCIAL SCIENTISTS, SUCH AS GEOGRAPHERS, POLITICAL SCIENTISTS, SOCIOLOGISTS AND OTHERS, ENGAGED IN EMPIRICAL RESEARCH IN DIVERSE ETHNOGRAPHIC SETTINGS. PROPOSED TOPICS SHOULD SET THE AGENDA CONCERNING NEW DEBATES AND CHART NEW THEORETICAL DIRECTIONS, ENCOURAGING REFLECTION ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL PARADIGM IN URBAN RESEARCH AND ITS CENTRALITY TO MAINSTREAM ACADEMIC DEBATES AND SOCIETY MORE BROADLY.

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